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Preface
Transformation of the military war ﬁghting capabilities in order to align them to new and
emerging strategic challenges necessitates fundamental changes in military doctrine and op-
erational concepts, military forces organization, and the war ﬁghters’ equipment and training.
The concept of Network Centric Warfare (NCW) originated in the USA. The NCW along
with its NATO counterpart, the NATO Network Enabled Capability (NNEC), are key in-
novational ideas that are seen as supporting the transformation of military operations. The
transformation eﬀort is aimed at increasing combat power by networking sensors, decision
makers and shooters to achieve shared awareness, increased speed of command, higher
tempo of operations, greater lethality, increased survivability, and an acceptable level of
self-synchronization.
This calls for a systematic and comprehensive evaluation of the possibilities and the eﬀec-
tiveness of emerging information and communications technologies and their compliance
with strict requirements, especially related to interoperability, mobility, security, adaptability,
ﬂexibility and integrity.
This issue of the Journal of Telecommunications and Information Technology is entitled
“Military Communications and Information Technologies” and contains 12 carefully selected
papers that reﬂect major trends in information technology development with application to
the military domain. It covers a wide spectrum of questions relevant to NNEC, with a special
focus on command and control (C2) systems, decision support and interoperability solutions,
tactical communications protocols and security issues, wireless sensor networks, software
deﬁned and cognitive radios, as well as mobile and ad hoc networks.
The ﬁrst paper, by N. Bau, M. Gerz and M. Glauer, refers to the basic questions of ensuring
C2 systems interoperability in a coalition environment. It gives an overview of the Multi-
lateral Interoperability Programme (MIP), its aims, and the steps that are taken within the
programme to test compliance with the standards being developed to, ensure interoperability
of disparately developed C2 systems. The authors describe in detail the novel techniques and
tools developed by them to provide an automated environment that can deliver repeatable
testing of standards conformance. The next paper by A. Najgebauer et al. describes an
innovative method of terrorist threat analysis aimed at implementation within decision
support tools in early warning systems. The idea is based on semantic and complex networks
that are used to extract useful information for terrorist threat identiﬁcation and assessment.
The authors also describe the basic features of a prototype implementation of the concept
that they have developed.
Today’s radio communications systems are mainly designed to utilize a single or a very
small number of waveforms. In practice this inﬂexibility often means that warﬁghters are
faced with signiﬁcant interoperability issues when the radios are ﬁelded. The next two papers
cover topics related to software deﬁned radio (SDR), as well as cognitive radio concepts, that
may signiﬁcantly contribute to overcome this drawback and achieve ﬂexibility, architectural
eﬃciency, energy eﬃciency and portability. E. M. Witte et al. describe an extension to the
SDR implementation concept based on a waveform development environment. They present
a method for improving the porting process of a waveform implementation onto a SDR plat-
form by feeding stimulus data from a hardware implementation back to a system simulation,
which allows an eﬃcient error analysis in the simulation environment. A cognitive radio
has ﬁrst to analyze the availability and characteristics of radio signals before making the
decision which transmission type will be the most favorable one to use to set up a new radio
link. Today, OFDM is a widely used modulation format which has found application in many
wireless short range and broadcast radio systems. F. Liedtke and U. Albers analyze a number
of OFDM sample signals recorded from the HF frequency band in order to identify various
discriminating features that can be used for automatic signal classiﬁcation.
The next two papers are focused on wireless sensor network implementation in the mili-
tary environment. The ﬁrst one by M. Winkler et al. is aimed at exploring the military
requirements for wireless sensor networks and identiﬁcation of the research areas which
would improve military usability, mainly related to distributed data processing and routing.
B. Scheers, W. Mees and B. Lauwens present the results of ongoing research eﬀorts on
IEEE 802.15.4-based wireless sensor networks performed at the Belgium Royal Military
Academy. They compare the results of theoretical analysis of eﬀective data capacity to
measurements performed in an experimental environment and discuss the basic diﬀerences.
They summarize the paper with a brief discussion on accuracy and applicability of us-
ing received signal strength indicators (RSSI) as a method for determining the positions of
sensor nodes.
The next papers examine some speciﬁc aspects of the implementation of wireless mobile
networks in a tactical environment and the evaluation of the utility of routing and other
protocols in such an environment. The paper by N. Aschenbruck, E. Gerhards-Padilla and
P. Martini gives an overview of diﬀerent node mobility models that can be applied to perfor-
mance evaluation of network protocols in a simulation environment. These models can be
used for concept development and validation and could help to identify the most promising
concept(s) to be veriﬁed in a ﬁeld trial. The authors summarize their considerations and
make recommendations regarding the implementation of mobility models in some speciﬁc
tactical scenarios. H. Bongartz and T. Bachran present their test results of diﬀerent mobile
ad hoc wireless routing protocols, particularly for transport of multicast data. In addition,
they describe a layer 2 routing protocol and demonstrate through quantitative measurements
some of its advantages. Lastly they compare the measured performance of the routing pro-
tocols in their test-bed with simulation results and make comments regarding the observed
diﬀerences. C. Adjih et al. present extensions to an OLSR protocol that supports QoS and
security provisions in a mobile ad hoc network. They also describe a router concept which
interconnects the wireless network, which uses an OLSR routing protocol, with a wired
network, which uses an OSPF routing protocol. Furthermore, the authors discuss in the
paper architecture, design, and implementation of extensions to the OLSR protocol that take
account of radio channel interferences, high dynamics and low capacity resources and that
have been implemented in a real MANET/OLSR test-bed. A question of providing secure
information exchange within groups of users is discussed in a paper by T. Aurisch et al.
They propose a mechanism for integrating automatic detection of IPsec devices into an eﬃ-
cient key management protocol that provides protection of multicast data traﬃc. The authors
deﬁne a speciﬁc scenario for the assessment of the security mechanisms. They discuss the
results of experiments executed in a test-bed environment and explore the applicability of
the proposed solution in a coalition network.
The next paper by M. Małowidzki and P. Bereziński is focused on implementation of a tech-
nology independent concept of network management that enables automation of the network
planning and network conﬁguration processes. The solution is based on the SNMP protocol;
however, the authors demonstrate that implementation of the NETCONF protocol would yield
a number of beneﬁts, including simpliﬁcation of the planning and conﬁguration processes.
The last paper, by P. Gajewski. J. M. Kelner and C. Ziółkowski, presents a novel method
of determining subscriber location in a military communication network. After a brief de-
scription of how the Doppler eﬀect can be exploited for radio emission location, the authors
describe the basic features of their concepts and deﬁne a new quality measure that enables
improvement of the precision of the location measurements. They also discuss some exper-
imental results they have conducted and specify the areas of applicability of the proposed
method.
The guest editors would like to take this opportunity to express their thanks to the authors
and reviewers for their eﬀorts in the preparation of this issue of the Journal of Telecommuni-
cations and Information Technology. They trust that the readers will ﬁnd the papers dealing
with the most recent research results in the area of military information and communication
systems both useful and interesting.
Markus Antweiler (Institute for Communications, Information Processing
and Ergonomics, Germany)
Marek Amanowicz (Military Communication Institute, Poland)
Peter Lenk (NATO Consultation, Command and Control Agency)
Guest Editors
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to the MIP solution
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Abstract—In the Multilateral Interoperability Programme
(MIP), 25 nations and NATO develop consensus-based, sys-
tem-independent specifications to achieve semantic interoper-
ability among distributed and heterogeneous command and
control information systems (C2ISs). Implementing a dis-
tributed system is a complex and error-prone task. Therefore,
extensive and efficient testing of the national MIP implementa-
tions is critical to ensure interoperability. For MIP baseline 3,
Research Institute for Communication, Information Process-
ing, and Ergonomics (FKIE) develops a test system that checks
the conformance of national C2ISs with regard to the MIP
specifications. It aims at reducing the testing effort and in-
creasing the quality of MIP-compliant C2IS by automating
the testing process. For that purpose, formal and executable
test cases are specified. The test system is used as the MIP
Test Reference System (MTRS) for the official MIP system
level tests. In this paper, we motivate the development of the
MTRS and describe the underlying testing approach. The
client-server architecture and the test language are described
in detail. Finally, the status quo and an outlook on future
enhancements are given.
Keywords— Multilateral Interoperability Programme, confor-
mance testing, MTRS.
1. Introduction
In an age, in which information superiority decides on
the outcome of military missions, the interoperability of
command and control information systems (C2ISs) is of
paramount importance. However, the C2 systems currently
ﬁelded do not speak a common language, yet. Over the
years, each nation has developed and maintained their own
C2 system(s) based on their national doctrine and informa-
tion requirements. This has led to dozens of systems with
diﬀerent, incompatible interfaces.
To support information exchange across national do-
mains in combined and joint operations, 25 nations and
NATO collaborate in the Multilateral Interoperability Pro-
gramme (MIP) [5]. MIP is a voluntary forum that devel-
ops consensus-based, system-independent speciﬁcations. It
aims at achieving “international interoperability of com-
mand and control information systems (C2IS) at all levels
from corps to battalion, or lowest appropriate level, in or-
der to support multinational (including NATO), combined
and joint operations and the advancement of digitization
in the international arena” [4]. MIP deﬁnes a common
interface for distributed, heterogeneous C2ISs and covers
operational, procedural, and technical aspects of C2 infor-
mation exchange [3].
A core feature of the MIP solution is the joint command,
control, and consultation information exchange data model
(JC3IEDM) [6]. The JC3IEDM provides the basis for in-
formation exchange and speciﬁes the semantics of militarily
relevant objects, actions, etc., as well as their relationships
in an unambiguous way. In addition, MIP deﬁnes infor-
mation exchange protocols and procedures. The MIP data
exchange mechanism (DEM) follows the publish-subscribe
paradigm and supports partial replication of operational
data.
The MIP interoperability tests. Implementing the MIP
solution – like any distributed system – is a complex and
error-prone task. In particular, this holds for its integra-
tion into legacy systems, which use proprietary data mod-
els and information exchange mechanisms internally. For
such systems, not only the network protocols have to be im-
plemented properly but also syntactic and semantic trans-
formations must be applied to operational data/information.
At the same time, the national MIP gateways build the back-
bone of the multinational network. A failure, in software
or hardware, may have the most serious consequences!
Therefore, extensive and eﬃcient testing of the national
MIP implementations is critical to ensure interoperability
even in special (error) situations and under heavy load.
In order to improve and evaluate the degree of interop-
erability of national C2ISs, MIP provides standardized test
speciﬁcations with test cases of varying technical detail and
abstraction. For instance, there are high-level test cases for
verifying operating procedures as well as test cases for spe-
ciﬁc technical issues in the protocols of the DEM.
The MIP diﬀers between three types of tests:
• Implementation level tests (ILT) are conducted under
national responsibility.
• System level tests (SLT) demonstrate the timely end-
to-end transfer of operational data between national
C2ISs.
• Operational level tests (OLT) evaluate the MIP solu-
tion, when deployed in the context of an operational
scenario, and validate that the MIP solution meets
the operational objective.
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The MIP system level tests are divided into three subcate-
gories [7]:
• SLT 1 focuses on data transmission and communica-
tion protocols (technical level testing).
• SLT 2 focuses on the correct information exchange
between JC3IEDM databases (data and procedural
level testing).
• SLT 3 validates the information exchanges between
C2ISs (C2IS level testing).
The MIP nations test their implementations in bi- and mul-
tilateral interoperability test sessions. These sessions are
performed via the Internet or during ﬁxed periods in Gred-
ing, Germany. According to [10], the MIP test activities can
be classiﬁed as active interoperability testing, since some
test speciﬁcations require fault injection (in order to test the
error handling of the peer C2IS) or detailed information on
the internal state of the MIP gateway.
Fig. 1. Test conﬁguration for bilateral MIP interoperability tests.
A generic test conﬁguration for bilateral MIP tests is shown
in Fig. 1. With this test conﬁguration, the interoperabil-
ity of two C2ISs A and B is tested. Both systems are
stimulated by inputs and their behavior is compared with
the expected results speciﬁed in the MIP test cases. More-
over, tester A and B are able to disrupt the underlying MIP
LAN in order to test their implementations under adverse
circumstances. During test execution, the test operators
must coordinate with each other oﬀline (e.g., by online
chat) to stimulate their C2ISs in the right order and to de-
termine the ﬁnal test verdict. The test cases are executed
twice with the national systems alternately taking the role of
both C2IS A and B.
Restrictions of the current approach. Unfortunately, this
way of testing has several limitations:
• Since the MIP test cases are described informally
or semi-formally only, they easily become subject to
interpretation. Moreover, they have to be performed
manually. Therefore, the test results often depend on
the judgment of the test operators involved (which
may also be the C2IS implementers).
• Due to the needed coordination with test partners and
the lack of automation, testing has proven to be very
time-consuming.
• Interoperability does not necessarily imply that the
systems conform to the MIP speciﬁcations. If all
interoperating systems are implemented in the same
erroneous way, errors remain undetected. The MIP
community tries to address this problem by testing
their C2ISs against as many other C2ISs as possi-
ble (3 to 5 systems). However, the resources for test
sessions are limited, especially when the MIP com-
munity continues growing.
• Fieldable C2IS are not designed for testing. We can-
not expect C2ISs to have (standardized) test inter-
faces for their internal components, as this would
strongly limit implementation options.
• A C2IS does not provide dedicated support for the
diﬀerent stages of the testing process, i.e., test de-
velopment, test preparation, test execution, and test
evaluation. When testing with another C2IS, a lot of
time is spent on setting up the test conﬁguration (in-
cluding resetting the operational database). Thus, it
is practically impossible to run thorough regression
tests after software changes.
The MIP Test Reference System. In order to support
the correct implementation in national C2ISs, the Research
Institute for Communication, Information Processing, and
Ergonomics (FKIE) develops a dedicated test system, in-
corporating ideas and feedback of the MIP community1.
Its purpose is to check the conformance of a national C2IS
with regard to the MIP speciﬁcations rather than its inter-
operability with other C2ISs. The test system makes use
of formal test cases and thus supports automated execution
and evaluation of test cases. The test system is supposed
to support the full range of MIP system level tests with the
exception of tests for the message exchange mechanism.
Initially, the MIP Test Reference System (MTRS) was
planned as a national project in order to decrease resources
needed for testing several MIP implementations while in-
creasing the test quality at the same time. Nevertheless,
the plans and concepts for a conformance test system have
been presented to the MIP Programme Management Group
and various working parties. Due to the positive feedback,
the test system is used as the MTRS for the oﬃcial MIP
system level tests, which have started in September 2007.
The MTRS is oﬀered free of charge to all systems partic-
ipating in the MIP SLT. Furthermore, we try to make the
MTRS as “transparent” as possible by unveiling its archi-
tecture, the test scripts, and the internal data ﬂow during
test execution.
1The project is funded by the Federal Oﬃce of the Bundeswehr for
Information Management and Information Technology.
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2. Conformance testing
In contrast to interoperability tests, which check whether
two or more systems are able to communicate and exchange
data with each other, conformance tests aim at checking
the functional behavior of a single system under test (SUT)
with regard to a speciﬁcation. In doing so, the SUT is
considered as a black box. The task of a conformance test
system is to control the SUT by sending some input (stim-
uli) and to compare the observed output (responses) with
the expected results.
The MIP conformance testing is challenging for two rea-
sons.
First, the MIP solution requires the implementation of sev-
eral diﬀerent software components. These include the DEM
protocol stack, a replication transaction component that
assembles outgoing and processes incoming operational
data, and, typically, a JC3IEDM-compliant database. Other
software components may validate data against JC3IEDM
business rules and map JC3IEDM data onto APP6a sym-
bols on screen and vice versa. When testing for MIP con-
formance, these software elements cannot be tested in iso-
lation but have to be considered as embedded components
in a complex C2IS. Moreover, no clear line can be drawn
between the C2IS core and the MIP-speciﬁc parts. Thus,
testing MIP compliance does not stop at the gateway/inter-
face of a C2IS but involves many diﬀerent, possibly deeply
hidden, C2IS components.
Second, the only standardized test interface of the C2IS
under test is the MIP interface. Therefore, the control and
observation of the SUT by means of an automatic test tool
is restricted. If the protocol data units (PDUs) sent and re-
ceived via MIP do not allow for the complete execution and
evaluation of a test case, the test operator has to be involved.
For instance, the test system may ask the operator to estab-
lish a contract manually via the user interface of the C2IS.
In terms of the open systems interconnection (OSI) confor-
mance testing methodology and framework (CTMF) [2],
only the remote test method is applicable. A generic test
conﬁguration for MIP conformance testing with a single
MIP tester gateway is shown in Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Conformance testing – remote test method.
Testing of the MIP solution must happen on diﬀerent tech-
nical and logical layers (protocol layers, database layers).
Accordingly, test cases should be speciﬁed on diﬀerent lev-
els of abstraction. In fact, it is unacceptable and virtually
impossible to specify test events on the lowest level, i.e.,
as TCP/UDP service primitives, when testing operational
data. Therefore, parts of a MIP implementation have to be
integrated into the test system itself.
For the MTRS, the MIP-speciﬁc modules have been de-
signed as ﬁne-grained components, each mapping to a par-
ticular aspect of the MIP speciﬁcations. They have been
modeled as closely to the MIP speciﬁcations as possible.
In particular, the names and the structure of the DEM mes-
sage classes in the MTRS implementation match with the
service primitives deﬁned in the MIP DEM speciﬁcation.
Moreover, we developed a lightweight component frame-
work that adopts concepts from popular Java frameworks.
The component framework allows to set up diﬀerent test
conﬁgurations and provides the test operator with informa-
tion on the data ﬂow between the components. The latter
enables eﬃcient error diagnosis and test evaluation. The
concrete test conﬁguration is speciﬁed as part of each for-
mal test case.
“Quis custodiet ipsos custodes”2. The inclusion of MIP
components raises the question whether the test system
itself is implemented correctly3. There are several ap-
proaches to minimize the risk of an incorrect implemen-
tation. For instance, we use FindBugs [9], a static analysis
tool that scans the source code of the MIP components
for anti-patterns. Where possible, the test system compo-
nents are derived directly from the (platform-independent)
MIP speciﬁcations, which are correct by deﬁnition. Model-
driven software development is applied for the MIP infor-
mation resource dictionary that does not only comprise the
meta model of the relational JC3IEDM but also formal rep-
resentations of many JC3IEDM business rules. This way,
database transactions can be handled generically.
Most importantly, a bootstrapping approach can be applied.
The conformance test suite is not only applied to the na-
tional C2ISs but also to the MIP components of the MTRS.
This is achieved in an incremental manner: starting with
a test system that does not include any MIP gateway com-
ponents, the test components of the lowest level (those that
use TCP or UDP at their lower interfaces) are tested. Once
these test components have passed all tests, they can be
used in the test system to test components of the next layer.
In other words: in order to test layer n+1, it only takes MIP
components of layer [1..n] and the executable test script for
layer n + 1.
This iterative process continues, until all test components
have passed the conformance test suite successfully. Note
that since the test cases for layer n + 1 and the MIP com-
ponents of the same layer are developed independently,
the MIP implementation does not automatically pass all
tests. Furthermore, the correctness of a test case can be
2“Who watches the watchmen?” Decimus Junius Juvenalis.
3Of course, the test framework, which is responsible for interpreting and
executing the test cases, may also be erroneous.
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veriﬁed by the MIP community by reviewing the test scripts
and analyzing the data ﬂow of test runs.
3. System architecture
The MTRS is designed as a client-server application. The
high-level architecture of the MTRS is shown in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Test system architecture.
The national test operator interacts with the MIP test sys-
tem via the test client (see also below). In particular, the
national test operator is able to run test cases on the server
and to analyze the way the data is processed in the test
server.
Conceptionally, the test server consists of a test manager
that is responsible for test execution and evaluation. The
test framework supports concurrent execution of test cases
for diﬀerent C2ISs. The MTRS test suite, the test results of
each individual C2IS, and the user data are made persistent
in the server database.
Depending on the test conﬁguration required by a given
test case, the test manager sets up, controls, observes, and
synchronizes speciﬁc test components. In Fig. 3, two MIP
gateway instances are set up. This is useful for, e.g., testing
the data forwarding capabilities of a C2IS, where the test
manager sends operational data via MIP gateway instance 1
and checks for the reception of the same data at MIP gate-
way instance 2. Exchange between the test server and the
national C2IS takes place via TCP/IP and UDP/IP.
As mentioned above, the MIP interface is the only stan-
dardized interface provided by all national C2ISs. There-
fore, at certain points, the test server sends action requests
to the test client, which asks the test operator to perform
some action or to provide feedback on what information is
displayed at the C2IS’s user interface.
Using a common test server shared by multiple nations has
some advantages and disadvantages.
On the one hand, the integrity of test cases and test results
is ensured by a central repository – the test operators are
not able to change them (neither accidentally nor intention-
ally). Since all test results are available, cross-national test
reports can be produced for the MIP test controllers at run
time. For that purpose, we have implemented a PDF export
functionality.
Moreover, the upgrade procedure for the test system and for
test cases is simpliﬁed, as no distribution among the nations
is needed. As described below, test scripts can be updated
on the ﬂy without having to restart the server. Similarly,
the test suite shown in the test client can be synchronized
with the server database during a user session.
Finally, server conﬁguration and database backups are at
the responsibility of a single organization, freeing the C2IS
developers and test operators from administration.
On the other hand, a server-based test system is a single
point of failure such that reliability and availability become
crucial quality factors. In particular, we must ensure that:
– parallel test runs do not interfere;
– faulty test components do not tear down the complete
server;
– no “zombie” threads remain if the test operator/client
disconnects from the server without previously stop-
ping a test run.
These issues have been addressed by encapsulating error-
prone server components in a sandbox. All exceptions
thrown within the sandbox are caught. Moreover, watch-
dog timers trigger the termination of long-running test cases
and of user sessions for which no activity was noticed for
a long period.
When running tests over the Internet, test operators must
assure that their C2ISs are able to access the server. Typ-
ically, the companies and organizations involved in MIP
have very strict ﬁrewall policies. Therefore, the MTRS was
designed in a way that it uses a minimal number of ﬁxed
ports. For the MTRS client-server communication, access
must be granted to only two server ports (1098/1099). For
communication of the national C2IS with the MTRS server,
the same TCP gateway ports are re-used for each test run.
Of course, all test data transmitted over the Internet must
be unclassiﬁed. Since all test scripts – which describe the
test data to be exchanged – are publicly available anyway,
we do not consider this as a major problem.
Test client user interface. The MTRS client is a Java ap-
plication. It can be run on any system, on which Java
Runtime Environment 5 or higher is installed. Figure 4
shows a screenshot of the MTRS client.
The graphical user interface is split into three main areas.
On the left, the test suite with its test groups, test cases,
and corresponding test runs is represented as a tree.
On the top right, meta information is provided for the cur-
rently selected tree node. For instance, test cases are char-
acterized by their name, version, and purpose, a reference
to the relevant MIP documentation, a selection criteria, gen-
eral comments, and keywords. The latter can be used for
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Fig. 4. The MTRS client.
ﬁltering test cases in the test client. Moreover, the operator
may add some C2IS-speciﬁc comments to a test case. For
a test run, the MTRS keeps track of the status (running,
terminated, aborted, etc.), test verdict, start date and time,
and the duration, as well as the test operator and the ver-
sions of the SUT, MTRS, and test case at the time when the
test was executed. In alignment with the OSI CTMF, the
MTRS supports three possible test verdicts: pass, fail, and
inconclusive. Test verdict inconclusive is assigned if the
C2IS does not meet the test objective but behaves correctly
according to the MIP speciﬁcations. Other causes for the
verdict inconclusive include ﬁrewall and network problems.
Finally, on the bottom right, the internal data ﬂow between
the MTRS MIP gateway components and various status
messages are shown. Besides displaying the log informa-
tion in a tabular view, the MTRS is able to create sequence
diagrams. The data ﬂow shown in Fig. 4 corresponds to
a successful execution of the test case given in Fig. 5.
4. Test speciﬁcation
In order to run test cases in an automated way, they have
to be written in a formal test language. Among others,
such a language must fulﬁll a couple of test-speciﬁc re-
quirements.
First, the test language has to allow for the deﬁnition of
dynamic test conﬁgurations. It must be possible to set
up and link individual test components on a per test case
basis. The conﬁguration concepts of the language must
match with the component model used for the MIP imple-
mentation. As mentioned above, the MTRS is written in
Java. It employs a lightweight component model based on
asynchronous message exchange and uses the Java interface
concept and the dependency injection pattern.
Second, the test language must provide control structures
for handling non-deterministic, partially ordered, and unex-
pected test events. Whenever the test system expects some
response from the SUT, it must be able to cope with vari-
ous possible inputs, including valid, inopportune, and erro-
neous responses. Moreover, the order of (valid) responses
may not be ﬁxed. For instance, if a C2IS is expected to
send three database records, the order of the records may be
irrelevant. In other cases, alternative messages may be re-
ceived (e.g., a connection conﬁrmation or a disconnection).
For clarity, the main body of a test case should describe the
expected behavior. Nevertheless, the test system must be
able to catch erroneous and inopportune behavior as well.
For that purpose, some kind of exception handling should
be available.
Third, the test language must support time and timers. Oc-
casionally, response times of an SUT have to be constrained
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to check functional requirements and to make sure that,
eventually, the test case terminates. For instance, timers are
needed in scenarios, in which the MTRS checks whether
a response does not occur within a given period. More-
over, it may be desirable to measure the time it takes for
a C2IS to forward data from one system to another and to
check whether this duration falls within a certain range of
tolerance.
Finally, it must be possible to specify test verdicts based
on the test events.
Ideally, the test language should be standardized. Rather
than reinventing the wheel, the test language should adhere
to some de facto or de jure standard. For the MIP test sys-
tem, two test languages/frameworks have been investigated
with regard to the requirements above: JUnit/Java and the
testing and test control notation (TTCN-3).
JUnit is an open source framework for writing and running
repeatable tests4. It provides assertions for testing expected
results, test ﬁxtures for sharing common test data, and test
runners for running tests. JUnit test cases are actually Java
classes that follow certain naming conventions or have spe-
cial annotations.
Our assessment has shown that the control structures pro-
vided by JUnit/Java are not suﬃcient to cope with alterna-
tive system behavior in an elegant way. In addition, proper
timer handling leads to convoluted code. This is not sur-
prising, as JUnit was designed for unit testing rather than
for testing distributed systems.
The TTCN-3 is widely used in the telecommunication and
automotive area and has been standardized by the European
Telecommunications Standards Institute (ETSI). In contrast
to JUnit, it has very sophisticated testing features for dis-
tributed systems. However, we concluded that the “seman-
tic gap” between TTCN-3 and Java, and the eﬀort to inte-
grate a TTCN-3 interpreter into the MTRS outweighs the
beneﬁts of using this standardized language. For instance,
TTCN-3 provides its own data model, which does not sup-
port object-orientation. A lot of development would have
been necessary for the mapping of Java classes and methods
onto suitable TTCN-3 constructs and vice versa.
4.1. The MTRS test language
For the MTRS, we have deﬁned a test language that is
mainly based on Java but borrows some concepts from
JUnit and TTCN-3 (Java with “syntactic sugar”). A sample
MTRS test case is shown in Fig. 5.
In order to facilitate the instantiation of a component, the
new operator of Java was complemented by a create oper-
ator. It does not only instantiate the respective component,
but also creates proxy objects that automatically intercept
all method calls of that component. Furthermore, the life
cycle of a component that was instantiated using the cre-
ate operator is tightly coupled with the execution of the test
case. Thus, when the test case ﬁnishes, the component is
stopped and disposed.
4See http://www.junit.org
Components can be linked via dependency injection.
Whenever two components are linked, a proxy object is
used to intercept the communication between them. For
each intercepted invocation, the method’s signature, the pa-
rameters provided, and information on the caller of that
method are added to the respective test case’s event queue.
To stimulate a component, the [!] operator was added. Its
syntax is:
[!] <method call> to <component>;
While the [!] operator only introduces a minor improve-
ment concerning the ability to write and comprehend a test
case, the addition of the operator [?] signiﬁcantly simpli-
ﬁes test case speciﬁcation in comparison to plain Java. The
[?] operator checks for whether a speciﬁc method is called
within a given time. The syntax of the [?] operator is:
[?] [ <called component>. ] <method signature>
[ from <calling component> ]
[ in <duration> ] <block>
It is used to express the expectation that a method with the
provided signature is invoked. Each [?] operator within
a test case is translated into Java code, which checks the
event queue of the respective test case for communication
between the called and calling component. If a proxy ob-
ject has logged communication between the components,
the test runner checks whether the logged method signature
matches the one of the [?] operator. If it does, all parame-
ters are assigned to variables and the preceding code block
is executed; otherwise, an exception is thrown. If com-
munication between the two components has not yet taken
place, the test execution waits until this event is intercepted
or a timeout occurs.
Additionally, the alt and interleave statements can be used
to group several [?] operators. The alt block is left, if one
of the [?] operators was triggered, whereas the interleave
operator waits until all [?] operators were processed. This
allows for waiting for multiple events that may occur in an
arbitrary order.
Within the code block of the [?] operator, the new re-
peat statement can be used to leave the current block and
to continue execution at the outer alt or interleave state-
ment, thus eﬀectively ignoring the event that has occurred.
A single [?] operator without a surrounding alt or inter-
leave is treated as being the only [?] operation inside an
alt statement.
Finally, a test .. handle statement was modeled similarly
to Java’s try .. catch. The handle part lists an arbitrary
number of [?] operators that are implicitly added to all
alt statements within the test body. test .. handle allows
to specify the reaction to unexpected or exceptional events
separately from the expected test events.
The sample test case shown in Fig. 5 makes use of some
of the new operators. It tests whether the SUT is able
to receive and process a DEM connection information
sent by the test system, and is able to send its own con-
nection information back to the test system. Afterwards,
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1 testgroup MIP.SLT_1.MSLT.Initialisation {
2
3 /∗∗
4 ∗ @Id 170
5 ∗ @Version 1.3
6 ∗ @Purpose Verify the establishment of a TMAN connection as a result of UDP based DEM connection information.
7 ∗ The test shall pass with a TMAN connection between the two DEMs to prove the connection information
8 ∗ was handled correctly.
9 ∗ @SelectionCriteria Low
10 ∗ @Keywords TMan DCI
11 ∗/
12 testcase MSLT1DEM_104 {
13 request("Please start your C2IS and expect to receive a DEM Connection Information via UDP.");
14
15 // set up test configuration:
16 Component udpMan = create UDPMan(getSut().getIpAddress(), getSut().getUdpPort());
17 Component connection = create FilteringConnection(getSut().getNodeId());
18 Component tcpMan = create TCPMan(getSut().getTcpPortGateway1());
19 Component tMan = create TMan();
20
21 link(udpMan, connection, "ConnectionInfoXML");
22 link(connection, udpMan, "ConnectionInfoXML");
23 link(connection, tMan, "TOpenIndAcceptDeny");
24 link(tMan, connection, "TOpenInd");
25 link(tcpMan, tMan, "PMessageInd");
26 link(tMan, tcpMan, "PMessageReq");
27
28 cm.start();
29
30 OwnConnectionInfo ownDCI = getOwnConnectionInformation("449000001", "BLK3 SLT1 REP ORG A",
31 getSut().getTcpPortGateway1());
32 ownDCI.setScope(Scope.ANNOUNCE);
33 ownDCI.setReceiverIp(getSut().getIpAddress());
34 [!] send(ownDCI) to connection;
35
36 // now we want to receive a reply:
37 [?] receive(ConnectionInfoAcceptDeny ind) from connection {
38 ConnectionInfo info = ind.getConnectionInfo();
39 assertEquals("nodeId", getSut().getNodeId(), info.getNodeId());
40 assertEquals("ipAddress", getSut().getIpAddress(), info.getIpAddress());
41 assertEquals("tcpPort", getSut().getTcpPort(), info.getTcpPort());
42 assertEquals("scope", Scope.REPLY, info.getScope());
43 }
44
45 request("The MTRS successfully received your DEM Connection Information. It will open a TMan connection now.");
46
47 TOpenReq openRequest = new TOpenReq(this, RoleDescriptor.RECEIVER, getSut().getNodeId(),
48 ownDCI.getNodeId(), getSut().getIpAddress(), getSut().getTcpPort());
49 [!] send(openRequest) to tMan;
50
51 [?] receive(TOpenInd ind) from tMan;
52
53 // check that the connection is open for at least 5 sec
54 Timer timer = create Timer(5000);
55 alt {
56 [?] tMan.receive(PCloseInd ind) from tcpMan {
57 return Verdict.Fail;
58 }
59 [?] tMan.receive(PDataInd ind) from tcpMan {
60 repeat;
61 }
62 [?] receive(Timeout t) from timer;
63 }
64
65 return Verdict.Pass;
66 }
67 }
Fig. 5. The MTRS test script.
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the MTRS opens a connection to the C2IS in order to
check whether the C2IS accepts connections from the node
ID and TCP port provided in the DEM connection in-
formation.
4.2. Test script processing
Test scripts can be updated on the MTRS server at run
time without having to shut down and restart the server.
For that purpose, the server administrator connects to the
MTRS server via a special administration tool and uploads
the scripts. On the server, the test scripts are parsed for
syntactical correctness. Then, the test suite, test group,
and test case meta information (given in JavaDoc for-
mat) is extracted and stored in the server database. Next,
the test scripts are transformed into pure Java classes by
rewriting all test language-speciﬁc extensions and short-
cuts. Finally, the Java compiler produces the correspond-
ing Java byte code. By exploiting the class loader fea-
tures of Java, it is possible to reload a Java class deﬁ-
nition at run time or even to keep diﬀerent implementa-
tions of the same class. Thus, whenever a new test run is
started, the latest byte code based on the latest test script is
loaded into the Java virtual machine without aﬀecting other
test runs.
5. Summary and outlook
The MIP Test Reference System introduces new ways to
test the conformance of national MIP implementations to
the MIP baseline 3 speciﬁcations. The MTRS aims at
improving the quality of national MIP implementations
(in terms of reliability, availability, and robustness), while
reducing the overall testing eﬀort (in terms of cost and
time). The MTRS performs functional black box tests,
i.e., it sends some stimuli to the C2IS under test and com-
pares its responses with the expected results. In doing
so, it does not rely on any speciﬁc C2IS interfaces other
than those required by the MIP speciﬁcations.
The test system allows for the execution of tests on diﬀerent
layers and with varying test conﬁgurations. The architec-
ture of the test server permits its simultaneous use by mul-
tiple nations without interference. Each nation performs its
tests against one or two MIP gateways, exclusively set up
at run time for a single test case or a group of consecutive
test cases. Detailed protocol logs allow for simpliﬁed test
evaluation. In particular, error diagnosis is supported by
unveiling the information ﬂow inside the test server gate-
way(s). Moreover, the MTRS provides powerful export
features to generate MIP test reports for national use and
for the MIP test controllers.
The MIP system level tests have started in September 2007.
As stated in the MIP test and evaluation master plan
(MTEMP) [7], “each system will test with the MTRS be-
fore testing with another system”. Many new SLT test cases
have been standardized within MIP that can only be run
with the help of a test system, as they cover scenarios not
reproducible by a regular C2IS.
All oﬃcial MIP SLT 1 test cases have been formalized,
resulting in more than 100 MTRS test scripts. In addition,
the MTRS oﬀers a special test case that starts a MIP gate-
way with some default behavior. It can be used to perform
interoperability tests over a longer period without focusing
on one particular test objective. By the end of Decem-
ber 2007, more than 9,000 SLT 1 tests have been executed
with the MTRS. For SLT 2, the MIP community has de-
ﬁned more than 150 test cases. Corresponding MTRS test
scripts will be available in January 2008.
The early adoption of the MIP solution made it possible to
gain experience with the draft standards while the speciﬁca-
tions were written. Various corrections and improvements
found their way back into the speciﬁcations. Among others,
faulty entries were ﬁxed in the MIRD and the DEM PDU
grammar was simpliﬁed. The state transition tables for the
DataMan protocol have been redesigned in order to enhance
error handling and reporting and to formalize those aspects
that were only described in textual form before. The price
to pay was that signiﬁcant parts of the MTRS MIP gateway
implementation had to be rewritten during the speciﬁcation
process.
In addition to the MTRS server, the FKIE hosts a sep-
arate web server with a project management envi-
ronment based on Trac [1] and Subversion [8]. At
https://trac.	ie.fgan.de/MTRS, MIP nations can download
the MTRS client as well as a stand-alone DEM protocol an-
alyzer tool. All test-related MIP documents as well as the
MTRS test scripts are put under version control in a Subver-
sion repository. The Wiki documentation includes several
animated tutorials for the MTRS client based on Adobe
Flash technology. Furthermore, a built-in ticketing system
can be used to report defects, ask questions, etc.
Our current work opens the door for many future enhance-
ments. First, MIP tests are still speciﬁed in an ad hoc
manner. Since large parts of the MIP speciﬁcations are
given in a formal representation, it is possible to apply au-
tomatic test generation algorithms. For SLT 2, some of the
JC3IEDM test data have already been generated automati-
cally based on the MIP information resource dictionary.
Where such algorithms cannot be applied (due to time con-
straints or technical complexity), it is beneﬁcial to get at
least some information on the coverage of the existing tests.
For instance, it would be interesting to know which parts
of the JC3IEDM are actually covered during the ﬁnal MIP
operational level test (MOLT).
Another interesting testing aspect is the validation of the
data exchange between two C2IS during the MOLT by net-
work sniﬃng (passive testing).
Finally, our ﬁndings and tools can be generalized beyond
the scope of MIP, such that they become applicable to
other interoperability programs and to other Java compo-
nent frameworks in general. In particular, the test language
extensions may be useful for a larger software development
community.
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Paper The prediction of terrorist threat
on the basis of semantic association
acquisition and complex network evolution
Andrzej Najgebauer, Ryszard Antkiewicz, Mariusz Chmielewski, and Rafał Kasprzyk
Abstract— In this paper, which is the continuation of an
MCC 2006 Conf. publication by the same group of authors,
we propose a concept of early detection of terrorist action
preparation activities. Our ideas rely on semantic and com-
plex networks to extract useful information for terrorist threat
indication. Presented methods will be used as a core frame-
work for Early Warning System.
Keywords— Early Warning System, semantic network, ontology,
complex network.
1. Introduction
Detecting terrorist threats requires a large spectrum of
data which in many cases are collected from various
sources. The process of unification, fusion and interpre-
tation of the collected data is crucial due to data redun-
dancy and specially to enable accurate predictions. For
knowledge representation we propose a semantic network
based on an ontology data model. Using semantic graph as
a storage for facts and events we have been able to develop
a method for indirect association acquisition which allows
us to pinpoint new relationships in our knowledge base to
indicate possible threats. The algorithms are designed as
two separate groups which are aimed at rule/ontology based
inference and graph structure analysis. Both groups provide
different approaches, which allow more accurate possible
threat extraction. Implementation of the concept is based
on the known standard for semantic data representation web
ontology language (OWL) and resource description frame-
work (RDF), while for inference engines we used the Java
based frameworks JENA and JADE.
In this paper we will introduce the design goals of ontology
used in our work, methods of filtering unreliable data and
most of all the concept of dynamic graph analysis using an
agent based environment. Considering the large scale of the
data set and the complexity structure analysis algorithms,
we were forced to provide additional modifications which
in essence are filtering ontologies. Using this method we
reduce the size of semantic network dividing the original
semantic graph in two parts and only one described in a fil-
tering ontology is the input for algorithms.
We focus special attention on research in complex net-
works. These kinds of networks have scale free, small word
and clustering features what make them accurate models of
spontaneously growing networks such as social networks
and in particular terrorist organizations. We are able to
transform any semantic network into a set of complex net-
works by choosing the ontology which is important for us
at the moment of analysis.
The main problem is one of choosing the way to represent
the structure of interest in a complex network and what set
of measurements of the topological features are the best
network characterization described by the net components
(nodes and edges).
Of particular interest is the relationship between the struc-
ture and dynamics of complex networks. We are convinced
of the importance of measuring the structural properties of
evolving networks in order to characterize how the con-
nectivity of the investigating structures being investigated
changes in time. Network measurements are therefore es-
sential in our investigation. We consider using the follow-
ing significant characteristics of a given network: clustering
coefficient, average path length, shortest longest path and
preferential attachment. Now we are able to calculate these
characteristics of complex network and observe its chang-
ing in time. We are convinced that the vector of significant
network characteristics has to be much more numerous than
the four we have proposed. The question is, how can the
non-stability of the characteristics mentioned above (col-
lected measures) be viewed as a factor that indicates an
abnormal state of the system (e.g., increasing terrorism ac-
tivity) modeled by complex networks?
In a previous paper [1] we introduced the Early Warning
System (EWS) concept. The EWS is a simulation-based
diagnostic support tool, with its associated algorithms, that
realises the following processes:
• Collecting information relevant to terrorism threat es-
timation and intelligence data analysis from:
– primary threat factors determination,
– aggregated threat factors (causative and execu-
tive) determination,
– threat coefficient estimation,
– possible goals of terrorist attack identification.
• The analysis and simulation, using the collected in-
formation in order to: predict the terrorism threat
over long periods of time, predict the stability of
the threat factors and the detect when pre-determined
threat factor thresholds have been exceeded.
• The visualization of EWS output for potential
users.
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2. Association acquisition
As mentioned in [1] methods used for terrorist threat recog-
nition and evaluation are the following [10, 12, 14]:
1. Graph path finding algorithms.
2. Rule based inference engine – inference algorithms
working with semantic information could provide an
optional source of indirect association (building new
knowledge).
3. Graph similarity algorithms – identifying crucial pat-
terns in semantic networks which are significant for
the asymmetric conflict scenarios.
The process of data acquisition for the building of the
knowledge base is executed by program agents which re-
view external data sources.
Our proposed method of building associations contains sev-
eral stages [2]:
• Designing a generic dynamically changing ontology
allowing flexible information representation.
• Designing the mechanisms for knowledge acquisition
for building of the semantic network (also designing
intelligent agents who provide the database search
algorithms).
• Defining parameters which will allow analysis of
the knowledge in the network (dependency analysis,
clustering connected to nodes concerning the base
ontology).
• Definition of particular ontologies, which are used as
filters for elimination of unnecessary links in the net.
To define specific paths let us introduce the following de-
scription [2]:
• Paths – heuristic route search algorithms, are based
on problem size reduction using the reference to the
ontology analysis but not the semantic network it-
self. Metamodel usage allows decreasing quantity of
nodes and links to be analyzed by the algorithm. The
linking of nodes to the calculated route (building as-
sociation) is achieved using the depth-first algorithm,
considering the currently analyzed node and the on-
tology template which gives the information of all
valid links to other nodes.
• Intersecting paths – using the definition of paths on
the semantic graph the algorithm is searching for
two paths, containing intersecting links which con-
nect nodes in those paths.
• Isomorphic paths – are based on the algorithm of
finding two paths which are isomorphic, that means
that we have to find two pairs of nodes with such
paths in the network that any of the nodes from one
path is a part of the other path.
The idea of our system’s activity, depicted in Fig. 1 was
originally given in [19].
Fig. 1. Idea of terrorist threat evaluation based on semantic
model of threat [19].
3. Acquiring new knowledge
Acquiring new knowledge in semantic network is based on
introducing new nodes and links between nodes [2]. This
can be achieved in two ways: using the analysis of the
structure of the semantic network, and inference engines.
Inference algorithms can be implemented as:
• General logic based inference engine – where there
are two main aims, first order logic, higher order
logic and description logic. First order logic (FOL)
are mechanisms which are very efficient but compu-
tationally not tractable for large amounts of data and
axioms. Higher order logic based engines, however,
are able to track the inference route but they require
a lot of resources to achieve the task.
• Solving algorithms – are specialized algorithms, of-
ten small size, designed to provide a solution in one
distinct problem. Problem solving methods (PSM)
define which actions in the whole inference process
need to be executed and how the control flow in such
algorithm should look like (considering the control
of the subtasks).
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The idea was implemented using standards for semantic
data representation RDF and OWL. For the inference en-
gine and tools allowing representation of semantic models
we use the JENA OpenSource API (see the description of
EWS environment).
4. Complex network evolution
Complex networks (CN) with scale free, small word and
clustering features are accurate model of spontaneously
growing networks such as: Internet, WWW, social net-
works [3, 5, 6, 8]. Our work has demonstrated that in
some cases we can use such complex network to automat-
ically detect and or estimate some aspects of a terrorist
organization by treating these as a special kind/type of so-
cial network.
This part of our work is strongly connected with social
networks. Social network analysis is a collection of mainly
statistical methods to support the study of communication
relations in groups, kinship relations, or the structure of be-
havior, to mention a few application areas. This methodol-
ogy assumes that the way the members of a group can com-
municate with each other affects some important properties
of that group. We have applied social network analysis in
anti-terrorism applications and indicate both its usefulness
and some of its limitations when using it as a quantita-
tive method for situation awareness and decision-making in
law-enforcement applications. Understanding nested con-
nections across a known set of individuals or organizations
is one example of social network analysis. Since not all
people who have had contacts with a terrorist are criminal
themselves, there is a need for techniques which can fil-
ter out those who have frequent contacts with known or
suspected individuals, or with any member of a known
or suspected group of terrorists from a large database of
contacts. Such people become more or less suspect them-
selves, thereby potentially spreading the suspicion to even
more individuals.
One of the important issues is connected with the question
how can we automatically estimate which people among
a very large community, who have been “transitively” in
contact with each other, need to be investigated further and
who do not. We explore such methods of social network
analysis using a complex network as a model of a terrorist
organization.
We are able to transform any semantic network into a set
of complex networks by choosing the ontology which is
important at the moment of analysis.
Fig. 2. Mapping from CN into a feature vector.
The main problem is to choose how to represent the struc-
ture of interest as a complex network and what set of mea-
surements of the topological features are the best network
characterization described on the net components (nodes
and edges).
We are convinced that the vector of significant characteris-
tics (SC) have to be numerous (Fig. 2). We consider using
following significant characteristics of a given network:
sc1 ≡C – clustering coefficient,
sc2 ≡ L – average path length,
sc3 ≡ l – shortest longest path,
sc4 ≡ D – diameter,
sc5 ≡<k> – average node degree,
sc6 ≡ kmax – maximum node degree,
sc7 ≡ P(k) – node degree distribution,
sc8 ≡ PA – preferential attachment.
Another problem we consider is how to use the obtained
structural properties (measurements) in order to identify
different categories of structures, which is directly related
to the area of pattern recognition. Each class of networks
Fig. 3. Evolution of a given network and result changes of
a feature vector.
presents specific topological features which characterize
its connectivity and highly influence the dynamics of pro-
cesses executed on the network. The analysis, discrimi-
nation, and synthesis of networks (in particular complex
networks) therefore rely on the use of measurements capa-
ble of expressing the most relevant topological features.
We focused attention particularly on the relationship be-
tween the structure and dynamics of complex networks. We
are convinced of the importance of measuring the struc-
tural properties of evolving networks in order to charac-
terize how the connectivity of the investigated structures
changes in time. This can help to identify some odd events
in modeled system.
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The vector of significant characteristics should be updated
at each ∆T along the network growth/decline. Figure 3
shows instances of the evolving network and respective
measures. This implies the very important question of how
to choose the most appropriate measures for a given sys-
tem. The answer must reflect the specific interest and it is
still an open question under our investigation.
Network measurements are therefore essential in our in-
vestigation. We can calculate significant characteristics of
a complex network as mentioned above and observe its
change in time. We intend to test how the non-stability of
characteristics mentioned above (collected measures) can
be viewed as a factor that show an abnormal state of the sys-
tem (e.g., increase in terrorism activity) modeled by com-
plex network.
Important related issues covered in our work comprise the
representation of the evolution of complex networks in
terms of trajectories in several measurement spaces, the
analysis of the correlations between some of the most tra-
ditional measurements, perturbation analysis, as well as the
use of multivariate statistics for feature selection and net-
work classification.
Figure 4 presents the sample trajectory defined in one of
the possible measures (phase) spaces involving three pos-
sible significant characteristic sci(t), sci+1(t) and sci+2(t).
In such a way, the evolution of the network can be inves-
tigated in terms of a trajectory in a “phase space” using
chaos theory for example.
Fig. 4. Trajectories in the “phase space” defined on the basis of
feature vector changing.
The ultimate purpose of the project is to simulate and ad-
ditionally visualize various scenarios of attack and defence
to investigate bottlenecks in security system. Visual rep-
resentation of information can be used to demystify data
and reveal otherwise hidden patterns by leveraging human
visual capabilities to make sense of completely abstract in-
formation (see the EWS environment description).
5. The EWS environment
Sections of EWS portal prototype consist of the following
parts.
Logging users – each user needs to register himself and
log in each time he wants to make use of portal functional-
ity. Registering user consist of two phases. First, the user
submits his personal data. In the second phase, performed
by the administrator using the portal, the user permissions
are submitted to each service (semantic network analysis,
complex network analysis, etc.).
Registering really simple syndication (RSS) – the portal
obtains multiple news reports from different news sources
to show a ticker console (text scroller) containing news re-
ports on any registered terrorist activity or terrorist report.
The RSS database is flexible and is updated in real-time.
The RSS sources stored on server can be extended as
needed (Fig. 5).
Fig. 5. Concept of aggregation RSS data between data sources.
Complex networks – link analysis – are tools for visual-
izing associations between stored data (e.g., terrorist social
activity – relation “knows”, “contacts”). The data shown
in figures have been taken from the September 11th attack.
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We propose an additional example as we have extracted the
log from our mail server and run several graph algorithms
such as maximum clique or k-clique algorithm to extract
groups of users communicating with each other.
Semantic network analysis – this category has been di-
vided in two parts. First one visualizes the ontology we
use to represent all stored data and relations in our seman-
tic graph (Fig. 6). This part directly presents the part of
the whole terrorist ontology as the full model is large and
it would be difficult to present. The other part is our pro-
posal for a method for indirect data association searching.
For this part we use the emerging standards for seman-
tic data representation RDF and OWL. For the inference
Fig. 6. Visualizing the ontology.
Fig. 7. The transition between semantic network and complex
network using ontology filtering.
Fig. 8. User registration for EWS portal.
Fig. 9. Homepage of EWS portal.
Fig. 10. Example of link analysis for complex networks – data
from 11th September attack.
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engine and tools allowing representation of semantic mod-
els we use JENA OpenSource API.
The semantic network filled with the collected data, for the
further analysis is transformed into the complex network.
The transformation is conducted as a filtering process based
on a set of filtering ontologies. We use them as filters to
reject unneeded data and extract only those relations that
are useful for link analysis. The scheme of the process is
shown in Fig. 7.
Additional functionalities provided include support for
rule based inference with ExSys Corvid which allows pro-
viding a questionnaire for the analyst which will guide
him through the process of collecting all information on
registered data/actions. The algorithm provides, based on
Fig. 11. Database of hyperlinks to other resources connected
with the domain of counterterrorism.
Fig. 12. Quick RSS content viewer.
the input data, a result which represents the probability lev-
els for stored scenario attacks.
For the EWS system we have also provided a regression
model for threat assessment. This was described in pre-
sented publications [1], and is available in the portal. It
requires a path to the defining database content and set of
primary and secondary factors. Using neural networks and
clustering techniques it is able to evaluate a set of threat
coefficients for the current set of stored crises.
The windows for different pages of the EWS portal are
illustrated in Figs. 8–12.
6. Conclusion
In this paper we presented methods and a prototype of
a EWS for terrorist threat identification which can be de-
veloped into a professional analysis tool. The solutions
presented in the paper are applied in the project of Crisis
Management System for big agglomeration.
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Abstract—With the increasing number of wireless commu-
nication standards flexibility has gained more and more im-
portance which has lead to the software defined radio (SDR)
concept. However, SDR development has to face many chal-
lenges, among them are the questions how SDR systems can
be designed to achieve flexibility, architectural efficiency, en-
ergy efficiency and portability at the same time. These re-
quirements result in very elaborate architectures and a highly
increased design complexity. To cope with such complexity, we
proposed an SDR development flow. During the development
of such SDR, debugging becomes more efficient on a proto-
type hardware implementation than on a simulation model.
However, error analysis on a prototype suffers from strong
limitations like a reduced state visibility. In this paper, an
extension to the SDR development flow is presented and suc-
cessfully applied to an example SDR. It allows for an efficient
error analysis with the SDR simulation model by the feedback
of stimulus data from the prototype.
Keywords— software defined radio, prototype platform, wave-
form development environment, electronic system level simula-
tion, waveform debugging, stimulus feedback.
1. Introduction
The demand for software defined radio (SDR) systems orig-
inates from the fact that today’s radio communication sys-
tems are designed for a single (or at least a very small num-
ber of) waveform specification(s) only. This causes severe
interoperability issues. In order to achieve interoperabil-
ity the key idea is to add flexibility to the radio hardware
platform. This allows to run many standards on the same
hardware and with this, enables the communication part-
ners to easily agree on a common waveform. The flexibility
issue can be solved by adding programmability and recon-
figurability to the hardware platform. However, there are
well known trade-offs between flexibility, performance and
energy efficiency. Heterogeneous multiprocessor systems
on chip (MPSoCs) are a widely accepted candidate to cope
with this challenge. Compared to traditional chip designs,
this approach results in a highly increased design com-
plexity.
While the goals of flexibility, programmability, and recon-
figurability are major hardware-related challenges in design-
ing an SDR system, an additional more software-related
key topic is portability. Portability means that a waveform
implementation can be transferred from one platform to an-
other. Portability of waveforms is of particular importance
if waveforms shall be exchanged between communication
partners with different hardware platforms. For instance,
currently efforts have been started within NATO to estab-
lish a waveform library for the coalition partners.
The software framework to realize these features has been
set by the software communications architecture (SCA) [2].
However, especially the hardware and portability related
problems raise a couple of issues, which are not addressed
by the SCA so far and have to be solved by the waveform
and system designers. For example, it has not been spec-
ified how to generate software (SW) and hardware (HW)
code that is applicable to a given specific SDR platform.
In order to solve these problems, a concept for a seam-
less design flow for a waveform development environ-
ment (WDE) starting from a waveform description lan-
guage (WDL) [3, 4] down to the (semi-) automatic gen-
eration of SCA-compliant SW/HW code for implementa-
tion on a (more or less) arbitrary SDR platform has been
proposed in [1]. Such a concept can be the basis for the
waveform library mentioned above. It contains waveforms
specified in the WDL which can be ported with reasonable
efforts by the nations to their national SDR platforms by
(semi-) automatic code generation.
The key idea of the concept is an orthogonalization of
the waveform description (functionality and topology), the
hardware platform design and the mapping to an arbitrary
hardware platform. These three tasks lead to an iterative
process of implementing, testing and taking design deci-
sions.
Due to its complexity, the SDR design process can bene-
fit from the hardware/software co-design concepts of elec-
tronic system level (ESL) [5] simulation platform (“virtual
prototype”). It allows designers to iteratively refine the
complete SDR MPSoC model on different abstraction lev-
els depending on the intended use. For example, fast in-
struction accurate models support the software developer
while cycle accurate hardware models are needed by the
hardware designer. During hardware implementation, ad-
ditional models will be required, depending on the abstrac-
tion level used in the ESL simulation platform. Although
the WDE concept has a focus on a consistent design flow,
the functional correctness of a prototype hardware imple-
mentation cannot be guaranteed. Therefore, implementa-
tion errors will also be detected on the HW prototype and
must be analyzed and resolved. However, due to the com-
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plexity of SDR systems, debugging via standard debug in-
terfaces such as joint test action group (JTAG) is difficult.
The visibility of internal states is limited. A debug halt of
one component can break the synchronicity between parts
of the system, for example a transmitter continues to run
while the receiver is being debugged which results in lost
samples at the receiver (real time requirements). There-
fore, this approach of debugging the SDR prototype results
in very high development and analysis effort.
However, often errors that are only identified in the pro-
totype implementation, still can be analyzed in the ESL
simulation model. This makes error analysis significantly
faster and more efficient by allowing the complete visibility
of internal states, and guarantees the synchronicity of all
system parts. In order to enable the system level analysis
of errors found in later development stages such as a pro-
totype or hardware implementation, it is necessary to drive
the system simulation into the same state as the hardware.
This can only be achieved by a suitable stimulus recorded
on the prototype and fed back into the system simulation.
In this paper, the extension of the WDE concept with stim-
ulus feedback loops as shown in Fig. 1 will be presented.
Fig. 1. Prototype toolflow integration by feedback loops.
Section 2 will briefly introduce the concept for a seamless
waveform development and highlight development issues
arising when realizing a hardware implementation, e.g., on
a prototype platform. In Section 3 the development flow of
an example SDR prototype system will be presented and
analyzed with respect to debugging properties. Based on
these investigations, Section 4 will present the realization
of the stimulus feedback loops.
2. Concept for seamless waveform
development
In [1] a concept for a seamless design environment for
SDRs starting from a waveform description down to the
implementation onto an SDR hardware platform has been
proposed. In contrast to formerly known approaches [3, 4],
it is neither limited to a single aspect like waveform de-
scriptions nor to a specific tool.
2.1. Concept description
The concept is based on four key elements as illustrated in
Fig. 2.
Fig. 2. Design flow from application description to implementa-
tion.
Waveform specification. Firstly, a waveform application,
typically given as a written document (specification) is im-
plemented based on general programming language struc-
tures that are applicable for both software and hardware
description. The waveform application is decomposed into
functional blocks (e.g., voice coding, forward error cor-
rection, and modulation) and communication edges. Every
edge represents a specific path for data exchange between
two blocks. The full assembly of blocks and edges forms
a topology graph. The topology graph summarizes the data
dependencies of the functional blocks and combines them
to a complete waveform application.
The SDR HW platform description. Secondly, the de-
scription of an arbitrary SDR hardware platform composed
of processing elements, communication architectures and
memories is required. The processing elements are the de-
vices which perform the signal processing. They can be
grouped into programmable (e.g., GPP, DSP), reconfig-
urable (e.g., FPGA), and configurable (e.g., ASIC) de-
vices. Communication architectures describe the data ex-
change capabilities and are mainly characterized by their
type (e.g., wires, point-to-point) and their interfaces.
Mapping. Thirdly, the mapping of a waveform application
onto an arbitrary platform has to be considered in temporal
(when to execute) and spatial (where to execute) manner.
The mapping has a major influence on system performance
and is a key issue for portability. Throughout the mapping
process, the functional blocks of the waveform decomposi-
tion are mapped to the processing elements and the edges
to the communication architectures, respectively. It is pos-
sible that several blocks are mapped to the same processing
element such that a scheduling of the functional execution
becomes necessary. It is also possible that one block is
split up into subtasks which are processed in parallel by
different elements. Criteria for the feasibility analysis of
such mappings have been discussed in [6].
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Code generation. Last but not least, the fourth step pro-
vides the link from the application and platform description
towards the system implementation by a (semi-) automatic
generation of SW/HW code [1].
2.2. SDR development and prototyping
The proposed concept highlights a seamless design flow
from the waveform down to the SDR implementation. De-
spite of a minimization of design errors by a seamless de-
sign flow, such a highly complex SDR prototype will likely
suffer from still undetected errors, even if the SDR appli-
cation and/or hardware platform have been fully verified
separately. Such a prototype implementation might reveal
issues and corner cases, e.g., related to synchronization,
latency problems, etc.
The proposed concept requires the developers to define the
SDR application, the SDR hardware platform and the map-
ping of waveform tasks to processing elements. Therefore,
the concept does not eliminate the developer’s expertise
from these tasks.
However, with these descriptions, the concept enables the
generation of the full system simulation and even the hard-
ware configuration (e.g., FPGA bit streams, etc.), if a suffi-
ciently detailed hardware description is provided. Thus, an
iterative design space exploration will become highly effi-
cient. The system simulation can provide detailed informa-
tion about the performance (throughput, latency, bus/CPU
load, etc.) of single components or the whole system. With
this analysis the developer is able to optimize the mapping,
the hardware platform and/or the waveform, depending on
his development focus. Furthermore, debugging benefits
from the full visibility of internal states. A prototype work-
bench realizing this concept has been introduced in [7].
The ESL models for the system simulation can be gener-
ated for the complete SDR. Fast field programmable gate
array (FPGA) prototyping is enabled by the automatic gen-
eration of implementation files for the Xilinx embedded
development kit (EDK) [8].
The SDR hardware platform can be considered as MPSoC.
Designing such an MPSoC is a challenging task, which is
addressed separately in research. Recent research activities
have put forth the paradigm of ESL [5]. Complete systems
(MPSoCs) are assembled and can be analyzed and verified
by simulation. To cope with the enormous complexity,
simulations are run at a higher level than register transfer
level (RTL) using transaction level modeling (TLM).
Figure 3 illustrates the system development flow based on
the proposed concept. After finalizing the description of
SDR waveform application and hardware platform, devel-
opers can map the application to the hardware platform.
The generated output is the system implementation, which
can either be an ESL simulation model or an FPGA proto-
type. The mapping must meet design constraints. Initially,
estimates will be used which are based on a high level
of abstraction of the hardware platform behavior. Then,
ESL simulation will be used to verify functional correct-
ness and to check compliance with performance constraints,
Fig. 3. System development flow.
(e.g., throughput, latency). Required modifications are ap-
plied to improve the mapping. ESL simulations can also be
used within the SDR waveform development or hardware
platform development cycle. In order to approach portabil-
ity, the development iterations of waveform and hardware
should be orthogonalized, ensuring that for example dur-
ing the waveform development, only the waveform will be
modified without relying on a specific mapping or hardware
platform. If all requirements are fulfilled, developers can
leave the ESL domain and can go into the phase of proto-
typing. This is usually at a point, where the bug detection
rate decreases in a saturation process [9]. Bug detection
now requires extensive simulation at low abstraction level
(full hardware details). Using a prototype implementation
can significantly speed up the bug detection process [10].
Possible issues occurring on the prototype are:
• Undetected software and system errors. Some errors
only occur after extensive testing (coverage issues).
• Errors in the design of hardware components that
were not captured in the system level model (model-
ing errors).
• Errors that only occur in a real time environment,
for example interaction with analog frontend/analog
components.
Therefore, debugging capabilities of the SDR prototype
with feedback loops to the simulation are inevitable to al-
low developers to identify and fix such errors efficiently.
In the following section we will highlight these problems
based on an exemplary waveform and an FPGA prototype.
In Section 4 a solution will be then introduced that allows
to cope with the debugging issues.
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3. SDR development flow
The WDE concept presented in Section 2 has been realized
as a development flow which will be discussed in the fol-
lowing. First, the SDR application waveform used in the
study will be shortly introduced followed by an exemplary
SDR hardware platform. The system implementation, sim-
ulation and prototype will then be discussed with respect
to the debugging and error analysis capabilities.
3.1. SDR application – example waveform
The waveform utilized in this study has been selected in or-
der to keep the design complexity reasonable, while putting
the focus on the investigation of the SDR development flow
aspects. Therefore, the waveform does not include chan-
nel coding, interleaving, pilot insertion, etc. The wave-
form implements a differential quaternary phase shift key-
ing (DQPSK) modulation scheme, pulse shaping is done
by a Root-Raised-Cosine filter (roll-off factor 0.22, over-
sampling factor 8), resulting in a symbol rate of 5 MHz
at a sampling rate of 40 MHz. The center frequency is
in the 2.4 GHz band, the receiver input is a signal at an
intermediate frequency (IF) of 10 MHz, mixed down to the
base-band by a digital down converter (DDC).
For data transmission purpose, a simple frame structure
consisting of 128 symbols has been defined. The payload
data is a small black and white picture of 160×160 pixels
in size. The picture is transmitted one line per frame with
the line number transmitted at the beginning of the frame
followed by the pixel data.
The transmitter will not be discussed in the following since
it consists only of a DQPSK modulator and a pulse form fil-
ter. It is a pure VHDL implementation due to the simplicity
of the given waveform. The receiver topology of this SDR
application is given in the block diagram in Fig. 4. The
signal is received as complex values at an IF of 10 MHz
converted to base band by the DDC block and filtered by
the matched filter (MF) block. The further processing only
requires timing synchronization for symbol detection and
a non-data-aided phase synchronization. The demodulator
is directly followed by the frame synchronization and pay-
load data decoder.
Fig. 4. Receiver block diagram for demonstration waveform.
In future, this waveform can be easily extended or replaced
depending on the focus of investigations which in our case
will be the SDR development flow aspects rather than on
the waveform itself.
3.2. Example SDR hardware platform
The main parts of the SDR receiver are software (C-code),
only parts with high computational requirements are real-
ized in hardware (VHDL). Therefore, the system basically
consists of two processing elements as depicted in Fig. 5
(a MicroBlaze general-purpose RISC processor [11] and
a hardware accelerator). The MicroBlaze processor has
been selected at this point in time for its ease of use and
debugging capabilities. It does not allow real-time opera-
tion (scaled performance only). In future, a more suitable,
real-time capable processor will be used.
Fig. 5. Sample SDR platform used in this study.
The processor is connected to the peripherals (e.g., VGA
port) by buses and IP cores. The hardware accelerators im-
plement DDC and a MF. The basic IP core for accessing
the SRFC RF interface has been provided by Signalion [12]
and extended for the use in the MicroBlaze environment.
3.3. Mapping
With the SDR application and HW platform description
developers can accomplish the mapping phase according
to the concept. Each task of the SDR application has to
be mapped onto a processing element (PE) of the underly-
ing SDR HW platform. For this exemplary SDR platform,
the mapping step is rather simple since only the Micro-
Blaze processor and dedicated hardware accelerators exist.
Therefore, the mapping allocates the RF RX interface, the
MF and DDC block as 1 : 1 mapping to the dedicated hard-
ware accelerators, whereas all other parts have a temporal
mapping as software tasks onto the MicroBlaze processor.
The system implementation can then be generated from
the defined mapping as depicted in Fig. 3. Such a sys-
tem implementation can be an ESL simulation or an FPGA
prototype system, depending on the intended use case,
e.g., whether a hardware implementation or a system model
on a higher abstraction level will be investigated.
3.4. Simulation environment
The simulation of the complete SDR system is performed
in the ESL domain. This allows the developer to test
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the interaction of all components at the same time and at
different abstraction levels of the implementation.
System simulation and abstraction provide many advantages
in ESL design. However, there are also issues with this ap-
proach: raising the abstraction level introduces inaccuracy.
Therefore, a successful detection depends on the type of er-
ror and on the selection of an appropriate abstraction level.
In our simulation, the components of the hardware plat-
form have been modeled with the abstractions described in
the following. More accurate models can be selected when
required.
• The MicroBlaze processor is represented by an in-
struction accurate simulation model.
• The DDC and MF components have been modeled by
SystemC blocks [13]. In this implementation, their
latency was not included in the system simulation
models, although this is possible in general.
• The RF interface has been reduced to a clocked
source of complex valued channel data. The control
interface has been reduced to the functional mini-
mum.
However, the use of the system simulation results in several
important advantages:
• Visibility. The developer has control over the com-
plete internal state of all components and can trace
the states of special interest. The possibilities for vi-
sualization of such traces for a time instant or over
time are manifold.
• Synchronicity. The system can be halted syn-
chronously. Therefore, no component will continue
to run while the state of another is being investi-
gated, guaranteeing a consistent debugging environ-
ment over time.
The following sections describe the FPGA prototype setup,
the hardware implementation of the SDR platform its de-
bugging capabilities.
3.5. SDR hardware implementation – prototyping
Prototyping platform setup. The hardware prototyping
platform is depicted in Fig. 6. It comprises an off-the-
shelf Xilinx Virtex 4 FPGA development board, namely the
ML402 board and a commercial RF-interface (SRFC) from
Signalion [12] with two channels in the 2.4 and 5.0 GHz
bands. The ML402 board provides on-board memories as
well as a series of common interfaces. For debugging pur-
poses, a standard JTAG interface is available which con-
nects (among other chips) to the FPGA. Designs within
the FPGA can connect to this JTAG chain, for example
the MicroBlaze processor core. The Signalion SRFC RF
frontend is connected to the 64-bit general purpose header
of the ML402 board via an adapter card which provides ac-
cess to the channel data and additional 22 signals via two
mictor connectors. Sampling rates can be coarsely adjusted
between 8 MHz and 80 MHz. In this setup, a sampling rate
of 40 MHz is used.
Fig. 6. Hardware prototype platform.
The SDR hardware platform implementation. The hard-
ware platform has been set up with the Xilinx EDK devel-
opment kit from a set of basic IP blocks connected by
buses. This implementation flow clearly follows the pro-
posed concept, the only gap that needs to be bridged later
is the translation from the system simulation configuration
into an EDK project configuration. The software binaries
already used in the system simulation can be re-used with-
out any changes for running the receiver prototype. The
RF interface is connected by an IP core provided by Sig-
nalion [12]. The hardware acceleration blocks for the down
conversion (DDC) and the matched filter have been imple-
mented by IP cores generated from the Xilinx IP core li-
brary. FIFO buffers connected to the buses guarantee that
blocks of continuous samples will be received by the pro-
cessor.
Fig. 7. Prototype debugging: consistency and visibility.
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Prototype debugging. The debugging options available
on the prototype platform used in this study are shown in
Fig. 7. One traditional way of debugging is the hardware
access via a JTAG interface [14]. Peripherals not connected
to the JTAG chain, e.g., the RF interface, will continue to
produce data, for example in case the processor is being
debugged via JTAG, stimulus data from the RF frontend
will be lost. Therefore, the time span for investigating such
a prototype is very limited, analysis of past or future states
is almost impossible or includes the risk of being inconsis-
tent due to non synchronized IP blocks.
In order to deal with the temporal visibility, the require-
ments are high: investigating 64 bit at only 40 MHz results
already in 320 MByte/s. The use of a logic analyser allows
to record at this rate and at least solves the problem of
analysing future and past by selecting the trigger position
relatively to the recorded data carefully.
The traditional top-down approach which has also been part
of the proposed WDE concept (see Section 2) requires an
extension in order to allow the analysis of errors found in
a complex prototype system, such as an SDR. This exten-
sion by feedback loops of stimulus data will be discussed
in the following section.
4. Stimulus feedback to higher
abstraction levels
As demonstrated, it is desirable to analyze errors, which
were detected on the prototype, in the ESL simulation.
However, there is a significant issue. It is neither suffi-
cient nor possible to trace and copy the SDR hardware
state to the system simulation due to limited visibility, pos-
sible differences in accuracy and the size of the complete
state information. One option is to feed back the essential
stimulus data from the prototype to the system simulation.
4.1. Requirements on stimulus recording and feedback
Typically, there is a delay between the occurrence of an
error and the observation of its effect. Therefore, a thor-
ough analysis of the observed malfunction and the recent
processing steps is necessary for debugging. Viewing past
events usually is not possible on a real HW implementation,
but it is feasible to record the stimulus data which caused
the error and to use this as input for the ESL simulation. In
order to allow such feedback of stimulus data the following
requirements have to be fulfilled:
• State reachability. The stimulus data must be suit-
able to drive the system into the state where the bug
can be detected and analyzed. This also poses re-
quirements on the accuracy of the system simulation
and the interfacing to the lower abstraction levels.
• Looking into the past. The stimulus data must cover
a specific amount of the time before the bug is de-
tected. This puts high requirements on the recording
technology in order to store a significant amount of
stimulus data before detecting the bug.
• Stimulus recording. The stimulus data can arrive at
high data rates. Interfaces such as serial communica-
tions, USB or hard disk are not capable to deal with
such data rates.
• Stimulus import. Seamless stimulus import is key
for each simulation setup. This is basically a require-
ment for the simulation interfaces and optional data
format conversion.
A question is, how much stimulus data before the trigger
point is required to reach the same system state that in-
cludes the underlying error. Because of recursive structures
it may in principle require collection of data starting with
the last known state (e.g., after reset). However, in the sig-
nal processing domain, many subsystems implement either
stream like processing without recursion (e.g., FIR filters
or buffers) or have a limited number of recursions. There-
fore, such systems can be steered into a desired state by
appropriate choice of history length. This will most proba-
bly not apply for layers above the physical layer. However,
internal states, e.g., on layers 2 and 3 are changing at much
lower rates, making state recording feasible. Therefore, fu-
ture extensions will have to consider this mix of stimulus
and state recording for higher layers.
4.2. Stimulus feedback implementation
Since the SDR application depicted in Fig. 4 does not
contain loops on the task level and no recursion inside
the tasks, the internal state of the SDR application only
depends on a limited number of recent input samples re-
ceived from the RF frontend. Therefore, recording the digi-
tized channel data at the interface to the SRFC RF frontend
is sufficient. The amount of data that needs to be recorded
before a bug is detected depends mainly on the latencies of
filters and FIFO buffers.
For recording stimulus data, the original adapter card
connecting the GPIO connector on the ML402 board to
the SRFC RF frontend had been extended by two mic-
tor connectors, providing a total of 64 bit of parallel data.
Since the samples on the RF RX channel have been se-
lected, stimulus data is being recorded at a sample rate
synchronous to the sampling clock. The SRFC interfaces
only occupies 42 of the 64 bit on the mictor interface, leav-
ing further 22 free bits for steering the recording trigger or
additional stimulus data.
The data is recorded by a logic analyzer connected to the
mictor connectors on the adapter card. In this setup, the
logic analyzer samples the data with the RF RX sampling
clock provided by one signal on the mictor connectors.
Thus the logic analyzer is synchronous with the SDR re-
ceiver implementation and the recorded data can be used
as stimulus within the system simulation.
To drive the ESL simulation into the correct state, the
stimulus data before a bug detection has to be recorded.
Modern logic analysers offer a trigger option, that allows
for the setting of the trigger position at any point in time
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within the later recorded data. Of course, the trigger con-
dition has to be set up manually. This requires a designer
to drive the free debug signals on the mictor connectors
accordingly (Fig. 8).
Fig. 8. Stimulus feedback loop realization.
The recorded data has been imported in ESL simulations
and even into Matlab simulations. This step basically con-
sists of the implementation of suitable import filters. The
data can be taken expressively or it might require the con-
version, e.g., to fixed/floating point number representations
like in Matlab. For the given example SDR system, im-
porter filters for both Matlab and the ESL simulation have
been developed.
4.3. Design process experience
This stimulus feedback setup has been used during the ini-
tial setup of the SDR hardware platform with the intention
to be used in future more extensively. Nevertheless, the
feedback setup has already been valuable during the devel-
opment steps of the SDR receiver system presented above.
On this platform, several basic algorithmic implementations
have been tested, for example, the implementations of es-
timations and corrections for timing, phase and frequency
errors.
One of the most helpful features of an ESL simulation us-
ing the recorded data has been the aspect of visualization.
Depending on the type of data (e.g., complex values) a suit-
able visualization (e.g., I/Q diagram) can be generated from
any trace of internal states, data transfers on buses, etc.
Therefore, the data analysis is virtually unlimited and gives
valuable support to the SDR developer.
When testing the first implementations of a basic frequency
error estimation and correction, the synchronization result
has been visualized on the VGA port of the prototype sys-
tem first. On the prototype, the frequency synchronization
result was hardly recognizable while the system simulation
seemed to work well with a generic channel input. Af-
ter some investigation the input stream sampled within the
FPGA was recorded by the logic analyzer and fed back into
the ESL simulation. The errors could be reproduced and vi-
sualized, this time even with Matlab. The key point in this
case has been the visualization which uncovered occasional
phase shifts by 90◦. The investigation showed that this er-
ror has been caused by a combination of the DDC hard-
ware block together with the erroneous clocking setup in
the FPGA which created an occasionally mis-sampled data
stream. The interesting aspect is the fact, that although the
error cause has been in very low level hardware, the feed-
back flow proved to be highly efficient for error tracking
and analysis.
Other errors have been localized in the software implemen-
tation, e.g., during the initial implementation of the timing
synchronization. Here, it has been extremely helpful to
debug the software implementation while comparing the
outputs visually with the results of the Matlab simulation
for the same input data.
Therefore, the extension of the WDE development concept
by stimulus feedback loops results in valuable benefit for
already small scale SDR systems. It will most probably be
inevitable for highly complex future SDR systems. Future
extensions will need to include state recording at much
lower rates for layers above the physical layer.
5. Conclusion and outlook
In this paper we proposed an extension to our WDE concept
that feeds back stimulus data from a hardware implementa-
tion such as a prototype back to the system simulation. This
allows the more efficient error analysis. We believe, that
such a feedback concept is essential for the development of
future complex SDR systems.
In future, this concept will be used in our SDR develop-
ment approaches based on the WDE concept. Extensions
will need to include state recording at much lower rates
for layers above the physical layer. So far, the steps of
the proposed development flow had been realized mainly
independently from each other. Therefore one important
point for future development is the realization of a seam-
less prototype work bench for SDR development ranging
from the waveform’s specification down to the implemen-
tation. Furthermore, with the help of this tool chain we will
investigate more realistic SDR systems and communication
standards like, e.g., the MIL-STD-188-110B. Additionally
we will investigate more in depth the key issue of portability
for SDRs.
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Evaluation of features
for the automatic recognition
of OFDM signals in monitoring
or cognitive receivers
Ferdinand Liedtke and Ulrike Albers
Abstract—The automatic recognition of signal types is an im-
portant task of monitoring receivers and also cognitive re-
ceivers. Several modulation recognition or classification pro-
cedures exist for single channel signal types while a simple
robust procedure for automatic recognition of OFDM sig-
nals is lacking because of its numerous frequency channels
lying close together. The task considered in this paper is the
discrimination between OFDM (or multi-channel) signals and
other signal types. The number of frequency channels of the
OFDM signals is assumed to be unknown a priori. So, to-
gether with the automatic OFDM detection the estimation of
the number of frequency channels is treated. Several discrim-
ination features have been examined and the most promising
ones are described: measures of the variation, of the skew-
ness, of the kurtosis, and of the specific picket-fence shape
of the spectrum which is typical for many OFDM signals.
For a number of real-world OFDM samples, recorded from
the high frequency range, results are presented. An auto-
matic discrimination from single channel or noise like sig-
nals is achieved and the number of system channels can be
estimated.
Keywords— OFDM signal recognition, discrimination features,
cepstrum evaluation, estimation of frequency channel number.
1. Introduction
Automatic recognition of signal types is an important
task for monitoring receivers and also cognitive receivers.
A monitoring receiver is a non-cooperative receiver used
for radio reconnaissance. A cognitive receiver is a coop-
erative receiver belonging to a cognitive radio which will
be a future advancement of a software defined radio. In
both kinds of receivers the knowledge of the signal type
is needed for further signal processing, such as synchro-
nization, equalization, and demodulation. Several mod-
ulation recognition or classification procedures exist for
single channel signal types, compare, e.g., [1, 2], while
a simple robust procedure for automatic recognition of
orthogonal frequency-division multiplexing (OFDM) sig-
nals with its numerous frequency channels lying close to-
gether is lacking. OFDM signals play an important role
in modern communication systems like, e.g., the wireless
LAN systems IEEE 802.11 a/g and IEEE 802.16 (WiMAX)
or broadcasting systems like DAB and DVB-T. They are
also considered, together with MC-CDMA signals, as pos-
sible signal types for the fourth generation of mobile com-
munication systems.
Furthermore, many new OFDM modems are used for pro-
fessional application. These modems can be used together
with conventional radio sets. As a consequence, the occur-
rence of this signal type on the air is expected not only in
the provided frequency ranges, e.g., the 2.4 GHz or 5 GHz
bands, but in the whole interesting radio frequency range,
i.e., from high frequency (HF) over very high frequency
(VHF) to ultra high frequency (UHF). The main advantages
of OFDM signals are their effective utilization of a preset
frequency bandwidth and their robustness to impairments
of the transmission channel, especially frequency selective
fading.
Disadvantages of OFDM signals are their great demands
on amplifier linearity and the necessity to provide a high
precision for time and frequency synchronization. To al-
leviate the synchronization, OFDM signals are transmitted
in block form and, typically, every block is preceded by
a guard interval in which delayed versions of multi-path
signal parts of the respective preceding block are expected.
In a cooperative receiver these guard intervals are processed
in another way than the signal parts containing the infor-
mation so that the undesired effects of multi-path reception
can be minimized.
One of the most demanding steps in designing an automatic
detection and classification procedure is to find appropriate
features with which the target signal type can be discrimi-
nated from other signal types. In the case of OFDM signals
as discussed here, the aim is to find and evaluate several
features suited for discrimination of the complete signal
with all used frequency channels and to avoid the neces-
sity to handle individual channels in advance. Otherwise,
attempting to achieve such a channel separation, a very pre-
cise synchronization of frequency and time would be neces-
sary which is not available at this level of signal processing,
especially for a non-cooperative monitoring receiver. So,
the particular number of frequency channels of an observed
OFDM signal should not be relevant for the discrimination
features which have to be found. After an automatic de-
tection of an OFDM signal however, the estimation of the
number of frequency channels is desired.
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In this paper the extraction and the evaluation of altogether
seven discrimination features are described. Before extract-
ing the features a certain preprocessing of the signal sam-
ples is necessary.
2. Signals and preprocessing
For the considerations below it is assumed that the detec-
tion of signal energy and the segmentation in time and
frequency were done in advance and that the signal sample
was down converted appropriately to the centre frequency
zero, resampled and filtered according to that bandwidth
value which resulted from the spectral segmentation pro-
cess. The final sampling rate was chosen with an oversam-
pling factor of four with respect to the significant signal
bandwidth.
Fig. 1. A typical HF OFDM signal: (a) spectrum; (b) spectrum
after preprocessing; (c) histogram of magnitude ρ , time domain;
(d) histogram of phase ϕ/pi , time domain.
To get an impression of the preprocessing, some charac-
teristics of a typical HF OFDM signal with 39 frequency
channels are shown in Fig. 1. In Fig. 1a the spectrum of
the recorded real valued signal is depicted. As typical for
OFDM signals with appreciable guard intervals, a picket-
fence shape of the spectrum is observed. This shape is
used to develop an efficient discrimination feature which
will be described in Section 4. Figure 1b shows the spec-
trum after the preprocessing was completed. The signal is
now complex valued. In Fig. 1c the histogram of the sig-
nal magnitude ρ and in Fig. 1d the histogram of the phase
ϕ/pi are depicted. The shapes of the histograms resem-
ble those for white Gausian noise (WGN), i.e., a Rayleigh
distribution for the magnitude and a uniform distribution
for the phase. This is not surprising because the distri-
bution of a superposition of many sine waves with equal
amplitudes, equidistant frequencies, and different phases is
approximately a Gaussian distribution. This fact will be
utilized for the choice and the evaluation of the first six
discrimination features which will be discussed in the next
section.
Table 1
Considered signals
Signal
Name Remarksno.
1 QPSK∞
Quaternary phase shift
keying; SNR = ∞
2 QPSK14 SNR = 14 dB
3 QPSK8 SNR = 8 dB
4 QPSK2 SNR = 2 dB
5 WGN White Gaussian noise
Rockwell modem; 39 chan-
6 ROC-39CH-MIL-1 nels; military version;
sample 1
Rockwell modem; 39 chan-
7 ROC-39CH-MIL-2 nels; military version;
sample 2; strong fading
8 NATO-39CH-1
NATO modem; 39 chan-
nels; sample 1
9 NATO-39CH-2
NATO modem; 39 chan-
nels; sample 2
10 BGR-39CH-TFC
Bulgaria; 39 channels;
traffic
11 BGR-39CH-IDLE-1
Bulgaria; 39 channels; idle
(no traffic); sample 1
12 BGR-39CH-IDLE-2
Bulgaria; 39 channels; idle
(no traffic); sample 2
13 CHN-39CH China; 39 channels
14 CZE-39CH
Czech Republic; 39 chan-
nels
15 MILST-39CH-S
Mil-standard 188-110a;
39 channels; short sample
16 RUS-45CH-TFC
Russia; 45 channels;
traffic
17 RUS-60CH-TFC Russia; 60 channels;
traffic
18 MT-63CH Multi-tone; 63 channels
19 NLD-64CH Netherlands; 64 channels
20 RUS-93CH-TFC
Russia; 93 channels;
traffic
21 RUS-93CH-IDLE
Russia; 93 channels; idle
(no traffic)
Table 1 shows a list of the considered signals. The sig-
nals no. 1 to 5 are synthetically generated ones which were
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selected as typical non-OFDM signal types to verify the
discrimination capability of the selected features described
below. Signals 1 to 4 are single frequency channel qua-
ternary phase shift keying (QPSK) signals with decreasing
signal-to-noise ratios (SNRs) and signal 5 is a white Gaus-
sian noise signal (WGN). The other signals are real-world
OFDM samples recorded from the HF range.
These signals have different total bandwidths, different
numbers of frequency channels, different symbol rates, dif-
ferent quality, and different sample lengths. The sample
lengths vary from about 40,000 to about 100,000 (after re-
sampling). These numbers seem large but their sizes have
to be related to the over-sampling factor and to the number
of frequency channels. The used oversampling factor is
four. The frequency channel numbers range from 39 to 93.
For the estimation of the spectrum details the number of
symbols per frequency channel is important and the corre-
sponding information content in the sample is only 1/(chan-
nel number) of the whole sample information. From a sta-
tistical point of view the different sample lengths are not
satisfying, but, this fact corresponds to real scenarios and
the signal processing has to cope with it. The signals are
ordered according to increasing numbers of used frequency
channels. Several signal types are represented with various
samples which have different characteristics. For some sig-
nals also samples with idle mode (no information is trans-
mitted) are included.
All signals were preprocessed as described above. The
relevant bandwidth value of the QPSK signals was cho-
sen as the symbol rate and the out of band spectral parts
were filtered out with the same low pass filter which was
used for all other signals too. The WGN signal was gener-
ated and also filtered with the same low pass filter. So, after
filtering, it had a bandwidth of one quarter of the sampling
rate too. With these preprocessing steps all signals were
scaled concerning their bandwidth and their sampling rate,
respectively. Additionally, the signal power was scaled. All
simulations were performed on a PC with MATLAB.
3. Discrimination features based on
statistical measures
Several features are considered which are based on mea-
sures of the moments µ and σ and/or percentiles Py. The
percentile Py is the resulting abscissa value of a preselected
ordinate value y of a distribution function, e.g., for y = 50%
the median P50 results. The inclusion of tests for specific
distribution functions like chi-square test or Kolmogorov-
Smirnov test was abandoned because these tests turned
out to be not robust enough for a reliable discrimination
of the different signal types. The selected features are:
the coefficient of variation VARCO, the skewness SKEW,
the kurtosis KUR, and three alternative measures compa-
rable to the first three ones but derived by using several
percentile values, VARCOAL, SKEWAL, and KURAL. The
first five measures are usual ones for statistical applica-
tions [3] while the last one is an own composition. The six
features are:
VARCO =
σρ
µρ
(1)
with ρ – signal magnitude,
SKEW =
E
{(
ρ− µρ
)3}
σ3ρ
, (2)
KUR =
E
{(
ρ− µρ
)4}
σ4ρ
−3 , (3)
VARCOAL = P75−P25
P75 + P25
(4)
with Py− y percent percentile
of the distribution of ρ ,
SKEWAL =
µρ −P50
σρ
(5)
with −1≤ SKEWAL≤ 1 ,
KURAL =
1
6
(P37.5−P25)nor
(P37.5−P25)
+
1
3
(P50−P37.5)nor
(P50−P37.5)
+
1
3
(P62.5−P50)nor
(P62.5−P50)
+
1
6
(P75−P62.5)nor
(P75−P62.5)
−1 . (6)
All features measures are not evaluated for the complex
signal values but for their magnitudes ρ because the exact
synchronization to the signal was not yet done at this level
of signal processing. So, some inaccuracies in the preced-
ing estimation of the centre frequency and its compensa-
tion influence the results only marginally. The aim of using
these features is the discrimination between strong single
channel signals and OFDM, multitone signals or noise like
signals. The discrimination between OFDM or multi-tone
signals and noise like signals is not possible with these fea-
tures. This discrimination will be carried out with another
feature which will be described in the next section.
In the following, the results of the six features are discussed.
In Fig. 2 the results of the coefficient of variation, VARCO,
are depicted. VARCO has small results if the standard vari-
ation of the considered variable ρ is small compared to its
mean. For the strong single channel QPSK signals, sig-
nals 1 and 2 (compare Table 1), VARCO is comparatively
small. The resulting values increase for the QPSK signals
with decreasing SNRs (signals 3 and 4) until a value above
0.5 is reached for the magnitude of WGN. The theoretical
value of a Rayleigh distributed variable is 0.5227 and is
depicted in Fig. 2 with a dashed line. Without regard to
the signals 19, 20, and 21 the results for the OFDM sig-
nals are all > 0.45. So, a decision level for discrimination
from single channel signals has to be set to a value be-
tween 0.37 and 0.45 depending on the accepted error rate.
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The signals 19, 20, and 21 with their comparatively low re-
sulting values belong to those considered HF OFDM types
with the higher channel numbers (64 and 93). Apparently,
they have a smaller amplitude variance.
Fig. 2. Coefficient of variation.
From a theoretical point of view it may be interesting to
have some information about the variance of the VARCO
values of the particular signals themselves, i.e., their intra
signal variance. But, we found out that the statistical vari-
ance of a single signal is smaller normally than the variance
caused by the different considered signals, i.e., the intra sig-
nal variance is smaller than the inter signal variance. So,
to keep the clearness of the picture and not to be forced to
divide the available real-world signal samples into shorter
segments the mean values of the whole signal samples are
estimated and depicted only. The same facts are also valid
for the other discrimination features which are discussed in
the sequel.
Fig. 3. Skewness.
In Fig. 3 the results of the skewness, SKEW, are de-
picted. The skewness is zero for symmetrically distributed
variables. It is negative if the distribution density func-
tion is skewed to the left and positive if it is skewed to
the right. The Rayleigh distributed variable resulting for
the magnitude ρ of a complex WGN has a skewness of
0.6311 which is indicated in the figure by a dashed line
and approximated by signal 5. As observed in Fig. 3, the
principal arrangement of the results is similar to that for
the VARCO results. Here, a decision level of about 0.2
seems to be adapted to discriminate most of the considered
OFDM signals.
Fig. 4. Kurtosis.
Figure 4 shows the results of the kurtosis, KUR. The kur-
tosis is a measure of flatness of a distribution density func-
tion near its centre. Positive values are sometimes used
to indicate that a density is more peaked around its cen-
tre than a normal curve and negative values could indicate
that a density is more flat around its centre than a normal
curve. The kurtosis of a Rayleigh distributed variable is
0.2451 which is indicated in the figure by a dashed line
and approximated by WGN, signal 5. The results in Fig. 4
indicate that the QPSK signal without noise (signal 1) has
a more peaked density than the other signals. But, KUR
has a very large inter signal variance and seems to be not
well suited for discrimination. A reason will be that the
fourth moment used for its computation is too sensitive to
Fig. 5. Alternative coefficient of variation.
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variations of the channel and/or the content of signal infor-
mation.
The next feature, an alternative coefficient of variation,
VARCOAL, is computed with the 25% and 75% percentiles
and has principally similar results as the coefficient of vari-
ation VARCO in Fig. 2 but with less inter signal variance
of the results, see Fig. 5. So, VARCOAL seems to be some-
what better suited as a discrimination feature than the orig-
inal coefficient of variation VARCO. With the dashed line
the theoretical result of a Rayleigh distributed variable is
depicted again.
The results of an alternative measure of skewness, SKE-
WAL, computed by using not only the mean and the stan-
dard deviation but also the median (P50) are depicted
in Fig. 6. The results are similar to those of the origi-
nal skewness, i.e., the OFDM signals 19 to 21 cannot be
separated.
Fig. 6. Alternative measure of skewness.
Fig. 7. Alternative measure of kurtosis.
The results of an alternative measure of kurtosis, KU-
RAL, composed of percentiles together with an appropri-
ate weighting (see Eq. (6)) are depicted in Fig. 7. The
inter signal variance of the OFDM signals and WGN is
comparatively low. This feature seems well suited for dis-
criminating between OFDM respectively WGN and strong
single channel signals.
In Figs. 6 and 7 the theoretical results of a Rayleigh dis-
tributed variable are again depicted with dashed lines.
4. Feature from evaluation
of the spectrum shape
The important remaining task is the discrimination between
OFDM on one side and a noise like signal, e.g., signal 5
(WGN), or signals without the specific picket-fence shape
of their spectra on the other side. An appropriate feature
is developed by evaluating the spectral shape. Therefore
a spectrum estimate has to be made available. But, this
can be taken from the preprocessing procedure where the
spectrum has been estimated for the spectral segmentation
mentioned in Section 2. The spectrum has to be limited
sharply to that part containing high power density. From
that spectrum part the cepstrum is computed: the loga-
rithmic spectrum values are transformed with the Fourier
transform, i.e., the digital Fourier transform (DFT) in the
simulation. The use of the magnitude values of the spec-
trum makes this computation a non-linear operation. If
the analysed spectrum shape has a regular ripple structure,
which is typical for many OFDM signals, a significant peak
is observed in the cepstrum. The abscissa value of the peak
corresponds to the number of periods of the ripple. It is
found out that a more distinct peak appearance is reached
in the cepstrum in general if the logarithmic spectrum val-
ues are weighted with a window function before computing
the DFT. For the simulations a Hanning window is used.
Fig. 8. The HF OFDM signal used for Fig. 1: (a) spectrum;
(b) cepstrum, zoom 1; (c) cepstrum, zoom 2.
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As an example, the relevant part of the spectrum and the
cepstrum of the same HF OFDM signal used for Fig. 1 are
shown in Fig. 8. Figure 8a shows the relevant spectrum
part, Figs. 8b and 8c depict cepstrum results with differ-
ent zooms. For a better resolution the cepstrum values are
computed with an interpolation factor of four (DFT length
of 4096). In the cepstrum graphs a significant peak is ob-
served at the abscissa value of approximately 157. After
dividing by the interpolation factor of four the result is
39.25 which is a good estimate of the number of frequency
channels of this signal which is 39. The detection and eval-
uation of such a significant peak can be done automatically.
The maximal cepstral peak or, if existing, the two largest
peaks with significant level have to be detected ignoring
the cepstrum part at the low interval numbers which is not
relevant for finding the interesting channel number of an
OFDM signal. As a measure of quality of the significant
peak its contrast is determined. The contrast is defined here
as the difference between peak and maximal side-lobe level
(in dB). The maximal side-lobe level is searched within
a range of +/– the peak width beside the low ends of the
interesting peak.
For comparison purposes the corresponding results of the
WGN signal are depicted in Fig. 9. As expected, no sig-
nificant peaks are observed in the corresponding cepstrum.
So, a regular ripple structure in the signal spectrum is not
indicated.
Fig. 9. The WGN signal: (a) spectrum; (b) cepstrum, zoom 1;
(c) cepstrum, zoom 2.
For all considered signals the appropriate contrast values
are depicted in Fig. 10. Signals 1 to 5 do not show re-
markable contrast values. Signal 1 to 4 are the QPSK
signals and signal 5 is the WGN signal. On the other hand,
the OFDM signals, signals 6 to 21, show significant contrast
values although with an appreciable inter signal variance.
The signals 11 and 12 with the smallest contrast results
are OFDM signals in idle mode, i.e. in non-traffic mode.
Frequently, those signal modes do not have well stamped
ripple structures in their spectra and the contrast values in
their cepstra are less significant. The results of the sig-
nals 11, 15, and 21, indicated with bold black star symbols
and linearly connected with the other results, are the respec-
tive largest contrasts found. But, these contrast values do
not correspond to those cepstral peaks which are adjoined to
the numbers of system traffic channels these systems have.
Fig. 10. Contrast of significant cepstral peaks.
The reason is that the observed signal samples are some
of those ones with idle mode or partly idle mode. Typi-
cally, idle mode signals have many lines, sharply peaked,
in their spectra. Consequently, the cepstral peaks with the
largest contrast values belong to the spectral patterns with
the sharply peaked lines. But, for those signals, the cep-
stral peaks corresponding to the system channel numbers
are the ones with the second large values. The results are
indicated in Fig. 10 with isolated star symbols. To sum
up, the respective maximal contrast values are connected
linearly and the contrast values corresponding to the sys-
tem channel numbers are always depicted with small star
symbols.
As observed from Fig. 10, for the discrimination between
the considered OFDM signals and other signal types a de-
cision level of 7 to 10 dB for the contrast would be appro-
priate. By evaluating not only the contrast of the cepstral
peaks but their abscissa values too, the channel number
and, for idle mode OFDM signals or other signal types, the
spectral peak structure can be determined.
With the described feature, not only the discrimination be-
tween OFDM and a noise like signal (WGN) is possible
but also the discrimination between OFDM and the other
signal types which have no significant regular spectral rip-
ples like QPSK. As result, this discrimination feature is an
efficient one.
35
Ferdinand Liedtke and Ulrike Albers
5. Conclusions
With the developed discrimination features an automatic
recognition of OFDM signals becomes possible. The dis-
crimination capabilities of the considered features are dif-
ferent.
From the two coefficients of variation the alternative one
computed with percentile values shows a smaller inter sig-
nal variance and, therefore, it is more appropriate for dis-
crimination. The two measures of skewness can discrim-
inate most of the OFDM signals but fail for some types
with higher channel numbers. The normal kurtosis mea-
sure is less suited for discrimination. Apparently, it is too
sensitive to different channel conditions and/or transmitted
signal mode (traffic or idle). Contrary to the original kurto-
sis, the alternative measure composed of percentile values
results in a well suited discrimination feature with small in-
ter signal variance. The last feature considered is obtained
from evaluation of the spectrum to identify the picket-fence
shape which is typical for many OFDM signals. This effi-
cient feature is developed by computation of the cepstrum
and evaluation of the largest peaks detected herein. The
contrast values of these peaks, exceeding preset decision
levels, are used.
Additionally, the number of frequency channels or the
structure of the spectrum can be estimated from the ab-
scissa values of the significant cepstral peaks. This feature
also discriminates between OFDM and noise like signals.
To develop a complete automatic recognition procedure,
the following further steps need to be performed: consid-
eration of more signal samples and tests including synthet-
ically generated signals too, weighting and fusion of the
selected discrimination features, and choosing an appropri-
ate classification algorithm.
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Abstract—Wireless sensor networks can be used by the mil-
itary for a number of purposes such as monitoring militant
activity in remote areas and force protection. Being equipped
with appropriate sensors these networks can enable detection
of enemy movement, identification of enemy force and analy-
sis of their movement and progress. The focus of this article
is on the military requirements for flexible wireless sensor
networks. Based on the main networking characteristics and
military use-cases, insight into specific military requirements
is given in order to facilitate the reader’s understanding of
the operation of these networks in the near to medium term
(within the next three to eight years). The article structures
the evolution of military sensor networking devices by identi-
fying three generations of sensors along with their capabilities.
Existing developer solutions are presented and an overview of
some existing tailored products for the military environment
is given. The article concludes with an analysis of outstanding
engineering and scientific challenges in order to achieve fully
flexible, security proved, ad hoc, self-organizing and scalable
military sensor networks.
Keywords— wireless sensor networks, military sensor applica-
tions, joint intelligence surveillance reconnaissance (JISR), mil-
itary sensors, energy efficient routing, WSN generations.
1. Introduction
There have been large amounts of research undertaken dur-
ing the past decade in the areas of ad hoc networking and
wireless sensor networks (WSNs) and significant progress
has been achieved. Possible civilian use-cases for such
networks include industrial plant monitoring and environ-
mental monitoring. However, one area commonly cited as
a primary use of sensor networks is for military benefit.
Frequently, assumptions are stated regarding the require-
ments for military networks to motivate the work. The aim
of this paper is to explore the military requirements of wire-
less sensor networks in the near to medium term (three to
eight years) and to identify areas of research which would
improve military usability.
2. The main characteristics of a sensor
network
Wireless ad hoc sensor networks generally consist of a vari-
able number of stationary sensors (also known as nodes)
spread across a geographical area. The capabilities of
these nodes typically comprise monitoring the environ-
ment and capturing specific information; the transmission
of collected (and possibly preprocessed) data; as well as
the forwarding of data obtained from neighbor nodes us-
ing wireless bearers1. A typical network structure is shown
in Fig. 1.
Fig. 1. Network set-up of a typical wireless ad hoc sensor net-
work.
The information flow in a wireless sensor network will in
general be from the sensor nodes to one or more wireless
sensor network gateways. The network gateways can serve
as data fusion points and provide reach-back capability. The
reach-back capability can be based on different approaches
such as:
– near real time connection, e.g., via longer range wire-
less transmissions (high frequency) or via a satellite
link;
– asynchronous data transfer to passing unmanned
aerial vehicles (UAVs).
Data processing can generally occur in three areas of the
sensor network as shown in Fig. 2.
Processing can be carried out on the sensor node itself (such
as the removal of unwanted signals from a target signal).
Processing at the node reduces the amount of data to be
passed over the network. This ensures that data loadings
can be kept within the capacity capabilities of the radio
system. In general, power consumption for the transmission
of data is greater than the power consumption required to
1It is worth noting that by appropriately equipping sensor nodes with ac-
tive capabilities, the network can operate actively as well as passively. The
Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency (DARPA) Wolfpack concept
of small, low-cost distributed jammers exemplifies an active network [1].
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Fig. 2. Processing within a sensor network.
perform the same amount of processing data, thus there are
power efficiency benefits in processing the data at source.
Data processing can also be used to alleviate the amount of
processing to be carried out at any gateways in the system.
However, some data processing depends on data coming
from multiple sources and therefore processing at source is
not always possible.
Data processing can also be distributed within the network.
This can be especially useful in large networks as it not
only alleviates the amount of processing at the gateway but
dramatically reduces the data loading which sensor nodes
have to relay across the network. Hierarchical topologies
lend themselves easily to perform distributed processing at
“head” or “cluster” nodes (i.e., those nodes which logically
“manage” other nodes in the hierarchy). However, there is
an overhead associated with distributed processing. Either
extra routing overhead is required to be able to pass data
to be processed to specified nodes, or flooding techniques
must be employed. Flooding techniques will forward user
data to all or a limited subgroup of nodes thus negating the
need for routing overhead traffic. These techniques allow
unprocessed data to be exchanged between nodes adjacent
to an “event” so that they can each do the processing re-
quired to locate the event. Then only the processed infor-
mation is passed back to the gateway.
Finally, data can be processed at the gateway node(s). This
allows the gateway to minimize the data it will send over
the reach-back channel. Processing at the gateway thus will
enable less power to be consumed in reach-back transmis-
sions thus increasing the gateway’s longevity and subse-
quently the lifetime of the whole network (as the gateway
node is frequently the first node to fail due to depletion of
its power source).
3. Military requirements
One of the main drivers for investigating wireless sensor
networks is their use in military applications. The military
use-cases for wireless sensor networks are diverse. They
encompass applications such as:
– monitoring militant activity in remote areas of spe-
cific interest (e.g., key roads, villages);
– force protection (e.g., ensuring that buildings which
have been cleared remain clear from infiltration by
an adversary).
One prominent use-case which has received a great deal
of interest from military personnel recently is base protec-
tion (or force protection in general). A possible set-up is
depicted in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Wireless sensors in support of base protection (e.g., mak-
ing use of acoustic as well as electro-optical sensors).
Having deployed a headquarters in an area of active en-
gagement it is essential to prevent the base from being
attacked. The surrounding terrain may be undulating or
mountainous and potentially could be obscured in trees
and vegetation. Attack could come in the form of militant
groups on foot or with motor vehicles.
In order to facilitate an early detection, the perimeter pro-
tection in Fig. 3 would cover a belt around the camp of up
to 4 km, while in practice ranges of up to 10 km might
be a requirement. Detection may be needed throughout
the whole of this range whilst identification may only be
required within a belt of around one to 1–2 km around
the base.
3.1. Typical assumptions in the research community
Military applications are a primary use of wireless sen-
sor networking and are best served by informed research
that avoids making assumptions that are based on presumed
military requirements. Many research papers propose algo-
rithms for network sizes of thousands of sensor nodes and
above. It is assumed that sensor nodes will be extremely
small, lightweight and cheap. These are combined with
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the need for long battery lifetime. These assumptions have
led to the following requirements:
– tailored routing and transport protocols are needed;
– short distances between nodes (often just a few me-
tres) are taken for granted;
– special-purpose operating systems are required.
In practice these assumptions are more challenging than
required in the near-term for current military needs while
other aspects such as tamper-resistance are not sufficiently
addressed. The following section gives an insight into cur-
rent requirements for sensor networks in the military envi-
ronment.
3.2. Realistic assumptions for military usage
In order to facilitate a meaningful operation of wireless
sensor networks for military purposes in the near to medium
term, there are a number of requirements which the military
expect to be met.
Physical attributes of sensors. It is likely that the sen-
sor nodes themselves could be hand deployed in advance
of an operation. They could be transported to the area of
deployment by vehicle. Thus the physical size and weight
of the sensor need not be a major constraint. Sensor nodes
the size of a matchbox, although desirable, are not cur-
rently expected and a sensor node (without including an-
tenna) of order 20–30 cm in height would be acceptable.
In occasional instances sensor nodes may be air dropped or
deployed through a rocket launcher and would need to be
suitably ruggedized.
Self-configuration after deployment. Sensor nodes must
be able to rapidly identify neighbours within communica-
tions range and configure themselves into an ad hoc net-
work. The network is likely to remain reasonably static as
sensor nodes are unlikely to be moved during operation.
The network should be able to cope with a node failing
and reconfiguration of the network should occur without
manual intervention.
Network size. For the majority of operations the area to be
covered by the network may be between 5–20 km2. Gen-
erally a communications range between nodes of around
250–500 m would be acceptable. This would amount to
networks with less than 100 nodes being required. In oc-
casional cases communication ranges of greater than 1 km
would be desirable.
Information flows. Initially one-way communications can
be seen as sufficient, i.e., from the sensor network to the
WSN gateway and beyond. This is sufficient to achieve im-
proved situational awareness for the warfighter as well as
for the commander. In the medium term some degree of
control within the network will be beneficial, e.g., the abil-
ity to orient cameras. This would however necessitate the
need for communications in both directions. This need for
two way communications should be reflected in the network
security concept in order to avoid information leakage be-
tween a stub sensor network and the core military network
to which it is attached.
Duration of usage. Some networks are only required to
operate for periods of days, although generally periods of
one to two months can be seen as a reasonable for military
sensor networks. In the base protection example (Fig. 3)
an exchange of batteries is practical and could extend the
lifetime further. In some instances the network may not
require to be functional throughout the whole day (perhaps
only needed at night) or transmission of data from the WSN
gateways may only be needed two or three times a day.
Physically and electronically inconspicuous operation. It
would be beneficial if the nodes were covert in appearance
with a small electromagnetic emission pattern so as to re-
main hidden from potential adversaries.
Data type. Even limited amounts of text (< 30 bytes) can
help to ensure information superiority by identifying an
incident and providing location reports. This means data
transmission rates do not need to be high. However, mil-
itary commanders are likely to request imagery and video
(both real-time and non-real time) in the future.
Data reliability. In many cases it is vital to ensure that
data has been received by the end-user successfully, and
techniques to guarantee delivery should be included. Also
data should be received in a secure manner without the
opportunity for interception and tampering by any eaves-
dropper.
Denial of service. Any network should be able to react
against a denial of service attack by an adversary, at least
by providing the means to report the incident of an attack
such as jamming.
Tamper-proof. The data held on the node along with any
crypto material must not be available to any third party even
if the node itself is captured. The sensor nodes should have
anti-tamper mechanisms in-built to address this.
Costs. As relevant information can be gained by the use of
networks with just a few tens of sensors, and the retrieval
of sensors after use might be desirable (e.g., for security
reasons), the price for a single node is generally not as
critical as in the “civil Bluetooth-focussed market”.
4. Current technologies
4.1. Generations of sensor products
In a similar fashion to the evolution of mobile cellular tech-
nologies, it is possible to describe the evolution of military
sensor devices in terms of generations.
First generation sensor networks (1GSN). Sensor net-
works consist of individual sensor devices. Deployment is
via manual emplacement. The network is fully preconfig-
ured. Access to information is via manual retrieval of the
device itself, or long-range point-to-point communication
links.
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Second generation sensor networks (2GSN). Sensors
work in collaboration to cover an area. The network is typ-
ically a hub and spoke formation with a small number of
sensors (typically 3 or 4) communicating with a control
node equipped with a reach-back link. They are typically
manually deployed, relying heavily on preconfiguration.
Third generation sensor networks (3GSN). The latest
generation of sensors encompasses self-organising, flexible
and scalable networks. Sensors communicate with one an-
other for two purposes, communications services (e.g., au-
tomatic relaying of messages to a network gateway) and
in-network processing (data aggregation and data fusion).
Sensor networks can contain many tens or even hundreds
of nodes. Deployment can be hand-emplaced or remotely
air-dropped. The sensors are able to establish and – if re-
quired – publish and make use of their own geographic
location, e.g., based on global positioning system (GPS).
4.2. Fully integrated solutions
Companies such as SenTech, Textron and Lockheed Mar-
tin have systems with a variety of sensors (including seis-
mic, acoustic, infrared) which transfer their data directly
to a ground station over a number of long-range non-line
of sight bearers (including satcom, very high frequency
and high frequency bearers). These generally fit into the
1GSN category of networks where each node is equipped
with its own backhaul system.
There is a number of 2GSN systems becoming available
such as the Terrain Commander and Future Combat Sys-
tem from Textron Systems, or the Falcon Watch System
from Harris which will provide processed information from
a number of sensors (including acoustic, seismic, magnetic,
electro-optical and passive infrared). However, in general,
there are very few of the 2GSN systems on the market. Nei-
ther, the 1GSN or 2GSN systems are truly ad hoc multi-hop
in nature requiring either a direct link back to a remote
ground station or a direct link back to a gateway node.
There are a few 3GSN ad hoc systems advertised although
many of these appear to be immature and still at proof-of-
concept stage.
The majority of the systems are aimed at military use (as
well as industrial plant monitoring) and many of them cite
perimeter protection as their main function (for both mili-
tary assets and civilian assets such as airstrips).
4.3. Wireless sensor network components
Flexible ad hoc sensor networking needs to be supported by
tailored network components such as the sensors themselves
and special-purpose routing protocols. Significant scientific
and engineering effort has been spent on some of these
components which is reflected in the following.
Routing protocols should enable self-configuration after
network deployment. They have influence on traffic latency
(as some routing protocols will find routes at set-up whilst
others require a route to be found prior to each transmis-
sion of user traffic), on networking overhead, on energy
efficiency, on the speed of network recovery in case of
failures, on traffic assurance. Three main classes of routing
protocols for energy-efficient wireless sensor networks have
been identified [2–4]:
• Hierarchical/node-centric. Most routing protocols
follow this approach. These protocols aim at clus-
tering the nodes so that “cluster heads” can perform
some aggregation. This reduces the amount of data
to be transmitted and saves energy. The scalability
of these protocols is very good. However, their rout-
ing tables may take time to converge (i.e., choose the
most appropriate route) if frequent network topology
changes occur (which can happen if nodes can tran-
sition into suspend mode to conserve energy).
• Location based/position-centric. This routing class
is based on the exact (GPS) or relative (triangulation,
analysis of neighbor dependencies) position of the
single nodes. The distance between sensor nodes can
be used to estimate the required transmission power
which facilitates energy efficient routing.
• Data-centric. In the data-centric approach the sensor
network is seen from the application point of view
as a pool of data. The interface to the network will
forward a query and the network will return the data
to satisfy the query condition. The routing is driven
by the query of the application, not on the identity
of the involved nodes or sensors. The underlying im-
plementation of the routing protocol might still be
hierarchical/node-centric, and it may only be the in-
terface available to the user that is data-centric.
Other classification of routing protocols for wireless sensor
networks can characterize the network by their ability to
make use of multipath transmissions, to aggregate data and
to eliminate redundant information:
• Multipath. The main reason for transmissions via
several paths is to provide tolerance to faults in the
network. The protocols address the fact that they
take advantage of more than one route to the gateway.
Mechanisms must be integrated to ensure that only
limited (or ideally no) redundant information will be
produced.
• Data processing. Data processing can be performed
at different places in the network as discussed in the
context of Fig. 2. Intelligent data aggregation allows
the network to operate in an energy efficient manner
as less data needs to flow over the network.
• Negotiation based. High level data descriptors can
be used to eliminate redundant information through
negotiation. The nodes will send negotiation mes-
sages to prevent or suppress the exchange of dupli-
cated or unwanted information. It is important to en-
sure that the level of negotiation overhead is limited.
A selection of routing protocols for wireless sensor net-
works which are subdivided into classes and associated
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Table 1
Routing protocols with associated characteristics
Routing protocol Node-centric
Position-
Data-centric Multipath
Data Negotiation
centric processing based
LEACH [5] X X X
PEGASIS [6] X X
Tiny-AODV [7] X X
MECN [8] X
Geographic adaptive fidelity [9] X X
GEAR [10] X
SPIN [11] X X X X
Directed diffusion [12] X X X X
Rumor routing [13] X X
Gradient-based routing [14] X X
COUGAR [15] X X
with the above-mentioned characteristics is shown in Ta-
ble 1. The presented protocols are just a sample of the
protocols discussed in literature. The usage of these proto-
cols in available products is however still rare and generally
non-specialized protocols such as optimized link state rout-
ing (OSLR) are used as these protocols are more mature.
In the future, disruption tolerant networking (DTN) tech-
niques [16, 17] may receive further attention. These help
to provide end-to-end communications in networks with
large delays and/or frequent interruptions. Also the connec-
tion of the sensor network through the network gateways to
the end application might profit from this approach – espe-
cially if this reach-back capability is not always present as
in the case of the UAV relay.
Medium access control (MAC). The medium access con-
trol scheme defines how multiple radios will access the
medium and is used to avoid collisions should two or more
radios wish to transmit simultaneously. The MAC scheme
has an influence on the efficiency of a distributed sen-
sor network in three ways: throughput, delay and energy.
Throughput can suffer due to collisions when two or more
nodes transmit information at the same time. This wastes
energy as well as introducing longer periods of idle listen-
ing. Within the range of specialized MAC protocols for
wireless sensor networks, two generic types can be identi-
fied [18]:
• Scheduled protocols. These are time division mul-
tiple access (TDMA) based protocols mostly used
in combination with hierarchical/node centric rout-
ing protocols as cluster heads are needed for syn-
chronization purposes.
• Contention protocols. Carrier sense multiple access
(CSMA) is an important part of the contention based
protocols. Modifications of the MAC scheme of
the Institute of Electrical and Electronic Engineers
(IEEE) 802.11 family addressing frequency changes
as well as protocol optimizations can be found.
Within existing wireless sensor products and developer
kits the use of “Commercial off the Shelf” (COTS) proto-
cols stemming from wireless local area network (WLAN),
Bluetooth or Zigbee are common, and mature implementa-
tions of specialized MAC protocols are rare.
Transmission technologies. Based on an analysis of mil-
itary use-cases it becomes apparent that low data rates of
just a few kilobits per second can often be sufficient while
transmission ranges of a few tens of metres or better a few
hundreds of metres are desirable. Sufficient coverage can
then be achieved based on multi-hopping (allowing inter-
mediate nodes to relay data). This hopping concept has
the additional positive effect, that the output power can be
reduced facilitating a low probability of detection and in-
terception.
In case of other signals being transmitted within the same
frequency band – be it due to other users or to jam-
ming – the transmission technology should provide some
robustness against narrowband interference. Combined
with the desire to achieve inconspicuous operation, the
following transmission technologies can subsequently be
seen as prominent for use in military wireless sensor net-
works:
– direct sequence spread spectrum (DS-SS),
– frequency hopping spread spectrum (FH-SS),
– pulsed ultra-wideband (UWB).
In many prototype networks, COTS chipsets are being used
providing transmission based on:
– Bluetooth (FH-SS),
– ZigBee (IEEE 802.15.4/WPAN, DS-SS) or
– WLAN (IEEE 802.11b using DS-SS as well).
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Table 2
Developer platforms and their operating systems (updated and expanded from [22])
RAM
Program Nonvolatile
Tiny OS Mantis
Platform MCU
[KB]
memory data memory Radio chip Tiny OS
V2 OS
SOS
[KB] [KB]
BTnode3 ATMega128 64 128 180 CC1000
X X
ZV4002 Bluet.
Cricket ATMega128 4 128 512 CC1000 X
imote ARM 7 64 512 0 ZV4002 Bluet. X
imote2 Intel PXA271 256 32 ·108 0 CC2420 X X
MANTIS nymph ATMega 128 4 128 64 CC1000 X
mica ATMega 128 4 128 512 TR1000 X
mica2 ATMega 128 4 128 512 CC1000 X X X X
mica2Dot ATMega 128 4 128 512 CC1000 X X X
micaz ATMega 128 4 128 512 CC2420 X X X X
rene2 ATMega 163 1 8 32 TR1000 X
TelosA TI MSP430 2 60 512 CC2420 X
TelosB TI MSP430 10 48 1000 CC2420 X X X
Tmote Sky TI MSP430 10 48 1000 CC2420 X
tinynode TI MSP430 10 48 512 XE1205 X X
XYZ ARM 7 32 256 256 CC2420 X
However, while remaining within the legal power limits for
the respective frequency bands, the transmission ranges are
not generally sufficient with WLAN achieving only dis-
tances of around 200 metres in practice2.
Sensor types. A wide range of different sensor types which
are usable for wireless sensor applications are available on
the market:
– acoustic sensors,
– seismic sensors,
– magnetic sensors,
– infrared sensors,
– electro-optical sensors (closed circuit TV, etc.),
– electromagnetic sensors.
Significant effort is necessary for proper integration into
larger-scale sensor networks, and one of the greatest chal-
lenges is improving sensor accuracy to keep the false
alarm rate to a minimum. The need for a reliable detec-
tion of critical incidents has led to the use of multi-modal
sensors. The intelligent combination of sensors and their
joint accuracy are essential for future robust sensor ap-
2Dependent on terrain and other environmental factors and with an
omni-directional antenna.
plications. Furthermore, multi-modal sensors can minimize
the power consumption as well as the generated traffic,
e.g., if a video camera is enabled by an acoustic sensor
or an infrared sensor.
Security. There are a number of security solutions to the
issues inherent in a wireless sensor network. A wireless
sensor network is like any other data exchange network with
generic vulnerabilities and associated solutions including:
• Eavesdropping. The potential for an enemy to in-
tercept and decode messages passed between devices
in the sensor network. Protection is possible using
available civil crypto to prevent successful eavesdrop-
ping in a sensor network, particularly as the informa-
tion is generally of only short-term utility.
• Spoofing. The potential for a (non-legitimate) node
to pass itself off as a legitimate network node and
thereby subvert network exchanges. Current cryp-
tographic authentication mechanisms are available
which would be appropriate for wireless sensor net-
works.
• Message integrity. The ability of messages to be
passed between nodes unchanged or unmodified en-
route. Cryptographic protection and strong integrity
checks (e.g., secure hash) are available now and pro-
vide robust protection against message tampering and
replay attacks.
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• Denial of service. Preventing nodes in the network
from being able to access and use the radio network
to pass messages. Low-cost transceivers currently do
not have robust anti-jam capabilities making sensor
networks susceptible to this type of attack.
• Geolocation. The ability to locate the geographical
position of nodes in the sensor network by detecting
and receiving emissions from the devices. Reduc-
ing transmissions to an absolute minimum both in
duration and number reduces the chance that an ad-
versary will detect or locate a sensor network. This
optimization can be included in the protocol choice
and design. However, there will always be the danger
that an adversary will detect transmissions, particu-
larly if they suspect that an area contains a sensor
network.
• Physical compromise. The ability of an enemy to
extract useful intelligence and information out of
a sensor node that has been located and captured.
It is likely physical compromise can be addressed
through simple anti-tamper mechanisms, e.g., micro-
switches, and fill-purge mechanisms to purge system
memory of sensitive data. These are tried and tested
approaches to physical resilience.
4.4. Developer kits
A number of developer solutions (“developer kits”) which
include sensor platforms, operating systems and transmis-
sion technologies are currently available. These are useful
for research purposes as well as to foster the development of
versatile sensor network applications. Table 2 shows a sum-
marized overview of existing platforms including some of
their technical parameters.
5. Research opportunities
5.1. Engineering challenges
Current wireless sensor networks can make use of multi-
ple years of research on ad hoc networking, energy-efficient
routing and related areas. Consequently, the use-cases illus-
trated in this paper can be met to a greater or lesser extent
by existing technologies. The key challenges to deploying
military wireless sensor networks are more practical engi-
neering problems than fundamental research issues as listed
below:
– clear identification of several simultaneous events,
and a reliable correlation of information from neigh-
boring nodes;
– classification of objects and events in addition to their
pure detection; an automatic identification and classi-
fication of objects and events would support a quick
and appropriate reaction and would hence improve
the use for military purposes;
– improved integration of different types of sensors
(multi-modal sensors) for enhanced information re-
liability; as many events have a number of simul-
taneous effects such as creating not only noise but
also emitting electromagnetic waves, combining sen-
sors for a “joint detection” is expected to significantly
improve the reliability especially in challenging en-
vironments;
– radio communications for use of wireless sensors
in, specifically, urban warfare provides further chal-
lenges such as overcoming possibly strong interfer-
ence from many sources, shadowing from buildings
coupled with severe multipath transmission and at the
same time achieving sufficient coverage and energy-
efficiency with inconspicuous small-scale antennas
and electromagnetic patterns;
– miniaturization of sensors allowing for a quick and
automated network deployment and unsuspicious op-
eration;
– robustness of sensors for deployment from planes or
by rocket-launches;
– avoidance of data loops in large sensor networks;
– appropriate anti-tamper mechanisms;
– the optimization of sensor networks to provide the
most efficient coverage of a geographic area; a num-
ber of trade-offs need to be considered including cost
(minimizing the cost per unit area of coverage), com-
munications range, sensor range, device size, weight,
power, capability (e.g., detect and classify or just de-
tect), and deployment mechanisms;
– agree on common formats and standards for sensor
data and communications exchange.
5.2. Scientific challenges
Capabilities required for 3GSN sensor networks are far-
reaching, and the step from existing 2GSN to future 3GSN
truly ad hoc systems is huge. Research has still to address
a number of challenges in order to increase the usability,
flexibility and security, as well as to facilitate longer-term
operations. These challenges include:
– security, particularly regarding the effectiveness of
reputation approaches to protect against the injection
of spoof messages or jamming;
– suitable power supplies and energy efficient proto-
cols to meet the long-endurance applications where
networks may be in place for several months; this
includes power scavenging (e.g., EU IST VIBES
project [19, 20]) and novel power sources [21];
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– effective and efficient remote air delivery of sensors
ensuring even density and coverage across area;
– robustness of data fusion and analysis, ensuring that
data from multiple sensors can be appropriately pro-
cessed to accurately detect and track moving objects
even in the presence of measurement inaccuracies,
distortions and communications delays.
6. Conclusions
Wireless sensor networks will have a role to play for a num-
ber of military purposes such as enemy movement detection
and force tracking.
Comparing the actual military requirements with the cur-
rent research and the available products, some misalign-
ments become obvious. Much effort in current academic
research is spent on optimization, e.g., routing protocols to
work with tens of thousands of nodes, which are assumed to
be small, lightweight and cheap. The paper has addressed
the military requirements for actual costs per node, the cur-
rent mode of deployment (mainly manual network set-up)
and physical size. The limited existing products tend to
address the current military requirements in that they are
composed of larger sensor devices and consist only of small
numbers of nodes (often even < 30 nodes).
The key challenges to deploying military wireless sensor
networks are more practical engineering problems than fun-
damental research issues. However there are still outstand-
ing scientific challenges as stated in this paper. Urban
warfare scenarios are especially demanding and efforts such
as the optimization of multi-modal sensors need to be ad-
dressed.
The use of common formats for sensor data such as tex-
tual information or images facilitates information exchange
across network boundaries and promotes openness between
sensor network vendors. This allows those requiring kit to
purchase from multiple suppliers and keeps a competitive
market place open (i.e., no one supplier can monopolize
the supply base). The use of appropriate NATO STANAGs
(standardization agreements) is encouraged.
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Paper Developments
on an IEEE 802.15.4-based
wireless sensor network
Bart Scheers, Wim Mees, and Ben Lauwens
Abstract— In this paper a summary is given of the ongo-
ing research at the Belgian Royal Military Academy in the
field of mobile ad hoc networks in general and wireless sen-
sor networks (WSNs) in particular. In this study, all wireless
sensor networks are based on the physical and the medium
access layer of the IEEE 802.15.4 low rate wireless personal
area networks standard. The paper gives a short overview of
the IEEE 802.15.4 standard in the beaconless mode together
with a description of the sensor nodes and the software used
throughout this work. The paper also reports on the devel-
opment of a packet sniffer for IEEE 802.15.4 integrated in
wireshark. This packet sniffer turns out to be indispensable
for debugging purposes. In view of future applications on
the wireless network, we made a theoretical study of the ef-
fective data capacity and compared this with measurements
performed on a real sensor network. The differences between
measurements and theory are explained. In case of geograph-
ically meaningful sensor data, it is important to have a knowl-
edge of the relative position of each node. In the last part of
the paper we present some experimental results of positioning
based on the received signal strength indicators (RSSI). As
one could expect, the accuracy of such a method is poor, even
in a well controlled environment. But the method has some
potential.
Keywords— wireless sensor networks, IEEE 802.15.4, effective
data capacity, positioning.
1. Introduction
Wireless ad hoc network is a generic term grouping diﬀer-
ent networks, which are self organizing, meaning that there
is neither a centralized administration nor a ﬁxed network
infrastructure and that the communication links are wire-
less. Diﬀerent types of wireless ad hoc networks include
mobile ad hoc networks (MANETS), wireless sensor net-
works (WSNs), smart dust, etc. A wireless sensor network
is an ad hoc network consisting of spatially distributed au-
tonomous sensor nodes, i.e., nodes equipped with a radio
transceiver, a microcontroller, an energy source (usually
a battery) and a sensor, to cooperatively monitor physical
or environmental conditions, such as temperature, sound,
vibration, pressure, motion or pollutants, at diﬀerent loca-
tions (see Fig. 1).
Wireless sensor network diﬀer from classical ad hoc net-
works in several ways, e.g., the number of nodes is larger
and the spatial distribution of the nodes is more dense, the
nodes are normally static (however, this is not always the
case), the energy of the nodes is limited, the amount of data
Fig. 1. Wireless sensor network.
transiting through the network is limited and in most cases
the data is converging to one single server node, collecting
and processing the data. All these factors have their inﬂu-
ence on the choice of the technology and routing protocol
used in this type of ad hoc networks.
The paper will be organized as follows. In Section 2 we
will give some background on the IEEE 802.15.4 PHY and
MAC layer, the sensor nodes and the software that is used
throughout this research. In Section 3 we will report on the
development of a packet sniﬀer for an IEEE 802.15.4-based
wireless sensor network. In Section 4 we will discuss the
theoretical eﬀective data capacity and compare this with
measurements conducted on a real sensor network. In the
last section we will describe how we can estimate the rel-
ative position of a sensor node in the network, based on
the received signal strength indicators (RSSI) from beacon
nodes with a priori known position. We will show the re-
sult of measurements conducted on a real sensor network,
deployed on a football ﬁeld, and discuss the accuracy of
such a method.
2. Background
2.1. The IEEE 802.15.4 standard
The IEEE 802.15.4 is a recent standard, approved in 2003,
describing the physical (PHY) and medium access con-
trol (MAC) layers for low rate wireless personal area net-
works (LR-PAN) [1]. IEEE 802.15.4 is expected to be
deployed on massive numbers of wireless devices, which
are usually inexpensive, long-life battery powered and of
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low computation capabilities. As such, the standard is also
ideal for WSN. At the physical layer the standard provides
for the use of 3 frequency bands. The most popular one
being the 2.4 GHz industrial, scientiﬁc and medical (ISM)
frequency band. In this frequency band, 16 channels are
available, each with a data throughput of 250 kbit/s on the
physical layer. On the MAC layer, the IEEE 802.15.4 stan-
dard supports diﬀerent modes of operation: beacon-enabled
or beaconless network mode, with or without a PAN coor-
dinator, in a star or in a peer-to-peer topology. Almost all
combinations of these 3 couples are possible.
In the scope of this research, we only use the beaconless
network mode, without a PAN coordinator in a peer-to-peer
topology. Note that this mode of operation allows multiple
hops to route messages from any device to any other device.
These routing functions can be added at the network layer,
but are not part of the standard. As we only use the bea-
conless network mode without a coordinator we will limit
the explanation of the medium access protocol to this par-
ticular mode. In a beaconless network, the medium access
is, just as in WIFI, based on un-slotted carrier sense mul-
tiple access – collision avoidance (CSMA-CA). However,
unlike the IEEE 802.11 standard, IEEE 802.15.4 omits the
request/clear to send (RTS/CTS) exchange; hence the hid-
den node problem will be an issue. The omission of the
RTS/CTS frames is justiﬁed by the limited size of the MAC
data packet unit, with is ﬁxed to a maximum of 127 bytes
in the standard.
Figure 2 shows a communication between two network de-
vices in a beaconless mode. Source device A ﬁrst performs
a clear channel assessment (CCA) is used to verify whether
the medium is free or not. If the channel is free, the source
device will send out the data frame and wait for an ac-
knowledge frame (optional). All other nodes, overhearing
this communication, will defer their transmission. In case
of an occupied channel, an exponential backoﬀ mechanism
is used.
Fig. 2. Communication between two devices.
The MAC layer of the device trying to get access to the
medium will delay its transmission for a random number
of complete backoﬀ periods in the range 0 to 2BE − 1.
BE is the backoﬀ exponent and a unit backoﬀ period
equals 320 µs in the 2.4 GHz band. If, after this delay,
the channel is assessed to be busy again, the MAC layer
will increment BE by one until BE reaches the value of 5
(maximum value for BE). The initial value of BE can be
set by the user. Note that if BE is initialized to 0, collision
avoidance will be disabled during the ﬁrst attempt to access
the medium.
Each device (transmitter) is identiﬁed by a unique 64 bit
hardware address, called the extended address, compara-
ble with an Ethernet MAC address. The standard however
allows the allocation of a 16 bit short address, which con-
siderably reduces the addressing ﬁelds in the MAC frame.
More details on the structure of the data frame will be given
in Section 4.
2.2. The sensor nodes
The hardware platform that is used as building block for
the WSN is the TmoteTM Sky platform from Moteiv [2]
(see Fig. 3). The Tmote Sky platform is a wireless sen-
sor node based on a TI MSP430 microcontroller with an
IEEE 802.15.4-compatible radio chip CC2420 from chip-
con [3], with an on-board antenna. The Tmote Sky plat-
form oﬀers a number of integrated peripherals including
a 12-bit ADC and DAC and a number of integrated sensors
like a temperature sensor, 2 light sensors and a humidity
sensor.
Fig. 3. TmoteTM Sky platform from Moteiv.
The microcontroller is programmed through the onboard
universal serial bus (USB) connector, which makes it easy
to use; no additional development kit for the microcon-
troller is needed. The USB can also be used as a serial
port to communicate with a host computer.
2.3. The real time operating system and communication
stack
Throughout all the projects, Contiki is used as real time
operating system on the Tmote Sky sensor nodes.
Contiki is an open source multi-tasking operating sys-
tem for networked systems. It is designed for embedded
systems with small amounts of memory. A typical Con-
tiki conﬁguration is 2 kbytes of RAM and 40 kbytes of
ROM. Contiki consists of an event-driven kernel on top of
which application programs can be dynamically loaded and
unloaded at runtime. The main reason why Contiki was
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chosen as real time operating system (RTOS) is that it is
written in standard C, which makes it easy to understand
and to modify.
As almost all applications on military networks are IP
based, we opted to use a TCP/IP stack on top of the IEEE
802.15.4 devices and not the usual ZigBee stack.
Contiki contains a small request for comments (RFC)-
compliant TCP/IP stack that makes it possible to com-
municate over an IP enabled network. Contiki also con-
tains a RFC-compliant ad hoc on-demand distance vector
(AODV) routing protocol. AODV is a reactive routing pro-
tocol for ad hoc networks. In a reactive routing protocol,
routes are only created when desired by the source nodes.
When a node requires a route to a destination, it initiates
a route discovery process within the network. This pro-
cess completes once a route is found or all possible route
permutations are examined. The route is maintained only
if there are data packets periodically travelling from the
source to the destination along that path. This protocol is
what is called “source initiated”.
3. Development of a packet sniﬀer
Doing research on IEEE 802.15.4 enabled WSN, it is in-
dispensable to have a good packet sniﬀer for debugging
purposes.
At the time this research started, the only available packet
sniﬀer was the chipcon packet sniﬀer for IEEE 802.15.4
which comes with the CC2420 evaluation board. The eval-
uation board is connected through the PC with a USB ca-
ble. The board is able to queue up to 248 packets for
USB transfer, allowing short periods of high workload for
the PC. A large amount of packets can be stored on the
computer in a trace ﬁle using a speciﬁc format.
Unfortunately the CC2420 packet sniﬀer only analyses the
PHY and MAC layer and not the IP data transported in the
MAC frame. We therefore developed a packet sniﬀer that
can be integrated in wireshark. Wireshark, formerly known
as Ethereal is a free software protocol analyzer.
As the IEEE 802.15.4 standard was not yet supported by
wireshark, we ﬁrst had to write a plug-in, in order to be
able to correctly decode the IEEE 802.15.4 frames. Wire-
shark uses dissectors, identiﬁed by a DLT number, to de-
code a speciﬁc layer or protocol, hence a new DLT number
had to be requested for this new link-layer protocol to the
developers of wireshark. The value 191 (0xBF) was at-
tributed by them. Based on this DLT number a dissector
was written to decode the IEEE 802.15.4 data and acknowl-
edge frames. Once decoded, the LL payload is then passed
to the next dissector (IP in our case).
The ﬁles that can be imported and decoded by wireshark
must be libpcap compatible. To obtain these pcap ﬁles, we
worked out two solutions. The ﬁrst solution is based on the
earlier presented CC2420 packet sniﬀer. A software was
written to transform the trace ﬁle from the CC2420 sniﬀer
into a libpcap compatible ﬁle format which could then be
imported in wireshark. The second solution is based on
the Tmote Sky sensor node. The software, downloaded on
the Sky node, puts the IEEE 802.15.4 radio in promiscuous
mode and does a continuous copy of the frames, received
on the air interface, to the USB serial interface. A PC,
connected to the node, runs a program that reads the USB
interface and writes the content of the PHY payload imme-
diately to a libpcap compatible ﬁle.
In the ﬁrst solution, the representation of the captured
frames in wireshark is done in three steps; ﬁrst the cap-
turing by the chipcon sniﬀer, then the conversion to a pcap
ﬁle. Once this is done the pcap ﬁle can be imported and
decoded by wireshark. In the second solution, the analysis
is done in two steps as the received frames are directly writ-
ten to a libpcap compatible ﬁle. The development of the
latter solution is still ongoing. For the moment, the times-
tamp of the arriving frames is given by the PC. However,
due to the limited data rate on the USB serial connection
between the node and the PC, arriving frames can cue up
in the sensor node, hence the timestamp given by the PC is
not accurate. In the future we want to let the sensor node
itself give the timestamp.
Figure 4 represents a screenshot of wireshark, showing the
decoded ﬁeld of the MAC header. In this case no IP packet
was transported in the frame.
Fig. 4. Screenshot of wireshark, showing the MAC header.
Fig. 5. Screenshot of wireshark, showing an AODV route request
message.
48
Developments on an IEEE 802.15.4-based wireless sensor network
Figure 5 shows an AODV route request message, encapsu-
lated in an UDP/IP packet, transported by an IEEE 802.15.4
frame. All details of the captured frames, on any layer, can
be decoded and analysed, which makes this tool very inter-
esting for debugging protocols or applications running on
the wireless nodes.
4. Eﬀective data capacities
Due to the MAC protocol (unslotted CSMA-CA) and the
possible multiple hops between source and sink, the eﬀec-
tive data capacity will always be smaller than the data rate
at the physical layer. In view of developing applications
on a MANET or WSN based on IEEE 802.15.4, it is inter-
esting to have an idea what the maximum data throughput
could be, using this given protocol. In this section, we cal-
culate the theoretical eﬀective data capacity for a single-
and multi-hop scenario and compare this with measure-
ments on a real network. A similar study was conducted
in [4], although not under the same conditions and using
the same tools.
In the following, the eﬀective data capacity is deﬁned as
the maximum achievable data rate for a user application,
in the absence of any cross traﬃc. All calculations and
experiments are performed under the following conditions:
the nodes are conﬁgured in the IEEE 802.15.4 compliant
beaconless mode, supporting an over the air data rate of
250 kbit/s at the physical layer (CPHY ), short addresses are
used, the optional acknowledge frames are enabled and the
backoﬀ exponent BE is initiated to 0. Further, the nodes
will be put in an ideal multi-hop forwarding chain, as rep-
resented on Fig. 8. This means that all nodes have the same
maximum transmission range Rmax and the fourth node in
the chain, i.e., node D, will not sense an ongoing commu-
nication between node A and B.
Note that in the standard [1] durations are often expressed
in number of symbols and not in seconds. In the 2.4 GHz
PHY layer duration of 1 byte = 2 symbols = 32 µs.
4.1. Theoretical approach
In a ﬁrst step we will calculate the eﬀective data capacity
for a single-hop connection between 2 neighbours. To allow
the MAC layer to process the data received by the PHY,
each data frame is followed by an interframe spacing (IFS).
If the length of the MAC protocol data unit (MPDU) is
larger than 20 bytes, a long IFS (LIFS) of 640 µs will
be used as shown in Fig. 6. The spacing Tack between
a data frame and the acknowledgement (ACK) frame equal
the TX-to-Rx maximum turnaround time (= 192 µs). Both
LIFS and Tack have been measured by a communication
analyzer and the values given by the standard are respected
by the CC2420 radios on the Tmote Sky. To calculate the
upper bound of the single-hop eﬀective data capacity C, the
length of the MPDU is set to its maximum, i.e., 127 bytes.
The size of the ACK frame is always 11 bytes. As BE is
initialized to 0 and there is no cross traﬃc, there will be
no backoﬀ delay in this scenario.
Fig. 6. Long inter frame spacing.
Note also that all other delays like CCA time and
turnaround time are included in Tack and LIFS. Hence the
total time between 2 long data frames Ttot is given by
Ttot = Tlong f rame + Tack + Tack f rame + LIFS = 5.44 ms (1)
with Tlong f rame = 133 ·32 µs, the time it takes to send out
a long frame of 133 byte, and Tack f rame = 11 ·32 µs.
Figure 7 shows the details of a data frame of maximum
size. The frame consists of 5 bytes synchronization header
(SHR) and 1 byte physical header (PHR). On the MAC
layer there are, using short addresses, 9 bytes of MAC
header (MHR) and 2 bytes of frame check sequence (FCS)
(CRC16). On the network layer, there is a 20 byte IP header
and an 8 byte user data protocol (UDP) header. This leads
to a total overhead of 45 bytes, meaning there are only
88 bytes left for user data.
Fig. 7. Structure of an IEEE 802.15.4 data frame. Explanations:
MSDU – MAC service data unit, PSDU – PHY service data unit,
PPDU – PHY protocol data unit.
Taking into account the MAC layer and the protocol over-
heads, the theoretical maximum throughput that a single-
hop transmission can achieve is given by
C = Tuser data
TTot
CPHY = 129.41 kbit/s (2)
with Tuser data = 88 ·32 µs, the time it takes to send the user
data over the PHY interface and CPHY = 250 kbit/s. Hence,
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the theoretical upper bound of the eﬀective data capacity
available for the user is only 52% of the PHY data rate.
In a multi-hop scenario with N nodes (N ≤ 4) and in the
absence of the backoﬀ mechanism, the upper bound of the
eﬀective data capacity is given by
C/(N−1) , (3)
since only one of the N nodes can transmit at any time.
In case of an ideal forwarding chain for N > 4 (Fig. 8),
the 4th node can transmit in parallel with the ﬁrst, without
interference, leading to an eﬀective data capacity of C/3
for any N > 4.
Fig. 8. The ideal forwarding chain.
Fig. 9. Upper bound of the theoretical eﬀective data capacity
in an ideal and non-ideal forwarding chain.
In a non-ideal multi-hop scenario, with the N nodes in each
other’s interfering zone, the eﬀective data capacity will still
be governed by Eq. (3). Figure 9 presents the upper bound
of the theoretical capacity in an ideal and non-ideal ad hoc
multi-hop forwarding chain.
4.2. Experiments
Experiments are performed with the Tmote Sky modules
under the same conditions as the theoretical calculations.
The transmission power of the nodes is set to the mini-
mum, resulting in a transmission range of about 30 cm.
The nodes were placed on a straight line at intervals
of 25 cm.
The application software running on the nodes is very sim-
ple. For the single-hop scenario, node B sends an UDP
packet with 88 bytes of data, waits for a given time Twait ,
sends the next packet and so on. Node A resets a timer,
waits for 1000 received packets, gives a timestamp and re-
ports to a PC. By ﬁne tuning Twait , a maximum is achieved.
For a 2-hop scenario, node C is the one sending the UDP
packets, and node B just relays the packets to the destination
node A, etc.
Figure 10 shows the results of the measurements for
a single- and a multi-hop scenario up to 4 hops. In all
cases the measured data capacity is less than the expected
data capacity, e.g., for the single-hop scenario 101 kbit/s is
measured instead of the expected 129.41 kbit/s (Eq. (2)).
The main reason for the discrepancy is due to Contiki and
how it is implemented on the Tmote Sky module. The
CC2420 radio module of the source node, node B in the
single-hop case, will empty its transmission buﬀer after re-
ception of the ACK frame. From that moment, the MSP430
microcontroller can transfer the next MAC frame to the ra-
dio module. This is done via an SPI interface, connecting
the microcontroller to the CC2420 radio. Unfortunately in
the OS Contiki, the baud rate of this SPI is set too low,
and the transfer of the 127 bytes over the SPI takes more
than the minimum time LIFS between 2 frames. As a con-
sequence, the total time between 2 frames is more than the
predicted 5.44 ms (see Fig. 6). In a multi-hop scenario the
situation is even worse. First of all there will be collisions
on the air interface, hence the backoﬀ mechanism will be
activated. Further, in a relaying node, the MAC frames
have to travel twice over the slow SPI interface and the IP
packets have to be processed by the microcontroller.
Fig. 10. Theoretical and measured eﬀective data capacity in case
of an ideal forwarding chain.
The measured eﬀective data capacity of a 3-hop chain and
a 4-hop chain are the same. This validates the assumption
of a C/3 data capacity for an ideal chain in case of N > 4.
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5. Positioning based on RSSI
To exploit the data coming from the sensors, it is often
inevitable to have an idea of the (relative) position of the
sensor nodes in the network. Equipping the nodes with
a GPS module could be a solution, although this implicates
an extra antenna on the node and a clear view of the sky,
which is not always feasible. Furthermore, a GPS module
will increase the price of a node and will compromise the
battery lifetime.
Some other well documented techniques for retrieving the
position of the nodes in a wireless network are based on
radio hop count, RSSI, time diﬀerence of arrival or angle
of arrival. A good overview presenting the most impor-
tant localization techniques can be found in [5]. A rel-
ative simple technique is the one based on the RSSI,
also called radio positioning. In this technique the nodes
look at the power of the received signal from their neigh-
bours and try to estimate the distances to their neighbours
for localization. In the IEEE 802.15.4 standard, the ra-
dio receivers are bound to measure the received signal
strength of arriving frames, hence the choice for using this
technique.
The technique of radio localization is well described in lit-
erature and practical evaluations of the method have been
presented. Mostly the method is found inaccurate, only
in open outdoor environments reasonable results can be
obtained [6]. To gain some practical experience on the
accuracy of the method, we decided to implement the po-
sitioning based on RSSI on our WSN and to do some basic
ﬁeld tests.
5.1. Propagation model
A necessary condition in this technique is to use a good
propagation model. For this experiment, the transmis-
sion channel was intentionally kept very simple, with only
a ground reﬂection and no other obstacles or fading sources
Fig. 11. Simulation of the received power for the 2-ray model.
present. In a wireless environment, the received signal
strength may be expressed as
PRx = PTx + GTx + GRx + L , (4)
where PT x is the transmitted power, GT x and GRx are the
transmit and receive antenna gains and L is the path loss
in dB. In free space, the path loss of the transmission chan-
nel is governed by a 1/r2 power-law. The presence of the
ground between the antennas however, allows a second ray
to reach the receiving antenna. As the receiving antenna
moves away from the emitting antenna, the two rays add
successively constructively and destructively, giving rise to
oscillations around the 1/r2 power-law. At a distance
d >> 4pi hT x hRxλ (5)
from the emitting antenna the oscillations around a 1/r2
power-law disappear and are replaced by a 1/r4 power-
law [7], as shown in Fig. 11.
5.2. Experiments
To avoid fading as shown on Fig. 11, we decided to limit the
height of the antennas to 25 cm above the ground, which
seems to be a realistic height for a real implementation.
In this case, the oscillations due to multi-path fading will
disappear for d > 6 m, leading to a smooth 1/r4 power-law
for the path loss. In a ﬁrst experiment a calibration was
performed. This calibration also allows to verify the 1/r4
power-law and gives an idea of the ranging capability of
the method.
Fig. 12. Calibration measurements for 4 diﬀerent nodes, con-
ﬁrming the propagation model.
Figure 12 shows the result of the calibration for 4 dif-
ferent nodes (nodes C-D-E and F). The receiving node
was displaced from 5 to 45 m in steps of 5 m. The bold
solid line represents a 1/r4-curve ﬁtted over the measured
data, serving as a reference. A ﬁrst conclusion can be
drawn here. The 1/r4 propagation model is conﬁrmed, but
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the ranging error increases over distance. This increasing
error depends on both noise and attenuation rate [6]. The
1/r4-curve ﬂattens out, meaning that a slight error in the
measurement of the RSSI will lead to a large ranging error,
in some cases up to 30% of the actual range. Note also
that the accuracy of the RSSI measurement by the CC2420
is only ±6 dB [3].
In a second experiment, 4 anchor nodes (nodes C-D-E-F
of the previous experiment) were placed in the 4 corners of
a half-football ﬁeld. A ﬁfth node was displaced at 20 dif-
ferent locations in the ﬁeld logging the RSSI-values of the
anchor nodes. For each position and anchor node at least
10 values are measured for averaging. Oﬀ-line, the dis-
tance to each anchor node was retrieved and the position
was calculated using a range-based least-squares multilat-
eration method.
Figure 13 shows the result for the 4 corners of the penalty
area. The retrieved positions are indicated by the arrows.
The median localization error in this experiment was 17 m
and a 90th percentile of 26 m.
Fig. 13. Experimental results of RSSI-based positioning on
a half-football ﬁeld using 4 anchor nodes.
Although the results seem inaccurate the method was found
out to have some potential and improvements to enhance
the accuracy can still be introduced. A ﬁrst possible im-
provement could be the use of external omni-directional
antennas instead of the internal antennas. A second im-
provement could be the reduction of the test area, so that the
distances between the nodes and the anchor nodes will de-
crease, leading to better ranging performance. For the mo-
ment only the RSSI-values to the anchor nodes are used to
calculate the position. Using also the RSSI-values to other
nodes and a network compensation based position compu-
tation method, will further enhance the accuracy. In the
future more experiments will be conducted implementing
these enhancements and evaluating also the radio localiza-
tion in less optimal outdoor conditions like environments
with vegetation and trees.
6. Conclusions
The research on ad hoc networks and WSN recently started
at the Belgian Royal Military Academy. In this paper
a summary was given of some the ﬁrst ongoing activi-
ties in this domain. The work is not only focussing on
a theory and simulations, but also practical implementa-
tions are considered. To do so, an IEEE 802.15.4-based
WSN is used. The RTOS running on the nodes is Con-
tiki, the network layer is IP-based and AODV is used as
ad hoc routing protocol. To be able to debug applications
on the IEEE 802.15.4-based wireless network, we devel-
oped a packet sniﬀer which can be integrated in wireshark.
A plug-in was written for wireshark, as the IEEE 802.15.4
standard was not yet supported.
In view of future applications on the wireless network,
a theoretical study of the eﬀective data capacity was made
and compared with measurements performed on the sensor
network. For a single-hop scenario, the theoretical upper
bound of the eﬀective data capacity available for the user
is only 129.41 kbit/s or 52% of the PHY data rate. In
practice, due to the OS Contiki and how it is implemented
on the wireless sensor nodes, the available eﬀective data
capacity is even less.
To exploit geographically meaningful sensor data, it is in-
evitable to know the (relative) position of the sensor nodes
in the network. A simple technique is the one based on
the RSSI. Mostly this method is found inaccurate, and only
in open outdoor environments reasonable results can be
obtained. We performed some experiments of positioning
based on RSSI on a half-football ﬁeld. The median local-
ization error was 17 m. The method has some potential in
outdoor environments and further improvements to achieve
better accuracy will be introduced.
References
[1] “IEEE Std 802.15.4-2003”, IEEE 802.15 WPANTM Task Group 4,
2003, http://www.ieee802.org/15/pub/TG4.html
[2] “Tmote Sky datasheet”, Moteiv corporation, 2006,
http://www.moteiv.com/products/
[3] “CC2420 datasheet, Chipcon products from Texas Instruments”, Texas
Instruments, 2004, http://www.chipcon.com/
[4] T. Sun, L.-J. Chen, C.-C. Han, G. Yang, and M. Gerla, “Measuring
eﬀective capacity of IEEE 802.15.4 beaconless mode”, in Wirel. Com-
mun. Netw. Conf. WCNC 2006, Las Vegas, USA, 2006, pp. 492–498.
[5] I. Stojmenović, Handbook of Sensor Networks, Algorithms and Archi-
tectures. Hoboken: Wiley, 2005, Chapter 9.
[6] K. Whitehouse, C. Karlof, and D. Culler, “A practical evaluation of ra-
dio signal strength for ranging-based localization”, ACM Mob. Comp.
Commun. Rev. (MC2R), Special Issue on Localization Technologies
and Algorithms, 2007.
[7] T. S. Rappaport, Wireless Communications, Principles and Practice,
2nd ed. Upper Saddle River: Prentice Hall, 2002.
52
Developments on an IEEE 802.15.4-based wireless sensor network
Bart Scheers was born in
Rumst, Belgium, in Novem-
ber 1966. He obtained his de-
gree of engineer, with a special-
ization in telecommunications,
at the Royal Military Academy
in 1991. After his studies he
served as an oﬃcer in a terri-
torial signal unit of the Belgian
Army. In 1994 he became an
Assistant at the Royal Military
Academy in the ﬁeld of signal processing. In 2001 he pre-
sented his Ph.D. thesis on the use of ground penetrating
radars in the ﬁeld of humanitarian demining. From 2000
he works as an Associate Professor in the Telecommuni-
cation Department. His current domains of interest are ad
hoc networks, wireless sensor networks and software de-
ﬁned radio.
e-mail: bart.scheers@rma.ac.be
Royal Military Academy
Department CISS
Renaissancelaan 30
B1000 Brussels, Belgium
Wim Mees was born in Sint-
Truiden, Belgium, in November
1967. He obtained his engineer-
ing degree with a specialization
in telecommunications at the
Royal Military Academy in
1990. After his studies he
served as an oﬃcer in a signal
unit of the Belgian Army work-
ing in support a NATO HQ.
In 1992 he returned to the Royal
Military Academy as a lecturer and he currently works as
an Associate Professor in the Communication, Information
System and Sensors Department. In 2000 he presented his
Ph.D. thesis on the use of artiﬁcial intelligence for the semi-
automatic interpretation of high-resolution satellite images.
His current domains of interest are command and control
systems and information security.
e-mail: wim.mees@rma.ac.be
Royal Military Academy
Department CISS
Renaissancelaan 30
B1000 Brussels, Belgium
Ben Lauwens was born in
Leuven, Belgium, in January
1977. He got his degree of
engineer, with a specialization
in telecommunications, from
the Royal Military Academy
in 2000. After his studies he
served as an oﬃcer in a ter-
ritorial signal unit of the Bel-
gian Army. In 2005 he obtained
a Master in engineering at the
Katholieke Universiteit Leuven. From 2005 he works as
an Assistant in the Telecommunication Department of the
Royal Military Academy and is working on a Ph.D. the-
sis entitled “Hybrid packet-event/ﬂuid-ﬂow network sim-
ulation with applications to communication and wireless
sensor networks”.
e-mail: ben.lauwens@rma.ac.be
Royal Military Academy
Department CISS
Renaissancelaan 30
B1000 Brussels, Belgium
53
Paper A survey on mobility models
for performance analysis in tactical
mobile networks
Nils Aschenbruck, Elmar Gerhards-Padilla, and Peter Martini
Abstract—In scenarios of military operations and catastro-
phes – even when there is no infrastructure available or left –
there is a need for communication. Due to the specific context
the communication systems used in these tactical scenarios
need to be as reliable as possible. Thus, the performance of
these systems has to be evaluated. Beside field-tests, computer
simulations are an interesting alternative concerning costs,
scalability, etc. Results of simulative performance evaluation
strongly depend on the models used. Since tactical networks
consist of, or, at least, contain mobile devices, the mobility
model used has a decisive impact. However, in common per-
formance evaluations mainly simple random-based models are
used. In the paper we will provide classification and survey of
existing mobility models. Furthermore, we will review these
models concerning the requirements for tactical scenarios.
Keywords— mobility models, performance analysis, wireless net-
works, mobile networks, tactical networks.
1. Introduction
Military operations as well as catastrophes, be it natural
ones (like hurricanes or tornados), man-made ones (like ex-
plosions or fires), or technical ones (like material-fatigue),
cause an area of destruction. Buildings, bridges, as well
as the infrastructure of the private and public systems for
mobile communication might be destroyed. Hence, units
working in these disaster areas need reliable communica-
tion which is independent of any infrastructure.
As the communication systems used in these tactical or
disaster area scenarios need to be as reliable as possi-
ble, the performance of these systems has to be evaluated.
Field-tests in manoeuvres may be the preferred evaluation
method. However, they are expensive, as sufficient hard-
ware is needed. Furthermore, the results concerning some
characteristics (e.g., scalability) are limited – who can per-
form field-tests with several hundreds of devices? Thus,
especially for the evaluation of algorithms and protocols,
simulation is an alternative.
Naturally, the results of simulative performance evaluation
strongly depend on the models used. Since tactical net-
works consist of, or, at least, contain mobile devices, the
mobility model used has a decisive impact. However, in
common performance evaluations mainly simple random-
based models are used.
In the paper our aim will be to give a survey on mobility
models used for performance evaluation in tactical mobile
networks. As tactical networks may also be networks with-
out infrastructure, the individual nodes and there movement
characteristics need to be modeled. In this paper we will
focus on models that realize the movement of individual
nodes (microscopic models). In the literature there are al-
ready some surveys on mobility models [2, 4, 11]. How-
ever, these surveys are quite old or miss a lot of specific
models. Furthermore, there is no review concerning the
requirements for tactical scenarios. Thus, in this paper we
will give a survey on existing mobility models and classify
and review these models concerning the requirements of
tactical communication systems.
The remaining part of this paper is structured as follows:
Section 2 points out requirements for tactical communica-
tion. Next, we will introduce the way the existing models
are classified (Section 3). After that, we will give a survey
on existing models and review to which extent these models
meet the requirements of tactical scenarios (Sections 4–8).
Finally, we will conclude the paper (Section 9).
2. Requirements
The users of tactical communication systems are military
or civil (e.g., civil protection) forces. These forces are
strictly structured (e.g., platoons, groups, etc.) and their
actions are strictly organized. The units do not walk around
randomly. There is one leader or a group of leaders which
tells everybody where and how to move or in which area
to work. In general, the movements are driven by tactical
reasons. Due to this, the units normally use the optimal
path to a destination.
The destinations depend on the working site which is based
on tactical issues. The tactics as well as the scene are usu-
ally hierarchically organized. Typically, the site is divided
into different tactical areas. Each unit belongs to one of
these areas. For example, in a disaster area scenario a fire-
fighter belongs to an incident site and a paramedic will work
at one place in the casualties treatment area. The units sent
to a specific location once will typically stay close to this
location. Some of them may have special tasks that make
them move from one area to another (e.g., transport units).
However, the major part of the units does not leave the area.
Thus, the area in which a unit moves depends on tactical
issues but is restricted to one specific area.
Furthermore, as tactical scenarios take place in areas of
destruction, obstacles might be encountered. Smaller ones
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may be ignored, because they only have little impact on the
movement. However, larger ones (walls, houses, etc.) will
have a certain impact on movements.
In tactical networks, units and troops often move in tactical
formation. Even if the detailed position may only have little
impact, this fact implies group mobility. Moreover, there
are units of different types. The units typically differ in
their equipment. Some of them possess vehicles and use
them resulting in faster movement. Others are pedestrians
and move slower. Thus, there is heterogeneous velocity
based on the type of node.
Finally, especially in tactical communication systems, it is
quite common that units leave the scenario, while others
join later on. In military scenarios there may be fatalities,
and in civil protection scenarios there may be units that take
patients to hospital. When some units leave the scenario,
typically others are requisitioned.
As a conclusion, the analysis yields the following main
requirements:
– heterogeneous velocity,
– tactical areas,
– optimal paths,
– obstacles,
– units join and leave the scenario,
– group movement.
The following sections present existing mobility models and
examine which models meet these requirements.
3. Classification
In general, the mobility models can be classified according
to the different kind of dependencies and restrictions that
are considered.
• Random based. There are neither dependencies nor
any other restriction modeled.
• Temporal dependencies. The actual movement of
a node is influenced by the movement of the past.
• Spatial dependencies. The movement of a node is
influenced by the nodes around it (e.g., group mobil-
ity).
• Geographic restrictions. The area in which the node
is allowed to move is restricted.
• Hybrid characteristics. A combination of temporal
dependencies, spatial dependencies, and geographic
restrictions is realized.
4. Random based movement
The mobility model often used in the last years (es-
pecially in performance evaluation of ad hoc networks)
is the random-waypoint model. The random-waypoint
model is a simple stochastic model in which a node per-
petually chooses destinations (waypoints) and moves to-
wards them. In the original model [21] the nodes are dis-
tributed randomly over the simulation area. After waiting
for a constant pause time, each node chooses a waypoint
and moves towards it with a speed chosen from an inter-
val [υmin;υmax]. After arriving at the waypoint, the node
again waits for a constant pause time and chooses the next
waypoint. In [30] it is proposed to also choose the pause
time from an interval [pmin; pmax]. The different random
variates are mostly chosen uniformly distributed.
In the last years, there were several studies that analyze
the random-waypoint model with respect to implicit (un-
wanted) assumptions and characteristics. As the nodes are
initially distributed randomly, it takes some time until the
nodes reach a stationary distribution (cf. [28]). Thus, a long
enough initial period should be discarded. In [36] it is
shown that the average velocity is decreasing over sim-
ulation time if vmin = 0. Thus, vmin > 0 and pmax < ∞
should be chosen. Furthermore, in several publications it
was shown that the nodes cumulate in the middle of the
simulation area (cf. [6, 7, 10]). For a square simulation
area a density as shown in Fig. 1 results.
Fig. 1. Density for the random-waypoint model.
A distribution and movement of the nodes across the entire
simulation area does not fit to the characteristics of most
realistic movements. There are extensions (e.g., [7]) which
add attraction points to this model in order to generate
more realistic non-equally distributed mobility. The proba-
bility that a node selects an attraction point or a point in an
attraction area as next waypoint is larger than the choice
of other points. The nodes visit some points more fre-
quently than others. Hence, they still move across the com-
plete simulation area. The clustered-mobility model [24]
is motivated by disaster areas and uses a similar approach.
The difference is that the attraction of a point depends
on the amount of nodes nearby. This implies that the ar-
eas of higher density variate concerning the intensity and
position. Further approaches like the random-direction
model [31], random-border model [7], and the modified-
random-direction model [31] also result in fully random
movement with different node density distributions.
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All random-based models result in random movement
across the complete simulation area. The models are quite
simple to implement, but the only characteristics of an tac-
tical scenario that is realized are the optimal paths. How-
ever, at least heterogeneous velocity may be integrated quite
easily.
5. Temporal dependencies
Using one of the models of the previous section, the nodes
suddenly may change speed or direction. This is quite un-
realistic considering aspects like acceleration and deceler-
ation. The models presented in this section realize such
aspects by using temporal dependencies.
In the Gauss-Markov model [23] velocity and direction of
the future (time interval t +1) depend on the current values
(time interval t). Initially for each node position, velocity,
and direction are chosen uniformly distributed. The move-
ment of each node is variated after an interval δ t. The
new values are chosen based on a first-order autoregressive
process. Further details can be found in [23].
The smooth-random model [4, 5] is a more detailed ap-
proach. The nodes are classified concerning their maxi-
mum velocity, preferred velocity, maximum acceleration,
and deceleration. New velocities and directions are cal-
culated based on these parameters and the current ones.
Velocity and direction may also be chosen in correla-
tion to each other. By doing so, more realistic move-
ments like deceleration before a change of direction may be
realized.
By using one of these models and realizing the temporal
dependencies the movements of the nodes become
smoother concerning direction and velocity. However,
typical characteristics of tactical scenarios are not realized
in this approach.
6. Spatial dependencies
Beside temporal dependencies there are also spatial ones.
Nodes may move together in groups. Thus, the move-
ment of one node may influence the movement of others
around him.
One approach to realizing spatial dependence is the use of
reference points. The reference-point-group-mobilitymodel
(RPGM) [15] models the movement of groups of nodes.
The movement of the groups is modeled according to an
arbitrary mobility model. The movement of the nodes in-
side a group is realized using a reference point for each
node. The actual position of a node is a random movement
vector added to the position of his reference point. The
absolute positions of the reference points do change ac-
cording to the arbitrary mobility model, but the relative
positions of the reference points inside a group do not
change. Hence, the spatial dependence is realized using
the reference points.
In [9] a variance of the model called structured-group-
mobility model is proposed. In this model there is no
random movement vector. The nodes of a group move in
a fixed non-changing formation. The formations are mo-
tivated by firefighter, police, and tanks. However, even if
there is a formation of tanks, there may be some variances
due to obstacles. In literature there are also found several
other variances of the RPGM model, e.g., column model,
pursue model, nomadic-community model (cf. [11, 34]).
Another approach to realize spatial dependence is to found
on social networks. The social-network-founded mobility
model [26] bases on interaction indicators for all pairs of
nodes – the larger an interaction indicator, the larger the
probability of a social relationship, the smaller the geo-
graphic distance. Initially the nodes are grouped in clouds
according to their interaction indicator. The clouds as well
as the nodes inside the clouds move according to a random-
waypoint model, where the waypoints are chosen according
to the interaction indicators as well. In [27] this approach
is reinvented as community-based mobility model. Differ-
ent more realistic algorithms are used for the classifica-
tion of the nodes into groups and the movement inside the
clouds. Furthermore, the interaction indicators are modified
over time.
For realizing group mobility in tactical scenarios, the
RPGM model seems to be the better approach, as with
an appropriate choice of parameters relative positions of
nodes inside the groups can be modeled explicitly. Us-
ing the RPGM model, beside the characteristic of group
movement, other characteristics may be realized by using
an appropriate model for the reference points.
7. Geographic restrictions
Beside considering temporal and spatial dependencies, for
many scenarios it is unrealistic to assume that the nodes are
allowed to move across the entire simulation area. There
are very different approaches to restrict the nodes move-
ment to certain parts of the simulation area. The following
sections will describe several approaches realizing the dif-
ferent kind of geographic restrictions.
7.1. Graph-based approaches
A quite intuitive approach is to manage the allowed paths in
a movement graph. The graph-based mobility model [35]
realizes a graph whose vertices are the possible destinations
and whose edges are the allowed paths. Based on this graph
a random waypoint approach is used. The nodes initially
start at a random position on the graph, choose a destination
(vertex), move there at random velocity, and choose the next
destination and velocity.
Another approach that is using graphs is the weighted-
waypoint mobility model [16]. The vertices of the graph
are specific areas (e.g., classroom, cafe, etc.). The nodes
choose destinations inside these areas. The directed edges
of the graph contain probabilities of choosing a destination
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in the directed area depending on the current area. Hav-
ing chosen a waypoint, the nodes move there on the direct
way similar to the random-waypoint model. Compared to
the graph-based model, the movement is not restricted to
distinct paths.
7.2. Voronoi-based approaches
One possibility of modeling simulation areas with obsta-
cles is to determine the movement paths or areas using
Voronoi-diagrams. This approach was first introduced with
the obstacle mobility model [18, 19]. In this model, the
edges of the buildings (e.g., of a campus) are used as
an input to calculate a Voronoi-diagram. The movement
graph consists of the Voronoi-diagram and additional ver-
tices. These vertices are the intersection of the edges of
the Voronoi-diagram and the edges of the obstacles. They
model entrances to obstacles (e.g., buildings). The move-
ment on the graph is realized similarly to the graph-based
model. By using Voronoi-diagrams, the paths are modeled
equidistant from all obstacles. Considering the require-
ments of tactical networks, these are not necessarily the
optimal paths. Furthermore, even for a campus network
it is a strong assumption that all streets are built equidis-
tant from all buildings and all nodes move in the middle
of the street. In [37] the approach is extended to real-
ize buildings and streets more realistically. In the Voronoi
mobility model movement, paths are refined to movement
areas. The nodes choose their destinations inside these ar-
eas. The movement using this model is more realistic, as
streets and buildings are realized more precisely. However,
there is still no movement on optimal paths.
7.3. Division-based approaches
Another approach is to divide the simulation area in sub-
areas and to use in them arbitrary mobility models.
The area-graph-based mobility model [8] tries to realize
clusters (sub-areas) with higher node density and paths in
between with lower node density. The clusters are regarded
as vertices of the area graph while the paths are regarded
as edges. A weight (probability) is assigned to each edge.
A node moves inside the cluster for a randomly chosen time
according to the random-waypoint model. After this time,
he chooses one path according to probabilities at the edges.
Next, the node moves on the path to the next area.
A similar approach is used in CosMos [14]. The simulation
area is subdivided into non-overlapping zones. In each zone
the nodes move according to an arbitrary mobility model.
The transition between the zones is realized similarly to the
area graph based mobility model using transition probabil-
ities. If a node is chosen to change the zone, he moves to
a handover area and switches to the other mobility model.
Considering tactical scenarios, both models contain inter-
esting aspects as it is possible to realize tactical areas. How-
ever, neither of the model realizes all requirements of tac-
tical scenarios.
7.4. Map-based approaches
A further approach to restrict the movement area geograph-
ically is to use information from road maps.
In the context of the UMTS standardization, the so-called
Manhattan-grid model was specified [13]. The simulation
area is divided into squared blocks. Nodes are modeled as
pedestrians moving on the vertices of the squares (streets).
Initially the nodes are randomly distributed on the streets.
Each node chooses a direction and a velocity. If a node
reaches a corner, the node changes direction with a certain
probability. The velocity is changed over time.
The random-waypoint-city model [22] realizes vehicular
traffic in urban environments. Therefore, road maps in-
cluding speed informations and crossroads are retrieved.
A node chooses a destination on the streets similar to the
random-waypoint model and chooses a route after an arbi-
trary metric (e.g., smallest travel time). At the crossroads
delays are modeled according to the amount of roads. Fur-
thermore, an equal distribution of the nodes throughout the
simulation area is realized.
In [25] two further models are described which realize mo-
bility models (e.g., random-waypoint) on graphs based on
road maps.
In respect to the requirements of tactical scenarios these
models seem to be not applicable. On the one hand, the
requirements are not realized, on the other, the streets on
which the maps base may be destroyed.
8. Hybrid characteristics
In the previous sections several models were described
that could quite clearly be assigned to one class of de-
pendencies. However, there are also some models that
realize hybrid dependencies and restrictions.
8.1. Complex vehicular traffic models
The freeway mobility model [3] realizes temporal and spa-
tial dependencies as well as geographic restrictions. The
nodes variate their velocity in dependence to their cur-
rent velocity (temporal dependencies). Furthermore, the
velocity is influenced by the velocity of a vehicle on the
same line inside a certain radius (spatial dependence). The
overall movement is restricted to a freeway (geographic
restrictions).
The street-random-waypoint model (STRAW) [12] uses in-
formation from maps similar to the random-waypoint-city
model. However, the actual movement of the vehicles is
realized according to vehicular congestion and simplified
traffic control mechanisms. The model realizes temporary
dependencies (acceleration), spatial dependencies (to other
vehicles) and geographic restrictions (streets).
Both models are specific for vehicular road-traffic and do
not fit to a tactical scenario.
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8.2. User-oriented meta-model
A general approach to modeling complex scenarios is de-
scribed in [32] as user-oriented mobility meta-model. The
model consists of three components:
1. Modeling the simulation area containing restric-
tions concerning the movements as well as attraction
points.
2. Sequences of movement made by a user, e.g., a se-
quence of attraction points.
3. Temporal and spatial dependencies concerning the
movements of a user.
Using this model, typical movements of node during a day
may be modeled (cf. [33]). This abstract meta-model is
generic and can be seen as general description of many
other models. The requirements of tactical scenarios may
be realized using this abstract meta-model. However, the
concrete realization of the requirements is not specified in
the meta-model.
8.3. Models for tactical scenarios
Apart from a lot of generic models, there are also some
approaches to realize specific scenarios. In [20] three sce-
narios are considered. Beside a conference and a concert
scenario there is also a catastrophe scenario. In the sce-
narios, obstacles, group movements, and tactical areas are
considered. As one example for a military scenario in [17]
a hostage rescue scenario was specified. The scenario is di-
vided into periods (e.g., march, pull, fallback). The move-
ment is modeled with regard to the specific phases. Another
scenario [29] models the movement of a platoon in a city
area. All these scenarios – the catastrophe, the hostage
rescue as well as the platoon scenario – realize several re-
quirements of tactical scenarios. However, they are only
specific scenarios that are restricted concerning scalability,
e.g., the amount of nodes and the size of the simulation
area.
8.4. Disaster-area model
In [1] a model which realistically represents the movements
in a disaster area scenario is provided. This model sup-
ports heterogeneous area-based movement on optimal paths
avoiding obstacles with joining/leaving of nodes as well as
group mobility.
To realize area-based movement, the simulation area is
divided into polygonal tactical areas. The tactical areas
are classified according to the civil-protection concept
separation of room (cf. Fig. 2). Each node is assigned to
one of these tactical areas. For some areas there are both
stationary nodes, which stay in the distinct area moving
according to a random based mobility model, as well as
transport nodes that carry the patients to the next area fol-
lowing a movement cycle. Different areas and classes allow
heterogeneous speeds. The area and the class (stationary or
transport) the node belongs to define the movement of the
node as well as the minimal and maximal speed distin-
guishing pedestrians from vehicles.
Fig. 2. Separation of the room in civil protection.
The optimal path for the movement of the transport units
between the different areas is determined by methods of
robot motion planning. For finding the shortest paths and
avoiding obstacles between the tactical areas, visibility
graphs are used. A visibility graph is a graph where its
vertices are the vertices of the polygons. There is an edge
between two vertices, if the vertices can “see” each other –
meaning the edge does not intersect the interior of any other
obstacle. The shortest path between two points consists of
an appropriate subset of the edges of the visibility graph.
Thus, after having calculated the visibility graph containing
all possible shortest paths between the areas avoiding ob-
stacles, the direct path between two areas for each transport
unit can be calculated.
Vehicular transport units (e.g., ambulances) typically leave
the disaster area to carry patients to hospital. Thus, joining
and leaving nodes are realized using specific entry and exit
points (registration areas).
Group mobility is realized as an optional characteristic for
disaster areas, as in civil protection there may only be one
device for each group. Nevertheless, it is realized similar to
RPGM [15] using reference points. The units of each area
are grouped. The size of the group depends on the type
of the area and the group. Similar to RPGM the nodes
follow their reference point. The movement of each node
in a group is calculated in relation to the movement of the
reference point.
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Table 1
Survey on an requirement analysis of existing mobility models
Model
Dependencies Requirements for tactical scenarios
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Random-waypoint [21] (√) (√)
√
Random-waypoint with attraction points [7] (√) (√)
√
Clustered-mobility [24] (√) (√) (√)
√
Random-direction [31] (√) (√)
√
Random-border-model [7] (√) (√)
√
Modified random-direction [31] (√) (√)
Random-walk [11] (√) (√)
Gauss-Markov [23]
√
(
√
) (
√
)
Smooth-random [5]
√ √
(
√
)
√
Reference-point-group [15] (√)
√
(
√
) (
√
) (
√
) (
√
) (
√
) (
√
)
√
Structured-group [9]
√
(
√
) (
√
)
√
Social-network-founded [26]
√
(
√
) (
√
)
√
Community-based [27]
√
(
√
)
√ √
Graph-based [35]
√
(
√
)
√
(
√
)
Weighted-waypoint [16]
√
(
√
)
√
Obstacle [18]
√
(
√
)
√
Voronoi [37]
√
(
√
)
√
Area-graph-based [8]
√
(
√
)
√
(
√
) (
√
)
CosMos [14]
√
(
√
)
√
(
√
)
Manhattan-grid [13]
√
(
√
)
Ramdom-waypoint-city [22]
√
(
√
)
Graph-random-waypoint [25]
√
(
√
)
Graph-random-walk [25]
√
(
√
)
Freeway [3]
√ √ √
(
√
)
Street-random-waypoint [12]
√ √ √ √
User-oriented-meta-model [32]
√ √ √ √ √ √ √
Catastrophe-scenario [20]
√ √ √ √ √
Hostage-rescue [17]
√ √ √
Platoon [29]
√ √ √ √
Disaster-area-model [1]
√ √ √ √ √ √ √ √
9. Conclusion
Finally, we want to discuss which requirements are real-
ized and which approaches model tactical scenarios. Ta-
ble 1 sums up the survey and requirements analysis that
was provided in the paper. In the table for each model the
dependencies considered as well as the requirements mod-
eled are shown. A “
√
” means “explicitly modeled”, while
a “(
√
)” means “not modeled but can be easily extended”.
For example heterogeneous velocity is not considered in all
models. However, it is quite easy to extend the models
supporting heterogeneous velocities for different classes of
nodes. Tactical areas are explicitly realized in some mod-
els. Others may be easily extended using an approach like
the area-graph-based model. Group movement may be eas-
ily integrated in other models using the reference point ap-
proach. The other requirements optimal paths, obstacles,
and units join and leave the scenario are considered in
some specific models. However, beside the disaster area
model there is no model that considers combinations of all
of them.
The disaster-area model is a model that realizes mobility for
one tactical scenario in detail, considering all the require-
ments. This scenario may also be used for the performance
evaluation of communication systems for military usage.
However, with respect to a military usage of a commu-
nication system, medical or humanitarian scenarios simi-
lar to civil protection are not the only ones to be consid-
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ered. There may be totally different characteristics in other
specific military scenarios that may have a certain impact
on the performance of the communication systems. There
are valuable first realizations of specific scenarios, e.g., the
hostage rescue and the platoon scenario. However, in the
future new scalable models for military scenarios should
be invented. Furthermore, the characteristics of these, and,
within this, the impact on existing performance evaluation
results should be examined.
References
[1] N. Aschenbruck, E. Gerhards-Padilla, M. Gerharz, M. Frank, and
P. Martini, “Modelling mobility in disaster area scenarios”, in Proc.
10th ACM IEEE Int. Symp. Model. Anal. Simul. Wirel. Mob. Syst.
MSWIM, Chania, Greece, 2007.
[2] F. Bai and A. Helmy, “Wireless ad hoc and sensor networks”, Chap-
ter 1: “A survey of mobility models”, 2004,
http://nile.usc.edu/ helmy/important/Modified-Chapter1-5-30-04.pdf
[3] F. Bai, N. Sadagopan, and A. Helmy, “IMPORTANT: a framework
to systematically analyze the impact of mobility on performance of
routing protocols for adhoc networks”, in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM,
San Francisco, USA, 2003, pp. 825–835.
[4] C. Bettstetter, “Mobility modeling in wireless networks: catego-
rization, smooth movement, and border effects”, ACM SIGMOBILE
Mob. Comp. Commun. Rev., vol. 5, no. 3, pp. 55–66, 2001.
[5] C. Bettstetter, “Smooth is better than sharp: a random mobility
model for simulation of wireless networks”, in Proc. 4th Int. Symp.
Model. Anal. Simul. Wirel. Mob. Syst. MSWIM, Rome, Italy, 2001,
pp. 19–27.
[6] C. Bettstetter, G. Resta, and P. Santi, “The node distribution of the
random waypoint mobility model for wireless ad hoc networks”,
IEEE Trans. Mob. Comp., vol. 2, no. 3, pp. 257–269, 2003.
[7] C. Bettstetter and C. Wagner, “The spatial node distribution of the
random waypoint mobility model”, in Proc. 1st German Worksh.
Mob. Ad-Hoc Netw. WMAN’02, Ulm, Germany, 2002, pp. 41–58.
[8] S. Bittner, W.-U. Raffel, and M. Scholz, “The area graph-based
mobility model and its impact on data dissemination”, in Proc. IEEE
PerCom, Kuaai Island, Hawaii, USA, 2005, pp. 268–272.
[9] K. Blakely and B. Lowekamp, “A structured group mobility model
for the simulation of mobile ad hoc networks”, in Int. Conf. Mob.
Comp. Netw., Proc. 2nd Int. Worksh. Mob. Manag. Wirel. Acc. Pro-
toc., Philadelphia, USA, 2004, pp. 111–118.
[10] D. M. Blough, G. Resta, and P. Santi, “A statistical analysis of the
long-run node spatial distribution in mobile ad hoc networks”, Wirel.
Netw., vol. 10, pp. 543–554, 2004.
[11] T. Camp, J. Boleng, and V. Davies, “A survey of mobility mod-
els for ad hoc network research”, Wirel. Commun. Mob. Comp.,
vol. 2 no. 5, pp. 483–502, 2002.
[12] D. R. Choffnes and F. E. Bustamante, “An integrated mobility and
traffic model for vehicular wireless networks”, in Int. Conf. Mob.
Comp. Netw., Proc. 2nd ACM Int. Worksh. Veh. Ad Hoc Netw.,
Cologne, Germany, 2005, pp. 69–78.
[13] “Universal Mobile Telecommunicatios System (UMTS); Selection
procedures for the choice of radio transmission technologies of the
UMTS (UMTS 30.03 version 3.2.0)”, ETSI TR 101 112 V3.2.0
(1998-04).
[14] M. Gu¨nes and J. Siekermann, “CosMos – communication scenario
and mobility scenario generator for mobile ad-hoc networks”, in
Proc. 2nd Int. Worksh. MANETs Interoper. Iss. MANETII’05, Las
Vegas, USA, 2005.
[15] X. Hong, M. Gerla, G. Pei, and C.-C. Chiang, “A group mobility
model for ad hoc wireless networks”, in Proc. Int. Symp. Model.
Simul. Wirel. Mob. Syst. MSWiM, Seattle, USA, 1999, pp. 53–60.
[16] W.-J. Hsu, K. Merchant, H.-W. Shu, C.-H. Hsu, and A. Helmy,
“Weighted waypoint mobility model and its impact on ad hoc net-
works”, ACM SIGMOBILE Mob. Comp. Commun. Rev., vol. 9,
no. 1, pp. 59–63, 2005.
[17] M. Jahnke, J. Tölle, A. Finkenbrink, and A. Wenzel, “Dokumenta-
tion zum Forschungsvorhaben E/IB1S/6A661/2F005 – 1. Zwischen-
bericht”, Tech. Rep., FGAN-FKIE im Auftrage des IT-AmtBw, 2006
(in German).
[18] A. Jardosh, E. M. Belding-Royer, K. C. Almeroth, and S. Suri,
“Towards realistic mobility models for mobile ad hoc networks”, in
Proc. IEEE MobiCom, San Diego, USA, 2003, pp. 217–229.
[19] A. P. Jardosh, E. M. Belding-Royer, A. K. C., and S. Suri, “Real-
world environment models for mobile network evaluation”, IEEE
J. Selec. Areas Commun., vol. 23, no. 3, pp. 622–632, 2005.
[20] P. Johansson, T. Larsson, N. Hedman, B. Mielczarek, and
M. Degermark, “Scenario-based performance analysis of routing
protocols for mobile ad-hoc networks”, in Proc. IEEE MobiCom,
Seattle, USA, 1999, pp. 195–206.
[21] D. B. Johnson and D. A. Maltz, “Dynamic source routing in ad
hoc wireless networks”, in Mobile Computing, T. Imielinski and
H. Korth, Eds. Norwell: Kluwer, 1996, vol. 353, pp. 153–181.
[22] J. Kraaier and U. Killat, “The random waypoint city model – user
distribution in a street-based mobility model for wireless network
simulations”, in Proc. 3rd ACM Int. Worksh. Wirel. Mob. Appl. Serv.
WLAN Hotsp., Cologne, Germany, 2005, pp. 100–103.
[23] B. Liang and Z. J. Haas, “Predictive distance-based mobility man-
agement for multidimensional PCS networks”, IEEE/ACM Trans.
Netw., vol. 11, no. 5, pp. 718–732, 2003.
[24] S. Lim, C. Yu, and C. R. Da, “Clustered mobility model for scale-
free wireless networks”, in Proc. IEEE Conf. Loc. Comput. Netw.
LCN 2006, Tampa, USA, 2006, pp. 231–238.
[25] P. S. Mogre, M. Hollick, N. d’Heureuse, H. W. Heckel, T. Krop,
and R. Steinmetz, “A graph-based simple mobility model”, in
Proc. WMAN’07, Proc. Conf. KiVS’07, Bern, Switzerland, 2007,
pp. 421–432.
[26] M. Musolesi, S. Hailes, and C. Mascolo, “An ad hoc mobility
model founded on social network theory”, in Proc. 7th ACM Int.
Symp. Model. Anal. Simul. Wirel. Mob. Syst., Venice, Italy, 2004,
pp. 20–24.
[27] M. Musolesi and C. Mascolo, “A community based mobility model
for ad hoc network research”, in Proc. 2nd ACM/SIGMOBILE Int.
Worksh. Multi-hop Ad Hoc Netw. Theory Real. REALMAN’06, Colo-
cated with MobiHoc2006, Florence, Italy, 2006, pp. 31–38.
[28] W. Navidi and T. Camp, “Stationary distributions for the random
waypoint mobility model”, IEEE Trans. Mob. Comp., vol. 3, no. 1,
pp. 99–108, 2004.
[29] S. Reidt and S. D. Wolthusen, “An evaluation of cluster head TA
distribution mechanisms in tactical MANET environments”, in Proc.
Conf. ACITA, College Park, USA, 2007.
[30] G. Resta and P. Santi, “An analysis of the node spatial distribu-
tion of the random waypoint model for ad hoc networks”, in Proc.
ACM Worksh. Princip. Mob. Comp. POMC, Toulouse, France, 2002,
pp. 44–50.
[31] E. M. Royer, P. M. Melliar-Smith, and L. E. Moser, “An analy-
sis of the optimum node density for ad hoc mobile networks”, in
Proc. IEEE Int. Conf. Commun., Helsinki, Finland, 2001, vol. 3,
pp. 857–861.
[32] I. Stepanov, J. Ha¨hner, C. Becker, J. Tian, and K. Rothermel,
“A meta-model and framework for user mobility in mobile net-
works”, in Proc. 11th Int. Conf. Netw. ICON 2003, Sydney, Australia,
2003, pp. 231–238.
[33] I. Stepanov, P. J. Marron, and K. Rothermel, “Mobility modeling
of outdoor scenarios for manets”, in Proc. 38th Ann. Simul. Symp.
ANSS’38, San Diego, USA, 2005, pp. 312–322.
[34] M. Sánchez and P. Manzoni, “ANEJOS: a Java based simulator
for ad hoc networks”, Fut. Gener. Comput. Syst., vol. 17, no. 5,
pp. 573–583, 2001.
[35] J. Tian, J. Ha¨hner, C. Becker, I. Stepanov, and K. Rothermel, “Graph-
based mobility model for mobile ad hoc network simulation”, in
Proc. 35th Ann. Simul. Symp., San Diego, USA, 2002, pp. 337–344.
[36] J. Yoon, M. Liu, and B. Noble, “Random waypoint considered
harmful”, in Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, San Francisco, USA, 2003,
pp. 1312–1321.
60
A survey on mobility models for performance analysis in tactical mobile networks
[37] H.-M. Zimmermann and I. Gruber. “A Voronoi-based mobility
model for urban environments”, in Eur. Wirel. 2005 Conf., Zypern,
Greece, 2005.
Nils Aschenbruck received his
Diploma in computer science
(Dipl.-Inform.) from the Uni-
versity of Bonn, Germany, in
2003. Currently he is a Ph.D.
candidate and research Assis-
tant in the communication sys-
tems group at the University of
Bonn. His research interests in-
clude mobile and wireless net-
works, especially mobility and
traffic modeling as well as security.
e-mail: aschenbruck@cs.uni-bonn.de
Institute of Computer Science IV
University of Bonn
Roemerstr. 164
53117 Bonn, Germany
Elmar Gerhards-Padilla re-
ceived his Diploma in computer
science (Dipl.-Inform.) from
the University of Bonn, Ger-
many, in 2005. Currently he is
a Ph.D. candidate and research
Assistant in the communication
systems group at the University
of Bonn. His research inter-
ests include mobile and wireless
networks, especially security in tactical mobile ad hoc net-
works and honeynets.
e-mail: padilla@cs.uni-bonn.de
Institute of Computer Science IV
University of Bonn
Roemerstr. 164
53117 Bonn, Germany
Peter Martini received his
Diploma and Ph.D. degrees
from the Aachen University of
Technology, Germany, in 1986
and 1987, respectively. From
1986 to 1990 he was with
the Institute of Computer Sci-
ence IV at the Aachen Univer-
sity of Technology. From 1990
to 1996 he was Professor of op-
erating systems and computer
networks at the University of Paderborn, Germany. Since
1996, Professor Martini heads the Institute of Computer
Science IV at the University of Bonn. His current re-
search interests include IT security and security assis-
tance systems, mobile communication systems and mo-
bile devices, high speed networks, and performance en-
gineering.
e-mail: martini@cs.uni-bonn.de
Institute of Computer Science IV
University of Bonn
Roemerstr. 164
53117 Bonn, Germany
61
Paper A static test-bed for the evaluation
and optimization of multihop wireless
network protocols
Harald H.-J. Bongartz and Thomas Bachran
Abstract—We investigate the performance of multicast trans-
missions in a simple stationary wireless multihop ad hoc net-
work test-bed. We compare several methods for MANET
multicast using implementations for the protocols MOLSR,
SMOLSR and SMF with an approach that uses explicit multi-
cast and link-layer retries for reliable multicast. Results from
the test-bed are compared with simulation results. We find
that implementing a combination of explicit multicast with
a retry mechanism gives the most promising results in test-
bed and simulation compared with other approaches.
Keywords— MANET, mobile ad hoc network, multihop wireless
network, multicast, wireless test-bed, simulation, explicit multi-
cast.
1. Introduction
Multihop wireless networks, namely wireless mobile ad hoc
networks (MANET) and wireless mesh networks (WMN),
are objects for a multitude of current research efforts. They
are also of high military relevance, as was found in the
“NATO network enabled capability feasibility study” [1]
particularly for MANETs. Their independence from exist-
ing network infrastructure makes them suitable for assess-
ment in destructed or unstructured areas as well as in urban
and rural areas where infrastructure support by local author-
ities might not be available or does not meet operational
requirements.
One challenge of ad hoc network protocol design is the ef-
ficient use of the wireless channel. Especially the family of
IEEE 802.11 wireless LAN protocols, prominent in civilian
wireless networks, are not designed for efficient multihop
communication and can impose a significant constraint on
wireless network performance. On the other hand, their
widespread civilian use increases the interest to explore
their military potential. Furthermore, their high availabil-
ity makes them an easily to deploy research foundation to
investigate challenges imposed by future military wireless
broadband communication standards.
For our research on military aspects of multihop ad hoc net-
works we developed a protocol framework called WNet that
is designed for efficient multihop transmission of multi- and
unicast data, allowing for the test and analysis of various
MANET routing techniques [2]. One of the key features is
its ability to be used both in a real-life network and in the
ns-2 network simulator.
In this paper we concentrate on the application of a real-life
network for MANET analysis. We present a basic test-bed
that consists of stationary nodes which form a wireless ad
hoc network using their IEEE 802.11a/b/g wireless inter-
faces. Although this test-bed is not suited to study effects
of mobility on the communication, it is a valuable research
tool to evaluate the real-life characteristics of wireless mul-
tihop communication. The static nature of this test-bed,
with its immutable topology and constant radio conditions,
permits measurements with a high degree of reproducibility
that is hard to gain in experimental setups that use vehicles
or personnel to add mobility. The drawback of this ap-
proach is the limited possibility to create topology changes,
so tests for the flexibility of the routing mechanism are re-
stricted. Routing aspects are therefore not assessed in this
paper.
With our test-bed we studied multihop multicast transmis-
sions using WNet and other ad hoc routing protocols. The
results from these studies are compared to results from
a simulated environment.
2. Related work
There has been plenty of research on ad hoc networks
during the past years, but for protocol design and evalu-
ation, network simulators have been the main – and often
only – research tool for a long time. Even though simula-
tion is indisputably an essential part of network research,
most simulations lack the possibility to properly take into
account the influence of radio propagation, interference, bit
errors and other effects of the physical and medium access
control (MAC) layers [3]. In fact, some researchers have
instead opted for a test-bed to evaluate wireless network
protocols, e. g., to survey routing metrics [4].
We decided to use the perfect reproducibility and flexibility
of a network simulation as well as study the real-life effects
found in a wireless test-bed and compare results.
The following section contains further related work con-
cerning the ad hoc protocol features we address and imple-
mentations we used in our work.
3. Routing protocols
A vast amount of wireless multihop routing protocols has
been designed in the last years. They are often classified
as proactive or reactive, depending on their approach to
find routes in the network either in advance (mostly using
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management frames to announce link states to their neigh-
bors and other nodes) or on demand (in most cases using
broadcasts to find a route to the destination). We assess
proactive protocols with their potential for fast reaction to
varying conditions, especially to high mobility, to be of
increased relevance for wireless tactical networks. There-
fore, our research concentrates on proactive protocols, the
most prominent example for unicast transmissions being
optimized link state routing (OLSR) [5]. Reactive pro-
tocols, on the other hand, can be an alternative, especially
for operational scenarios where fast connection start-up and
immediate reaction to topology changes – i. e., fast access
to other network nodes – are not as important as the pos-
sibility to maintain radio silence even in short periods of
inactivity.
3.1. Proactive MANET multicast protocols
Since one of our main concerns is the efficient transmission
of multicast data traffic, we integrated several multicast en-
abled MANET protocols in our test-bed. For this paper,
we used the following ones:
MOLSR (version 0.2 for OOLSR 0.99.16). A multicast
extension for OOLSR, the OLSR implementation from
INRIA (FR) [6]. MOLSR takes a source tree based ap-
proach for multicast. For broadcast messages flooding is
done using the multi-point relay (MPR) flooding mecha-
nism of OLSR.
SMOLSR. A simple variant of MOLSR above, using sim-
ple flooding instead of a multicast tree. SMOLSR is also
from INRIA and integrated into the MOLSR code.
SMF (NRL version 1.0a3). The simplified multicast for-
warding protocol (SMF) for MANET as described in [7].
This is the prospective multicast and flooding protocol from
the IETF MANET Working Group. We used an implemen-
tation from the US Naval Research Lab (NRL) that inter-
faces with the NRLOLSR implementation (version 7.7) for
efficient MPR flooding.
3.2. WNet
Since most of the available protocol specifications address
only single aspects of efficient multihop communication –
either quality-aware routing, or multicast traffic, or conges-
tion management – we decided to design our own frame-
work, termed WNet, to be able to integrate multiple of
these mechanisms.
At the moment, this framework implements an OLSR-like
proactive MANET routing with additional provisioning for
multicast transport, link quality estimation, quality-aware
routing and congestion management [2]. In contrast to
other MANET routing protocols WNet is implemented on
layer 2 of the ISO/OSI network model and thus transpar-
ent for IP traffic. To enhance reliability, WNet uses link-
layer acknowledgments and a retry mechanism that is used
even for multicast transmissions. This feature is optional
and can be disabled. Alternatively, multicast transmissions
can use flooding instead of the above explicit multicast
approach.
Furthermore, WNet employs rate selection on the WLAN
MAC to choose the most effective modulation for the in-
tended next hop recipients of a transmission. In combina-
tion with multicast acknowledgments, a necessary packet
retry will use the best modulation (i.e., the fastest data rate)
possible to reach exactly those nodes that did not acknowl-
edge reception of the data packet.
Fig. 1. Schematic test setup.
WNet also offers multiple link metrics that can be activated
to find optimal routing paths with respect to a predefined
quality metric. This includes received signal strength, the
packet reception loss rate and the radio link utilization. In
our test setup, mainly the signal strength based metric is
used. Although our scenario does not offer many alternate
routes, routing decisions might have a small influence when
a link becomes unavailable. This can happen due to con-
gestion at the “fan-out” from node C to receiving nodes D,
E and F in Fig. 1. Node C might then decide to route
packets over one of the remaining receivers.
3.3. MFP
We also compare our approach with the reactive MANET
forwarding protocol (MFP) that is described in [8]. To im-
prove multicast performance, MFP implements an optional
mechanism that uses (multiple) unicast transmissions on
a hop when the number of receivers on that hop is lower
than a given threshold [9]. The default for this threshold
is 3. This way, MFP can take advantage of the link layer
transmissions of IEEE 802.11 for unicast frames.
4. Test setup
4.1. Hardware
Our test-bed consists of six wireless nodes, set up with con-
nectivity as seen in Fig. 1. The nodes are PC-like embed-
ded servers running GNU/Linux with kernel 2.6.18. Each
server is equipped with IEEE 802.11a/b/g WLAN PC cards
and an external omni-directional antenna. The WLAN cards
are set up in IEEE 802.11g mode. The nodes use MAD-
WiFi WLAN drivers [10] for all protocols except WNet,
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which brings its own MADWiFi-based kernel driver to ease
layer 2 access.
The connectivity laid out in Fig. 1 is realized with nodes
set up in different rooms next to one of our office hallways.
The topology demonstrates a sender, followed by a simple
chain of wireless relays that end in a bundle of multicast re-
ceivers. Because it is not practicable to accomplish physical
distances large enough to attain the desired network topol-
ogy, we use RF attenuators between each WLAN card and
its antenna. Signal strength is effectively reduced to about
−75 to −85 dBm at the receivers for the connections be-
tween nodes A and B; B and C; C and D/E/F , respectively.
This leads to a modulation corresponding to 6 Mbit/s data
rate, so that the multi-rate mechanism of WNet and the
“multicast over unicast” mechanism of MFP can not gain
an advantage over the IEEE 802.11 broadcast-based proto-
cols that will never use more than the 6 Mbit/s modulation,
the lowest data rate for 802.11g mode operation. For links
with a higher signal quality, we would expect an additional
performance gain for protocols like WNet which imple-
ment a multi-rate feature. Connections between nodes D,
E and F show higher signal strength values and therefore
higher data rate modulations, but this should be of small
relevance due to our traffic model.
In addition to the wireless network interface, all nodes pro-
vide fast Ethernet network adapters that allow out-of-band
remote control access and time synchronization.
4.2. Test software
For network traffic generation, we use a modified version of
the iperf bandwidth measurement tool [11]. Our modifica-
tion implements an additional logging facility that records
packet sequence number and size as well as sender and re-
ceiver time stamps for every successfully received packet.
Network time protocol (NTP) clients on all nodes allow
time synchronization with an NTP server in the LAN, con-
nected over the fast Ethernet adapters. We can obtain
a synchronization below 100 µs relative to the NTP server,
which proves to be well under the observed end-to-end de-
lays within the wireless network in the range of some 1 ms
and more, so that packet time stamps can be used for delay
calculation.
4.3. Test execution
Preceding to our tests, we did measurements of the received
signal strength of transmissions on all nodes for several
days, using only WNet management traffic. We found that
at night, radio conditions were stable to a very high de-
gree, with quite low variances between different nights,
whereas during office hours we could observe short- and
long-term variations in the order of multiple dBm, as seen
in Fig. 2. They were probably caused by opening and clos-
ing doors and moving people. We thus decided to conduct
our tests only during the night hours when the surroundings
of the test-bed were devoid of people and the environment
was static. Rounds of the night watchmen did not have
measurable influence.
Fig. 2. Example for received signal strength from node B on
node C during 24 hours. Signal strengths are averaged over 10 s;
time is UTC (coordinated universal time).
We use iperf constant bit rate (CBR) multicast user data-
gram protocol (UDP) traffic from sender node A to receiver
nodes D, E and F , varying either the data rate or the pay-
load size. Every set-up is run for 10 minutes, with an ad-
ditional 10 second holding time after the last iperf packet
was transmitted.
5. Test results
The goodput ratio from every test run is measured as the
total of all successfully received iperf packets on a single
receiver, divided by all packets sent by iperf . Goodput ra-
tios for the three receivers D, E and F are then averaged
and a standard deviation is calculated. In contrast, packet
delays for a test run are averaged for all successfully re-
ceived packets on a single node and the standard deviation
is also calculated. These values are then averaged again for
the three receivers, including the standard deviations. The
delay error resulting from the imperfect NTP synchroniza-
tion amounts to less than 100 µs, as mentioned above, and
has been neglected.
Most test runs were performed multiple times to check for
consistency, but results are only shown from one test run
for each setup.
5.1. Data rate variation
In Figs. 3 to 6 we see results from a test suite that applied
increasing load to the network. For these measurements,
we used a constant payload size of 1000 bytes and data
rates between 100 and 1500 kbit/s.
Figure 3 shows the relative data goodput measured in iperf ,
i.e., the net percentage of successfully received data packets
in relation to sent data packets. As can be easily seen, the
WNet variant using the standard signal strength metric and
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link-layer acknowledgments with retries (WNet Ret) yields
a high goodput even for increased network load and un-
der congestion. This is mainly due to the retry mechanism
of WNet. The MFP implementation that uses unicast trans-
missions for multicast packets also takes advantage from
retries, but those integral to the IEEE 802.11 MAC layer.
The other protocols begin to suffer from very high losses
already for moderate load.
Fig. 3. (a) Measured goodput versus data rate at 1000 bytes
packet size; (b) a view zoomed in at high goodput and low data
rates.
The positive effect of WNet retransmissions can clearly be
seen in Fig. 4. The graphs show results from different pro-
tocol variants of the WNet framework: WNet NoRet uses
the same signal strength based metric as WNet Ret, but
does not use multicast acknowledgments and no link layer
retransmissions. The WNet Ret+LR variant combines the
signal strength metric with a loss rate based metric. We
discussed the options for a combination of these metrics
in [12]. The retry mechanism is also activated in this vari-
ant. The same test conditions as above were applied. Ap-
parently, acknowledgments and retries counteract the losses
caused by interference and increase the success rate signif-
icantly, especially for low data rates. For high data rates,
congestion effects prevail. The usage of retries under very
high load is not beneficial and only increases congestion.
Due to this effect WNet NoRet achieves a higher goodput
than the other variants at 700 to 1000 kbit/s. Comparing
Fig. 4. (a) Measured goodput versus data rate for three WNet
variants at 1000 bytes packet size; (b) a view zoomed in at high
goodput and low data rates.
WNet Ret and WNet Ret+LR, the usage of the loss rate met-
ric is beneficial, especially under medium and higher load,
as it presumably counteracts the effects of congestion.
Fig. 5. Measured delay versus data rate at 1000 bytes packet
size.
The end-to-end packet delays (Fig. 5; please note the
logarithmic scale) are low in WNet up to data rates of
1000 kbit/s. Under congestion, though, frequent collisions
lead to a higher number of retries, increasing the load even
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more. Other protocols suffer from high delays even under
lower load. The unicast approach of MFP can keep the
delays significantly lower than for other protocols with the
exception of WNet. It is noticeable that the multicast-over-
unicast approach with link layer retries from IEEE 802.11,
as used by MFP, shows no advantages over the WNet mul-
ticast retry mechanism which has no “true” link layer sup-
port due to implementation restrictions. Of course, MFP
has to send every packet n times for n next hop receivers,
regardless of how many receivers are in fact within radio
range.
Fig. 6. Measured delay versus data rate for three WNet variants
at 1000 bytes packet size.
The downside of the WNet retry mechanism is apparent
in Fig. 6. Activating retries generally increases end-to-end
delays. For low to medium load, though, the delay differ-
ence is moderate and may be a reasonable price to pay
for higher multicast transport reliability. Nevertheless the
delay increases significantly under high load and under
congestion. Taking the goodput into account, it is ques-
tionable whether a retry mechanism should be active un-
der very high load conditions. But considering the gain
in goodput, it is advisable to enable retries for low and
medium load, especially if transmissions over more than
three hops occur. We expect an increased influence of
the retry mechanism if the hop count increases, since the
loss rates of the links are multiplied along a path and
the retry mechanism reduces these loss rates. This re-
mains subject to further investigation using other network
topologies.
5.2. Packet size variation
In another test suite, we vary the payload size for our pack-
ets, keeping the iperf data rate at a constant 200 kbit/s.
It should be noted that this leads to higher network load
for smaller packet sizes, since the packet frequency and
thus the payload overhead increases. Figure 7 shows the
iperf goodput for the different protocols. For MOLSR,
SMOLSR and SMF, packets with sizes beyond the MTU
Fig. 7. Measured goodput versus packet size at 200 kbit/s.
Fig. 8. Measured delay versus packet size at 200 kbit/s.
size of 1500 bytes are dropped, because the implementa-
tions can not handle packet fragmentation. The last sig-
nificant measurement for these protocols is at 1400 bytes
payload size. We also had problems to gain reasonable re-
sults for very small packet sizes (. 50 bytes payload). We
expect these problems to be due to implementation prob-
lems in the network device drivers, but this issue has to be
further investigated.
Fig. 9. Measured goodput versus packet size for three WNet
variants at 200 kbit/s.
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WNet Ret with link layer retransmissions and MFP with
its IEEE 802.11 retries again show the best overall perfor-
mance, with MFP revealing a considerable decline at high
load conditions caused by small packets. The performance
impairment of MFP correlates with increased end-to-end
delay, as can be seen in Fig. 8. Without this exception,
WNet and MFP show quite low delays. All other protocols
show significant decrease in the goodput and higher de-
lays for all packet sizes, SMF being closest to a satisfying
performance for medium packet sizes.
Fig. 10. Measured delay versus packet size for three WNet
variants at 200 kbit/s.
Switching off the WNet retry mechanism, as seen with
WNet NoRet in Fig. 9, decreases the success rate consid-
erably for all packet sizes. In contrast to the high load
scenarios in Fig. 6, the retry mechanism has no significant
influence on the delay for varying packet sizes, all WNet
variants showing constantly low delays (Fig. 10).
6. Simulation setup
To complement our results from the test-bed, we perform
network simulations for the same static topology and with
the same WNet variants as above. For other protocols used
in the test-bed, simulation results are unfortunately not yet
available.
We use the ns-2 simulator [13] in version 2.29 with an
enhanced version of the IEEE 802.11 ns-2 implementation
published by the University of Bonn [14]. This implemen-
tation eliminates some known inaccuracies of the current
implementation included in ns-2 that lead to frequent fail-
ures with higher data rates.
Many MANET simulations use simplified radio propaga-
tion models, resulting in disk-shaped radio ranges with fixed
radius for each node, and are far from modeling a real-
world scenario [3]. To obtain better results in contrast
to these simpler models we use the log-distance model
for large-scale fading and Ricean fading as a small-scale
fading model [15]. The path-loss exponent for the log-
distance model is set to 3.5, resembling an environment
with multiple smaller obstructions like in our office en-
vironment.
The Ricean fading model is based on the assumption that
in addition to a dominant signal component (e.g., line-of-
sight) there is a large number of multi-path components
at the receiver which can lead to attenuation or amplifi-
cation, depending on the phase shifts caused by the sig-
nal propagation times along different paths. The Ricean
K factor specifies the ratio between the signal strength of
the dominant component and that of the multi-path com-
ponents. To find a suitable K factor for our simulations,
we evaluated the signal strength variations observed during
measurement periods in the test-bed (from 6 pm to 4 am
in Fig. 2). This data was used to fit to a Ricean signal
strength probability distribution and estimate the K factor
to 40.
In contrast to the test-bed, we can easily obtain our topology
without simulated antenna attenuation, using larger distance
between the nodes. A connectivity comparable to our test-
bed, with similar received signal strengths and resulting
modulations, is achieved with a distance of 150 m between
adjacent nodes (except D to E and E to F , respectively,
where distances are 77.6 m).
The traffic model corresponds to the traffic produced with
iperf , using CBR multicast UDP traffic from node A to
nodes D, E and F . To increase statistics and decrease
probability for synchronization effects between agent traf-
fic and WNet management traffic, simulations are repeated
5 times with small variation (jitter) in the traffic starting
time. Additionally, results are averaged over all three re-
ceivers.
For the WNet protocol, the same code base is used for the
simulation and the test-bed implementations.
7. Simulation results
Figure 11 shows the simulated goodput for varied data
rates, corresponding to Fig. 4 for the test-bed. Although
we achieved a high similarity between the simulated en-
vironment and the test-bed, the simulation results show
considerable differences. The goodput is generally bet-
ter, and congestion effects appear at significantly higher
loads. Especially WNet NoRet, the WNet variant where
the retry mechanism is disabled, shows major differences
to the test-bed results from Fig. 9 and an astonishing sta-
ble behavior up to very high loads. Additional simula-
tions could show that congestion starts at approximately
2000 kbit/s with WNet NoRet. Nevertheless, goodput for
low to medium loads is almost as mediocre as in the test-
bed. In contrast to the test-bed, the advantage gained by the
added loss rate metric in WNet Ret+LR does not exist in the
simulation.
The decreasing goodput for higher load corresponds
clearly with higher delays, as seen in Fig. 12. The
emerging congestion at about 800 kbit/s is abundantly
clear.
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Fig. 11. (a) Simulated goodput versus data rate for three WNet
variants at 1000 byte packet size; (b) a view zoomed in at high
goodput and low data rates.
Fig. 12. Simulated delay versus data rate for three WNet variants
at 1000 byte packet size.
For the packet size variation, the simulation results of-
fer less surprises. The packet goodput ratio from Fig. 13
shows the same decrease when WNet retries are disabled
as in Fig. 9. The performance with retries enabled is nearer
to 100 percent, though.
Fig. 13. Simulated goodput versus packet size for three WNet
variants at 200 kbit/s.
Delays for varying packet sizes also show the same overall
behavior in Fig. 14 as they show in Fig. 10, although they
are in general some milliseconds lower.
Fig. 14. Simulated delay versus packet size for three WNet
variants at 200 kbit/s.
8. Conclusion
We have shown that for multicast transmissions in an ad
hoc network based on IEEE 802.11, improvements to the
link layer are strongly advisable.
The positive influence of link layer retries for multicast
packets on the overall network goodput is obvious, at least
for our scenario. Simulation results confirm these findings
as far as the scenarios are comparable. Addition of link
layer acknowledgements and retries, like those applied to
IEEE 802.11 unicast transmissions, would be a feasible
approach, but must be combined with explicit multicast
forwarding to determine the next hop recipients. Also, an
implementation of multicast over unicast can improve the
delivery rate in our scenario, but it increases the network
load even when not needed. For high-density networks
and large multicast groups, ACK implosions will probably
counteract the positive effect of these features.
Efficient flooding mechanisms, like those that can be in-
tegrated with SMF, are supposed to attain major advan-
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tages for scenarios that offer multiple paths between source
and destinations, higher node densities or increased mo-
bility. For the simple relay chain scenario presented here,
the flooding approach appears detrimental. Even when link
layer retries are not activated, as it is the case with WNet
NoRet, goodput and especially delays are significantly bet-
ter with explicit multicast than with flooding.
All in all, we have reproduced the main effects seen in the
test-bed with our simulations. But compared with the real-
life test-bed results all simulations show a more consistent
and “smooth” behavior that can not be explained simply by
better statistics.
Future work. Although the results from our simulations
show a reassuring similarity to our test-bed results, there
are still obvious differences that should be resolved. Delays
for small packets are significantly lower in simulation than
in the test-bed, congestion effects show earlier in the test-
bed. Apparently, the models used still lack a certain amount
of applicability for the validation of test-bed results. But
the reliability and stability of the network drivers and hard-
ware can as well be a source of otherwise unexplainable
variation. This should be clarified, where possible.
On the other hand, different scenarios should be tested,
both static and mobile. Whereas node mobility can be easily
added in simulation, designing a real-world mobile test-bed
with high reproducibility presents a hard to meet challenge.
In addition, a suitable mobility model has to be found that
can be viewed as a practical application of mobile commu-
nication in tactical environments.
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Paper Quality of service support,
security and OSPF interconnection
in a MANET using OLSR
Cedric Adjih, Pascale Minet, Paul Muhlethaler, Emmanuel Baccelli, and Thierry Plesse
Abstract— The MANET networks are of prime interest for
military networks. One of the proeminent routing protocols
for MANET is OLSR, and indeed, OLSR has been used in
many evaluations and experiments of MANETs. As OLSR is
on its way to standardization, there are still a number of exten-
sions that are useful and sometimes necessary for practical use
of OLSR networks: such extensions are quality of service sup-
port, security, and OSPF interconnection. In this paper, we
present the architecture, design, specifications and implemen-
tations that we made to integrate these features in a military
test-bed. This test-bed is a real MANET comprising 18 nodes.
These nodes communicate by radio and use the IEEE 802.11b
MAC protocol. The OLSR routing protocol updates the rout-
ing table used by the IP protocol to forward packets.
Keywords— mobile ad hoc networks, OLSR, quality of service,
security, OSPF, interconnection.
1. Introduction
A mobile ad hoc network (MANET), is a collection of
autonomous mobile nodes communicating over a wireless
medium without requiring any pre-existing infrastructure.
These nodes are free to move about arbitrarily. MANETs
exhibit very interesting properties: they are self-organizing,
decentralized and support mobility. Hence, they are very
good candidates for tactical networks in military applica-
tions. Military world integrates today new concepts which
are, i.e., battlefield digitalization (NEB), network centric
warfare (NCW), aeroterrestrial operational bubble (BOA),
cooperative engagement. The goal of these concepts is
to create a total numerical network, amongst other things
on tactical perimeter, which connects the various tactical
pawns (i.e., headquarters, soldiers). In the general context
of military IP networks architecture (strategic, operative,
tactical), with implementations on various types of techno-
logical supports, and through various networks (i.e., fixed,
mobile, satellite), it is required for a MANET to be a full
IP network. As a MANET is generally multihop, and in
order to allow the communication between any two nodes,
a routing protocol must be used. The IETF MANET work-
ing group has standardized four routing protocols that cre-
ate and update the routing table used by IP. Among them,
optimized link state routing (OLSR) [1] is a proactive pro-
tocol where nodes periodically exchange topology informa-
tion in order to establish a route to any destination in the
network.
The OLSR [1] is an optimization of a pure link state rout-
ing protocol. It is based on the concept of multipoint re-
lays (MPRs). First, using multipoint relays reduces the
size of the control messages: rather than declaring all its
links in the network, a node declares only the set of links
with its neighbors that have selected it as multipoint re-
lay. The use of MPRs also minimizes flooding of control
traffic. Indeed only multipoint relays forward control mes-
sages. This technique significantly reduces the number of
retransmissions of broadcast messages. Each node acquires
the knowledge of its one-hop and two-hop neighborhoods
by means of periodic Hello messages. It independently se-
lects its own set of multipoint relays among its one-hop
neighbors in such a way that the multipoint relays cover
(in terms of radio range) all its two-hop neighbors. Each
node also maintains topological information about the net-
work obtained by means of topology control (TC) messages
broadcast by MPR nodes. The routing table is computed
by the Dijkstra algorithm. It provides the shortest route
(i.e., the route with the smallest hop number) to any desti-
nation in the network. In [2], we reported the performance
evaluation results showing that a MANET with OLSR rout-
ing achieves very satisfying performances.
However, OLSR, as defined in [1], does not support qual-
ity of service (QoS) and hence does not satisfy the mili-
tary operational constraints associated with the various traf-
fics exchanged in a tactical mobile ad hoc network. On
these tactical mobile networks, as on the fixed networks,
various types of traffics coexist: data, voice, and video.
These traffics have different characteristics and military
operational constraints. They must receive a differentiated
treatment: the importance of military operational flows
(i.e., hierarchical priority) must be taken into account
(example: “flash” message crossing a mobile ad hoc net-
work). The QoS support based on OLSR has to take into
account constrained environments and to optimize with re-
spect to this environment, the mechanisms which contribute
to QoS support. The concept of constrained environments
can correspond to various operational military criteria such
as low data bit rate, “time constrained network”, secured
architecture of “red/black” type, constraints of mobility. It
is also necessary to manage end-to-end QoS in an opti-
mal way, to correlate IP level quality of service with that
of the radio level. That leads, among other things, to
the optimization of the couples “QoS mechanisms – radio
medium access protocol (MAC layer)”: concept of “cross
layering”.
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Fig. 1. The CELAR MANET/OLSR platform. Explanations: ALGECO – a modular construction, INSC – interoperable networks for
secure communications.
We present a QoS support based on OLSR in Section 2.
Another requirement in a military network is security.
The OLSR routing protocol, as defined in [1], does not
meet this requirement. Indeed, a node can, for instance,
pretend to be another node or advertise false links. Such
a behavior can seriously damage the routing. In extreme
cases, no message reaches its destination. This problem
is common to both reactive and proactive routing proto-
cols. That is why, we have proposed mechanisms to pro-
vide a secure routing. These mechanisms will be presented
in Section 3.
A tactical network is not isolated, it should be able to com-
municate with other networks, more conventional. These
networks generally use open shortest path first (OSPF).
Consequently, an interconnection should be done between
the OLSR and the OSPF routing domains. We show how
to take advantage that both protocols are link based routing
protocols in order to perform such an interconnection. This
OLSR-OSPF interconnection is described in Section 4.
The MANET in general and OLSR networks specifically,
are of prime interest to DGA/CELAR (French MoD).
Hence in partenership with INRIA, which developped and
installed a MANET/OLSR platform at CELAR (Technical
Defense Center for InformationWarfare), such OLSR-based
MANETs have been experimented and their features and
performances have been evaluated.
The platform used for experimentation is illustrated by
Fig. 1. It comprises 18 nodes which are routers, laptops
and VAIOs. They use the IEEE 802.11b protocol to access
the wireless medium. They operate with IPv4 or IPv6.
They use the OLSR protocol for routing. This protocol
has been enhanced with security functionalities and QoS
support. The nodes are distributed in the central tower of
the CELAR, and in a shelter, denoted ALGECO on Fig. 1,
and some of them are embedded in vehicles. This MANET
is interconnected to a wired network by means of an OLSR-
OSPF router. This router takes advantage of the fact that
both routing protocols are link-state protocols.
In this paper, we describe in Section 2 the QoS support
we have implemented on this platform. We will present
in Section 3 how to make the OLSR routing protocol se-
cure. Section 4 shows how to interconnect an OLSR rout-
ing domain with an OSPF one, taking advantage of the fact
that both are link state routing protocols.
2. QoS support in an OLSR MANET
Several works deal with QoS support in a MANET, see
for instance [3–6]. Some of them are based on the OLSR
routing protocol like [7–10]. The QoS support we have
implemented on the CELAR platform comprises five com-
ponents as illustrated by Fig. 2.
As resources are scarce in MANETs, our extension [10]
keeps the optimizations present in OLSR, which rely on
two principles:
– a partial topology knowledge: the advertised link set
is a subset of the whole topology;
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– an optimized flooding, called MPR flooding: it is
based on the concept of multipoint relays.
In this solution, we distinguish the four following classes
of flows, listed by decreasing priority order.
• Control flows. They are required to make the net-
work operational, like for instance OLSR messages.
This class is not allowed to user flows.
• Delay flows. These flows have delay requirements,
like voice flows. In this solution, they are processed
with a high priority.
• Bandwidth flows. These flows have bandwidth re-
quirements, like video flows.
• Best effort flows. They have no specific QoS re-
quirements.
In the following, we denote QoS flows, flows having delay
or bandwidth requirements. BE denote best effort flows.
Fig. 2. The QoS support with its five components.
The admission control is in charge of deciding whether
a new QoS flow can be accepted or not. The decision de-
pends on the bandwidth requested by this flow, the available
bandwidth at each node and the possible interferences cre-
ated by this flow. If there is not enough resources to accept
the new flow, this flow is rejected. The decision is taken
locally by the source of the QoS flow with regard to the
bandwidth requested by the flow.
We can notice that this admission control is applied only
on QoS flows. If BE flows were not constrained, they
could saturate the medium and degrade the QoS granted to
QoS flows. We introduce a leaky bucket on each node to
limit the bandwidth consumed by BE flows and protect the
QoS flows.
To select the shortest route meeting the bandwidth required,
the QoS routing protocol must know the bandwidth locally
available at each node. QoS signalling is introduced for
that purpose. QoS parameters values are disseminated in
the network by means of MPRs. The selection of MPRs
is modified to consider the bandwidth locally available at
each node. The main drawback of this solution lies in the
overhead generated. Each flooded message leads to a num-
ber of retransmissions higher than that obtained with native
OLSR [10]. In order to conciliate the optimized perfor-
mances of MPR flooding with QoS support, we distinguish
two types of MPRs.
• The MPRs, selected according to the native version
of OLSR, are used to optimize flooding.
• The QoS MPRs, selected considering the local avail-
able bandwidth, are used to compute the routes.
This extension of OLSR would provide better performances
if a QoS MAC were used. An ideal QoS MAC would be
deterministic, would grant access to the waiting packet with
the highest priority and would provide information concern-
ing the QoS at the MAC level (example: the local avail-
able bandwidth, the waiting time for transmission). How-
ever, even if the MAC layer does not support QoS, QoS
OLSR improves the quality of service provided to QoS
flows, as shown in [10, 11], where the protocol used is
IEEE 802.11b.
We can notice that this QoS support does not need any
additional message. The Hello and TC messages of OLSR
are extended with QoS information in order to allow any
flow source to compute the shortest route providing the
bandwidth requested by its new flow. As the problem
of finding a route meeting a given bandwidth has been
shown NP-hard in wireless networks subject to radio in-
terferences [4], we use an approximation to compute the
bandwidth consumed by a flow at the MAC level. This
approximation is used only by the QoS routing protocol
to select the route which also depends on the local avail-
able bandwidth measured at each node. Once a route has
been found for a QoS flow, it is used by all packets of the
flow considered, until either a shorter route is established
because network resources have been released, or it is no
longer valid because of a link breakage. Source routing can
be used for that purpose. Notice that BE flows are routed
hop-by-hop.
With this QoS support, QoS flows receive a throughput
close to this requested, their delivery rate is improved, be-
cause interferences are taken into account. Users perceive
the QoS improvement. Moreover, this gain is still obtained
in case of node mobility up to 20 m/s. In that case, some
additional rules should be taken in the selection of MPRs
and QoS MPRs, in order to avoid nodes at the transmission
range limit.
3. Security in an OLSR MANET
A significant issue in MANETs is that of the integrity
of the network itself. OLSR allows any node to partici-
pate in the network – the assumption being that all nodes
are behaving well and welcome. If that assumption fails,
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then the network may be subject to malicious nodes, and
the integrity of the network fails.
In OLSR as in any other proactive MANET routing proto-
col, each node must, first, correctly generate routing proto-
col control traffic, conforming to the protocol specification.
Secondly, each node is responsible for forwarding routing
protocol control traffic on behalf of other nodes in the net-
work. Thus incorrect behavior of a node can result from
either a node generating incorrect control messages or from
incorrect relaying of control traffic from other nodes. Thus
we have two types of attacks against the OLSR routing
protocol.
The first type of attack consists, for a node, in generat-
ing incorrect control message. For this first type of attack,
the node can generate a fake control message from scratch
or it can replay already sent control messages. In this sec-
ond case, we have an incorrect control message generation
using replay. Another even more advanced such replay at-
tack consists in capturing a control message in a given lo-
cation of the network and relaying it very rapidly to another
location to replay it.
In the second type of attack, the node is not relaying cor-
rectly either the control messages or the data packets. This
attack can range from the absence of relaying to an in-
correct relaying, e.g., a data packet can be forwarded to
a wrong next hop node.
The security architecture initially proposed in [12] that we
have used to counter the previous attacks relies on two main
mechanisms:
– a signature mechanism is used to authenticate control
messages;
– a timestamp mechanism is used to ensure the fresh-
ness of control messages.
This security architecture can be easily implemented using
the message format shown in Fig. 3. Notice that the op-
tional source interface address is used to make the sig-
Fig. 3. Format of a signed message.
nature depends on this address which is not in the
OLSR message; without this option attacker could replay
a Hello message changing the source interface address
which is found by OLSR in the IP header.
For the signature mechanism, three possibilities were con-
sidered.
• Signature with symmetric cryptography, traditional
asymmetric cryptography or identity-based (pairing-
based) cryptography.
• Using asymmetric keys (with traditional cryptogra-
phy) requires the distribution of these keys: this leads
to overhead and additional attacks.
• Identity-based cryptography (based on pairing) could
be an interesting solution, however the signature
and verification times are beyond the computational
power of the routers (see [16]).
For simplicity and computational power reasons, we have
implemented the HMAC authentication algorithm (which
MD5 hashing function) using a symmetric shared secret
key.
The timestamps are simply the times given by nodes inter-
nal clock. A strict synchronization of nodes clocks is not
necessary since the timestamp is used to complete the al-
ready existing protection offered by the message sequence
number and the duplicate set. As a matter of fact, messages
that are already in the duplicate set are silently dropped.
If the nodes clocks are of very poor quality, it is still possi-
ble to use them to generate timestamps. In [17] an OLSR
secure time protocol (OSTP) is presented. It allows nodes
to run with non-synchronized clocks while the timestamps
are still using the nodes clocks.
With such security architecture and without compromised
nodes, the above mentioned attacks can be countered ex-
cept the relay attacks. Attacker nodes will be maintained
outside the network; these nodes will never be relays and
will even not be present in the routing table of the net-
work nodes. The relay attacks as the attacks in presence
of compromised nodes are more difficult to counter; pos-
sible techniques are proposed in [13–15]. Compromised
nodes have the knowledge of given crypotgraphic keys of
the network.
4. OSPF interconnection
4.1. Overview
The OLSR and OSPF are both well-established proto-
cols with different application areas. However in the mil-
itary networks, at different levels, there are network in-
frastructures that fit the requirements of either OLSR
or OSPF.
Hence, one important feature is to be able to integrate both
types of networks and make them interoperate. A general
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solution is to use an external protocol such as border gate-
way protocol (BGP) [18], to connect networks with differ-
ent routing technologies.
Fortunately, OSPF and OLSR share some similarities: they
are both link state protocols. Hence a possibility exists to
make both interoperate.
In this spirit, we indeed designed, implemented and experi-
mented a mechanism to perform OSPF/OLSR interconnec-
tion. The core idea is the following: OSPF and OLSR
both incorporate mechanisms in order to exchange rout-
ing information with other routing protocols; hence those
mechanisms are used.
4.2. Principles of the OSPF/OLSR interconnection
The OLSR features a simple and efficient mechanism to
import routes coming from another routing protocol: host
and network association (HNA) messaging. With these
messages, an OLSR node can advertise it has reachabil-
ity to non-OLSR hosts or networks. For instance, if an
OLSR node is also connected via another interface to an
OSPF network, it can periodically generate and transmit
such HNA messages including the OSPF network’s IP pre-
fixes. Routes to the OSPF network will then be included
in OLSR-driven routing tables.
Similarily, OSPF features its own mechanisms to import
routes coming from another routing protocol: link state
advertisement (LSA) messages type 5 and 7. These mes-
sages advertise routes that are “external” to the OSPF
network, which are then included in OSPF-driven rout-
ing tables. There are however two different types of
metrics.
In order to achieve OLSR/OSPF interconnection, it is there-
fore sufficient to use these two mechanisms to transfer
routes between OSPF and OLSR through the interface
routers (the routers that have both OSPF and OLSR in-
terfaces).
4.3. Implementation of the OSPF/OLSR interconnection
In practice, in OLSR and OSPF, the mechanisms to import
route from other protocols are implementation-dependent.
Hence, we started with the choice of two implementations:
the OLSR implementation which is used is the OOLSR
implementation [20] from INRIA.
The OSPF (OSPFv3) implementation which is used, is part
of the Quagga [21] routing suite (precisely quagga-0.99.4).
It is a derivative of Zebra [23]. Notice that we will use
the names Zebra and Quagga interchangeably, since the
architecture, interfaces and code are near identical.
The overview of Quagga, is given by supporting doc-
umentation [22]: “Quagga is a routing software suite,
providing implementations of OSPFv2, OSPFv3, RIP v1
and v2, RIPv3 and BGPv4 for Unix platforms, particularly
FreeBSD, Linux, Solaris and NetBSD. The Quagga archi-
tecture consists of a core daemon: zebra, which acts as an
abstraction layer to the underlying Unix kernel and presents
the Zserv API over a Unix or TCP stream to Quagga clients.
It is these Zserv clients which typically implement a rout-
ing protocol and communicate routing updates to the ze-
bra daemon”, . . . such as ospf6d, implementing OSPFv3
(IPv6).
Hence, the central part of Quagga, is the zebra daemon
which is offering an API, called Zserv. This main daemon
is in charge of actually performing low-level or system-
level parts, such as for instance setting up the routes in the
kernel. It is also in charge of exchanging routes, interfaces
and addresses information to the daemons.
Figure 4 represents the architecture of Quagga: each rout-
ing protocol is implemented as a daemon.
Fig. 4. Zebra/Quagga architecture.
As a result of running the routing protocol, some routes
are detected or exchanged between some nodes in the net-
work.
Instead of setting directly the routes as in traditional routing
protocol implementations, the routing daemons communi-
cate the added/deleted routes to the main daemon zebra,
which will add/remove them actually in the network.
An important point is that the Zserv protocol between
the main daemon and the routing protocol daemons in-
cludes the ability to send routes in both directions: hence,
in Fig. 4, the ospf6d daemon is also able to get routes
which are set up by ripgngd for instance, if it has regis-
tered to do so. This feature is largely used in the Quagga
routing suite, in order for daemons to redistribute routes
obtained by other daemons.
4.4. Interconnection between OOLSR and Quagga:
QOED
In order to interconnect OLSR and OSPF, we have de-
cided to use the traditionnal way of Quagga: another rout-
ing daemon is added, which sets routes by communicating
with the main Quagga daemon. The exchange of routes
between OLSR and OSPF is then done through this main
daemon.
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As shown on Fig. 5, the communication is actually done
indirectly, using a daemon called QOED, Quagga OOLSR
Exchange daemon, which mediates between Quagga and
OOLSR. The reasons for this are multiple, but mostly re-
late to the desire for limiting the changes to OOLSR and
Quagga.
Fig. 5. Quagga/OOLSR interconnection architecture.
To Quagga main daemon zebra, QOED appears as a normal
Quagga routing daemon, which gives some routes (OLSR
routes), and asks for other routes (IPv6 OSPF routes).
To ospf6d, QOED appears indirectly: this daemon has the
ability to redistribute routes from other protocols (such
as RIP, BGP, . . .) QOED and OLSR appear through the
routes they set in zebra.
To OOLSR, QOED appears as a daemon implementing the
specific protocols for route exchanges OOLSR→QOED and
QOED→OOLSR.
A crucial point of the architecture and implementation,
is that, the Quagga/Zebra Zserv protocol is re-used, and
also that additional protocols for route exchanges between
OOLSR and QOED are used.
5. Conclusion
In this paper, we have shown how to extend OLSR in
order to provide QoS support, ensure a secure routing
and interconnect the OLSR and OSPF domains. All these
extensions take care of MANET specificities: radio in-
terferences, high dynamicity and low capacity resources.
They have been implemented on a real MANET/OLSR
platform comprising 18 nodes. Performances obtained on
this platform allow us to conclude that the OLSR exten-
sions are very useful to military applications and very
significantly improve the network behavior, in particular
when self-organization, mesh operations, with a possible
high mobility are required. MANET solutions have to be
considered today for tactical edge routing scenario, but
also for transit networks, where it would require more
studies concerning the scalability. MANET meets mil-
itary requirements and that in particular below Brigade
echelon.
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Paper Automatic multicast IPsec
by using a proactive IPsec discovery protocol
and a group key management
Thorsten Aurisch, Tobias Ginzler, Peter Martini, Roger Ogden, Trung Tran, and Hartmut Seifert
Abstract— Internet protocol based networking is gaining
ground in armed forces, leading to a concept described by the
NATO as network centric capabilities (NCC). The goal is to
enable state-of-the-art, affordable and powerful electronic in-
formation services to the troops. A tighter connection of the
forces is expected to further enhance the joined strike capa-
bilities. Providing secure information exchange within groups
of armed forces is one aspect of the NCC concept. Such
group communication is enabled by the multicast feature of
the IP technology. Security requirements are met by using the
IP security (IPsec) architecture. IPsec enables secure commu-
nication between secure private networks via an unsecured
public text network. While secure unicast transmission with
IPsec is common, only few achievements have been made to se-
cure multicast transmissions. The protection of multicast data
traffic of a group in an automated way is described in this doc-
ument. We utilize an automatic detection of IPsec devices and
an efficient key management protocol to reach our aim.
Keywords— secure group communication group key manage-
ment, multicast IPsec, automatic IPSec device discovery.
1. Introduction
Establishment of keys and protocol parameters is necessary
to enable IP security (IPsec) for securing network traffic.
Such a set of keys and parameters is called security associa-
tion (SA) in IPsec terminology. Manual configuration of the
IPsec capable nodes is a time consuming task. Moreover
deploying pre-shared keys for network encryption renders
all IPsec nodes insecure if a single node is compromised.
To overcome these caveats in point-to-point communication
the Internet key exchange protocol (IKE) has been created.
It provides an automated configuration of IPsec devices.
IKE enforces a set of security policies (SPs) such as mini-
mum key length or maximum key life-time and configures
security associations at the IPsec devices.
For multicast IPsec on the other hand, no automated way
for configuration exists yet. It is required to have both au-
tomated key and IPsec parameter establishment for group
communication, too. In many situations group communi-
cation needs to be secure, but trained computer special-
ists might not be available for manual configuration. Our
two-parted approach addresses both requirements: easy to
maintain and secure. One component of our concept is the
IPsec discovery protocol (IDP) [10]. It discovers IPsec ca-
pable devices and configures them in an automated way.
The second component is the multicast Internet key ex-
change protocol (MIKE) [5, 9, 18]. It negotiates and es-
tablishes a group key in a secure manner. By combining
the two, an automatically secured network is possible. Only
a one-time configuration of the affected network nodes is
necessary in our approach. After that, the system self-
maintains its security properties, even if nodes join or leave
the group.
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 gives account
of previous work done in the realm of key management
and IPsec discovery protocols. Our target use case is de-
scribed in Sections 3 and 4. Section 5 goes into the details
of the protocol communication. Our performance analysis
deployment is described in Section 6. Finally, Section 7
summarizes and gives a further outlook.
2. Previous work
In this section, we want to give an overview of existing key
management and IPsec discovery solutions. We want to
motivate, why MIKE and the IDP were chosen to automate
network encryption.
The IPsec discovery protocol clients run at the borders of
secure (“red”) networks and un-secure public (“black”) net-
works. Their task is to discover red enclaves and inter-
connect them over the black network. A global discovery
protocol for IPsec devices is described in [1]. It describes
an infrastructure with a worldwide hierarchy of servers in
a domain name system (DNS)-like manner (client-server
discovery – CSD). Although different balancing schemes
are discussed, the architecture relies on a single root server,
which is considered to be a single point of failure.
Another possibility to locate IPsec routers is to reserve spe-
cial IP addresses in each network prefix for them. It elim-
inates the need for a discovery protocol at all. This im-
plicit peer enclave discovery protocol (IMPEPD) called so-
lution scales well, but offers little flexibility. Another mech-
anism is called multicast discovery (MD), reaching neigh-
bor routers via a multicast router request. Because of its
reactive nature it may impose latency especially in dynamic
environments. All of these proposals are expected to be
included or are already part of high assurance Internet pro-
tocol encryptor interoperability specification (HAIPE IS)
Version 3, the U.S. approved version of IPsec.
An approach which overcomes most of the limitations of the
existing IPsec discovery mechanisms is the IPsec discovery
protocol. IDP relies on IP multicasting within the black
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network. Because of its proactive nature and because it
needs no special servers, it is best suited for medium scale
networks. Larger scale networks can be enabled by parti-
tioning them and introducing IDP security gateways. IDP
is able to configure IPsec security associations and enforces
a common IPsec security policy within the domain. Cer-
tificates are distributed by IDP, too.
Table 1 summarizes the comparison of the different discov-
ery mechanisms. The capability to handle a large number
of networks, robustness against the loss of parts of the in-
frastructure, flexibility and imposed latency is taken into
account.
Table 1
Comparison of discovery architectures
Discovery
mechanism
Scalability Robustness Flexibility Latency
IMPEPD Good Good Worst Best
MD Average Good Good Worst
CSD Best Average Average Good
IDP Good Good Good Good
A key management service is necessary to enable multicast
IPsec. The key management establishes a common group
key at all IPsec devices. The key establishment takes place
over the black network, so it has to be done in a secure
manner. Public key cryptography and certificates are often
used to accomplish this task. Once the common key is es-
tablished, a confidential and authenticated communication
through the black network is possible. Additionally, a key
management system should be able to support users to join
and leave the group without sacrificing security.
Different protocols and key management architectures exist.
An overview of existing approaches is given in Fig. 1. For
security reasons adding and excluding members of a group
enforces a key change. Algorithms which support the fre-
quent change of group keys are called “dynamic” key man-
agement approaches. The pre-distributed group keys (PGK)
method is the only listed system which uses a static key and
does not support frequent changes. For this reason it is only
practicable for small, static groups.
Fig. 1. Overview of group key management mechanisms.
Most of the algorithms rely on a centralized or hierarchical
structure. Centralized systems like group key management
protocol (GKMP) [11] or group domain of interpretation
(GDOI) [12] contain a server. On the one hand a server
is considered as a single point of failure. On the other
hand, building a hierarchical system often involves invest-
ing in a costly infrastructure (scalable multicast key dis-
tribution – SMKD [16]) or doing expensive de- and re-
encryption (IOLUS [15]). At first sight, distributed key
management mechanisms seem to offer both efficiency and
robustness. But most of the distributed systems depend on
a reliable or ordered delivery of messages (e.g., tree-based
group Diffie-Hellman (TGDH) [13]). Such a service is not
offered by IP multicast. Some algorithms only utilize dis-
tributed systems to spread the key, while the calculation is
done by a single instance (distributed one-way function tree
(DOFT) [14]). An attacker would concentrate on this point.
To overcome the limitations of the existing key management
mechanisms, the group key management system MIKE in
the key agreement (KA) mode has been developed. Even
though MIKE offers a distributed key management, it does
not depend on ordered or reliable message transport. MIKE
operates on top of the standard UDP/IP layer. A transac-
tion manager (TM) spreads topology and status informa-
tion to the clients. After that, every authenticated mem-
ber is able to calculate the group key itself. Any device
can hold the transaction manager status. The MIKE pro-
tocol defines which IPsec device is the current transaction
manager. Mechanisms exist to elect a new TM if a TM be-
comes unreachable. Scalability and performance have been
evaluated. Utilizing the key agreement operation mode of
MIKE, approximately 50 IPsec devices can be managed
easily. Larger networks are supported in the centralized op-
eration mode called key distribution (KD). Key agreement
mode offers robustness against failure of IPsec devices and
network errors, while maintaining fair scalability.
Based upon a medium scale scenario described in the next
section, MIKE and IDP seem to be the best solution for
automated network encryption. IDP detects IPsec capable
devices, while group key management is done by MIKE.
We want to analyze how the combination of these two com-
ponents is going to perform.
3. Scenario
An international research project sketched a typical net-
work, as it may be deployed within a coalitional opera-
tion [2]. The following requirements and conditions have
been identified:
– nations want to protect their red national networks;
– the national local area networks (LANs) are intercon-
nected by public wide area networks (WANs);
– nations want to exchange information seamlessly at
the tactical level;
– strict WAN/LAN separation;
– no security guarantees are given by the WAN opera-
tor.
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The sketched network is shown in Fig. 2. IPv6 is used
to benefit from the advanced security and multicast capa-
bilities. The IPsec labeled components are border routers
with IPsec capabilities. We want to test if the IDPMIKE
solution deployed on these devices will enable seamless
interconnection of the national LANs.
Fig. 2. Network setup of a coalitional operation.
In a typical coalition network, the number of nations (and
national LANs) does not exceed a few dozens. So it is
not necessary to use IDP security gateways. Furthermore
MIKE can be used in key agreement mode.
Certificate distribution is possible with IDP, but it has been
deliberately kept out of the scope of this paper, since our
focus is on feasibility, scalability, and performance of the
network configuration. We consider certificates to be al-
ready deployed at the IPsec devices. The IDPMIKE solu-
tion is prepared for various kinds of public key infrastruc-
ture (PKI) concepts and policy guidelines.
4. Test-bed
According to the sketched network in the section before,
a test-bed was built. The crucial components are the border
IPsec devices, drawn as two-parted rectangles in Fig. 2.
These devices are COTS hardware products, namely PCs
running a Fedora Core Linux kernel. IDP Version 3.1.4
runs in combination with MIKE Version 0.8 on these IPsec
devices. The realized test-bed is shown in Fig. 3.
Overall ten IPsec devices were involved. For simplifica-
tion, a switch was used to interconnect the black routers.
In a real deployment this is done by a public WAN. All
connections were realized as 100 Mbit/s Ethernet. The up-
per three routers are border routers of the black network.
Open shortest path first (OSPF) or the protocol independent
multicast (PIM) [8] multicast routing protocol run between
these routers. The IPsec devices are drawn as triangles;
they contain the IDPMIKE solution. The IPsec devices
divide the network into the red network domain and the
black network domain. The lower routers are in the do-
Fig. 3. The realized test-bed.
main of the national LAN, providing secure network access
to clients.
The realized test net provides not the functionality of the
ideal network sketched before. Linux kernel does not sup-
port IPv6 multicast routing through IPsec yet. It is not
possible to route red IPv6 multicast traffic through IPsec
and across the black network to another red network. The
setting of the IPsec SA and SP according to the scenario
was correct. In independent experiments multicast routing
was proved to work correctly as well as IPsec but not both
in combination. The reason is that the Linux IPv6 multi-
cast routing procedure bypasses the netfilter API and IPsec
stack [3].
5. IDPMIKE interoperation
The interaction process between IDP and MIKE is divided
into three phases (Fig. 4). First the discovery process de-
tects a change in its internal connectivity tables. For ex-
ample an IPsec device joins or leaves the network. The
MIKE service is informed about the change by an UDP
datagram (Fig. 4, Step 1). In the second phase MIKE es-
tablishes a new group key and returns it via a datagram
answer to IDP (Fig. 4, Step 2). In the last phase IDP con-
figures the IPsec devices automatically (Fig. 4, Step 3).
The phases are now described in detail.
Fig. 4. Interacting sequence of IDP and MIKE.
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When an IDP instance starts up, it multicasts a hello mes-
sage periodically. Simultaneously it listens to any incoming
IDP message. All IDP instances receiving a hello message
add the sending IPsec device to their connectivity table if it
is not already added. Then they establish a unicast IPsec SA
to this device. This connection is secured by a pre-shared
key. The SA is used by the IPsec devices to announce its
IP network prefix to the newly discovered instance period-
ically. The prefixes are evaluated by the receivers and the
routing is updated accordingly. When no change in the net-
work is detected within four times of the hello interval, the
announcing of prefixes stops and only hello messages are
continued to be sent. If an IPsec device stops sending hello
messages it is considered down and all other IPsec devices
delete the according IPsec SAs, SPs and routing entries.
The pre-shared key of the SA is used for advertisement of
the prefixes only. In an improved version of the integration
this pre-shared key can be replaced by the dynamic MIKE
key.
After IDP detects a change in the network, MIKE is in-
formed about it. There are three IDP-to-MIKE messages
defined. One indicates a JOIN of an IPsec device. IDP re-
ports a newly discovered instance on every IPsec device, so
the joining device reports itself, too. The second indicates
a LEAVE event and the third event informs MIKE about
a RESTORE of an IPsec device. A RESTORE occurs if
an IPsec device is reconnected after its network connec-
tion temporary failed. A RESTORE is distinguished from
a restart by the hello messages originating from an already
known device. All hello messages carry a timestamp of
the startup time of the IDP instance. If the timestamp has
changed, a restart must have occurred, otherwise a RE-
STORE event occurred. Restarted IPsec devices are treated
as joining instances.
According to the indication reported by IDP, MIKE ex-
ecutes one of the following steps. If a JOIN event was
triggered, MIKE checks the IP address of the joined mem-
ber. If the IP address of the joining instance matches the
local IP address, the JOIN is executed and the IPsec de-
vice becomes a member of the secure MIKE group. If the
addresses differ, no action is performed. It is necessary
to check the addresses because only the newly discovered
instance can add itself to the MIKE.
The MIKE reacts to a RESTORE event similar as to
a JOIN event. Even if the instance is already in the MIKE
group, the join is executed (rejoin). This is necessary be-
cause the group key may have changed while the IPsec
device was temporarily disconnected. A forced rejoin re-
news the key and assures the proper distribution to all
IPsec devices.
While JOIN and RESTORE event are executed by the newly
(re)discovered instance, the LEAVE event is only processed
by the current MIKE transaction manager. If the TM is
supposed to leave the group itself, it hands over the TM
status to another IPsec device before leaving. After the
handover, the new TM excludes the old one. To put it all
together: a LEAVE detected by IDP triggers the exclusion
of that member out of the MIKE group, thus rendering the
key of the excluded member useless.
After MIKE has finished its operation it informs the IDP
service about it. A short status report is sent, containing
a pointer to the new group key. In a final step, IDP writes
a multicast IPsec SA with the group key MIKE reported.
Establishing the unicast SA and SPs and the multicast SA
is done in parallel, as soon as a change is detected. The
multicast policy is left unchanged, because it has already
set at startup time.
During a bilateral workshop the sketched scenario and inter-
operation functionality was proved within the test-bed [4].
Mainly two test cases were examined:
1) successive addition of new members,
2) successive leave of members.
After each addition or leave the security associations were
checked at the IPsec devices. Joining was performed by
starting up IDP. A leave was simulated by shutting down an
IDP instance. It was possible to produce the same results by
physically disconnecting IPsec devices and reconnect them.
It shows the robustness and applicability of the protocol
combination in tactical networks.
The IDP waits four times of the hello interval before con-
sidering an instance to be down. This is the reason why it
handles flipping connections well. If a connection changes
between the up and down state periodically, this connec-
tion is considered valid. If the connection stays down for
longer than four times of the hello interval, it is considered
down. This prevents unnecessary key updates due to lost
hello datagrams.
6. Measurement setup
To analyze the scalability of our solution, measurements
were conducted. It had to be determined how long it takes
from connecting a network to finishing the setup of the
new group key. The measured time span reached from the
detection of other members of the intercoalition LAN to
the setup of the IPsec SAs at the new device is finished
(Fig. 5).
In a real deployment the IPsec devices are interconnected
through black routers. After an IPsec device is physically
connected to a router, it may take some time until all other
black routers have established routes to the newly connected
network. This delay is not taken into consideration, as is
relies heavily on the used routing protocol and its timeout
parameters.
It is also noted, that communication between different IPsec
devices is only possible, if the SAs are set up at both IPsec
devices. The difference between the set-up times at the
different IPsec devices is called dispersal. The dispersal
depends mainly on network delay and computational speed
of the IPsec devices. It was shown, that dispersal in a lo-
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Fig. 5. Time sequence of a measurement step.
cal 100 Mbit/s Ethernet network with homogenous IPsec
device hardware is minimal for MIKE [5]. Since the ad-
ditional delay imposed by IDP is constant, dispersal in the
IDPMIKE scenario may be also constant.
The test-bed shown in Fig. 3 was adopted for performance
measurements. All devices were interconnected by a switch,
no routers were involved. This simplification was necessary
to minimize routing protocol side effects and dispersal. The
number of clients was increased to ten IPsec devices to bet-
ter show scaling effects. The devices were interconnected
to each other, but IDPMIKE was not started at this point
in time. It simulated, that the devices were not able to
communicate. In a preparation step, two IDPMIKE IPsec
devices were started up. The devices discovered each other
and built up their IPsec SAs. One of them was determined
as monitor. The monitor measured for each IDP opera-
tion how long it takes from detecting a member to IDP
writing the multicast SA. The second IPsec device was re-
sponsible for holding the MIKE transaction manager sta-
Fig. 6. Latency of IDPMIKE.
tus before the actual measurement started. It is important
to have the same device being TM each time a measure-
ment is conducted, to ensure identical conditions for each
measurement step.
Writing the unicast SAs and multicast SAs is done simulta-
neously, when a change in the network is detected. For our
performance evaluation we assured the multicast SA to be
written first. This is done because the focus of our work is
in the establishment of multicast IPsec SAs.
After the preparation has finished, IDPMIKE starts up on
the remaining IPsec devices. The start up is time trig-
gered. All time triggered events were pre-calculated before
the measurements. The monitor logs the time after the SA
was written. After that, the second IP-sec device takes over
the TM status. The group size is increased by starting up
another IDPMIKE device. This is done until all IPsec de-
vices have started up. The difference between the startup
time and the time the SA is plotted in Fig. 6. Ten repetitions
are done resulting in 80 values.
All IPsec devices are time synchronized using the network
time protocol (NTP) [17]. Update interval and an adopted
kernel are utilized to keep time synchronization error
below 1 ms [6].
7. Results
The delay imposed by IDP and MIKE before a secure
connection is established is about 400 ms. In Fig. 6 the
measured delays are drawn. As a second result it is ob-
served that the delay hardly increases when the group be-
comes larger. Indeed the delay increases with a small linear
factor with the group size due to the MIKE key establish-
ment algorithm. But the growth is too little to be visible
is the diagram. The performance of MIKE was analyzed
in [5] in detail. The measure data is reprinted in Fig. 7.
As for a group size of ten, the delay imposed by MIKE
is about 50 ms and will not exceed 80 ms at a group size
of 50 members.
Fig. 7. Delay of MIKE in larger groups.
81
Thorsten Aurisch, Tobias Ginzler, Peter Martini, Roger Ogden, Trung Tran, and Hartmut Seifert
To further investigate the composition of the delay, two
measurement points were analyzed in more detail (Fig. 8).
The communication overhead for signaling changes to
MIKE and the way back is very small. So the interpro-
cess communication is not a bottleneck.
Fig. 8. Delay splitted up.
Surprisingly the vast majority of time is consumed by
deleting the old IPsec multicast SA and writing the new
one. If the duration for writing the unicast SA is taken
into account, the delay is about 200 ms longer. The
Linux setkey command can be used to manually create
IPsec SAs. The time it takes for writing an IPsec SA can
be determined by calling the time command in conjunc-
tion with setkey as shown in Fig. 9. The manual creation
of an IPsec SA took about 200 ms. The result was verified
on different machines. The execution duration is dependant
on the CPU power of the machine.
Fig. 9. Performance of setkey on a 2.53 GHz P4.
In the available, preliminary version of IDP setkey is
called via the system directive. The usage of the PF KEY
API [7] instead of system may lead to smaller delays.
8. Summary
We showed automated network encryption to be manage-
able by combining the discovery algorithm of IDP and the
key management of MIKE. In the test deployment, a full
intercoalition network with all involved components such
as protocol independent multicast routers and IPsec devices
was proven to be working. Our approach enables dynamic
and automated multicast traffic protection. This minimizes
setup times for intercoalition networks. In a later enhance-
ment of the protocol, the pre-shared key used for IDP prefix
advertisement traffic can be replaced by the common group
key supplied by MIKE. We were able to show that adding
a multicast network to an existing coalition network can be
performed within 400 ms with strong security guarantees.
The obtained measurement results indicate that IDP in com-
bination with MIKE scales well with increasing network
size. The delay is expected to be smaller, once a different
interface to set IPsec security associations is used.
References
[1] G. Nakamoto, L. Higgins, and J. Richter, “Scalable HAIPE discovery
using a DNS-like referral mode”, MITRE Corporation, Aug. 2005.
[2] H. Seifert et al., “Interoperable networks for secure communica-
tions II (INSC II) Task 2”, Final Rep., Aug. 2006, p. 6f.
[3] A. Faul, C. Zänker, and M. Zeller, “PMIDP-implementation in
LINUX”, IABG, March 2007.
[4] A. Faul, T. Ginzler, and M. Zeller, “IDP and MIKE interoperation
on LINUX”, IABG and FGAN, July 2007.
[5] T. Ginzler, “Bewertung und Implementierung von Schlüsselman-
agentsystemen in Rechnernetzen”, Diploma thesis, University of
Bonn, 2006.
[6] V. Smotlacha, “One-way delay measurement using NTP”, CESNET,
2003.
[7] D. McDonald, C. Metz, and B. Phan, “RFC 2367 – PF KEY key
management API”, Version 2, The Internet Society, 1998.
[8] B. Fenner, M. Handley, H. Holbrook, and I. Kouvelas, “Protocol
independent multicast – sparse mode (PIM-SM)”, The Internet So-
ciety, Aug. 2006.
[9] T. Aurisch and C. Karg, “A deamon for multicast internet key ex-
change”, in Proc. 28th Ann. IEEE Int. Conf. Loc. Comput. Netw.
LCN’03, Ko¨nigswinter, Germany, 2003, p. 368ff.
[10] T. H. Tran, “Proactive multicast-based IPsec discovery protocol and
multicast extension”, in Proc. IEEE MILCOM 2006 Conf., Washing-
ton, USA, 2006.
[11] H. Harney and C. Muckenhirn, “Request for comments 2093: group
key management protocol (GKMP) architecture”, IETF, 1997.
[12] M. Baugher, B. Weis, T. Hardjono, and T. Harney, “Request for
comments 3747: the group domain of interpretation”, IETF, 2003.
[13] Y. Kim, A. Perrig, and G. Tsudik, “Simple, and fault-tolerant key
agreement for dynamic collaborative groups”, in 7th ACM Conf.
Comput. Commun. Secur., Athens, Greece, 2000, pp. 235–244.
[14] L. Dondeti, S. Mukherjee, and A. Samal, “A distributed group
key management scheme for secure many-to-many communication”,
Tech. Rep. PINTL-TR-207-99, Department of Computer Science,
University of Maryland, 1999.
[15] S. Mittra, “IOLUS: a framework for scalable secure multicast-
ing”, in Proc. ACM SIGCOMM’97 Conf., Cannes, France, 1997,
pp. 277–288.
[16] A. Ballardie, “Request for comments 1949: scalable multicast key
distribution”, IETF, 1998.
[17] D. Mills, “Request for comments 1305: network time protocol (Ver-
sion 3) specification and analysis”, IETF, 1992.
[18] T. Aurisch, “Using key trees for securing military multicast com-
munication”, in Proc. IEEE MILCOM 2004 Conf., Monterey, USA,
2004.
[19] T. Aurisch, “Optimization technique for military multicast key man-
agement”, in Proc. IEEE MILCOM 2005 Conf., Atlantic City, USA,
2005.
82
Automatic multicast IPsec by using a proactive IPsec discovery protocol and a group key management
Thorsten Aurisch received his
diploma degree in physics from
the University of Bonn, Ger-
many, in 1997. Since 1998 he
works as scientist at the Re-
search Establishment for Ap-
plied Science (FGAN). He has
been involved in several na-
tional and international research
projects related to military net-
work design and planning. His
research interests include security in wired and resource-
restricted wireless networks.
e-mail: t.aurisch@fgan.de
Department Communication Systems
Research Establishment for Applied Science (FGAN)
Neuenahrer st 20
D-53343 Wachtberg-Werthhoven, Germany
Tobias Ginzler received his
diploma degree in computer
science from the University of
Bonn, Germany, in 2006. Since
then he works as a scientist
at the Research Establishment
for Applied Science (FGAN)
research facility. He is dedi-
cated to network security and
wireless technologies.
e-mail: ginzler@fgan.de
Department Communication Systems
Research Establishment for Applied Science (FGAN)
Neuenahrer st 20
D-53343 Wachtberg-Werthhoven, Germany
Roger Ogden has a B.Sc. de-
gree in mathematics and a Mas-
ters degree in physics. He has
been employed at SPAWAR
Systems Center in San Diego,
USA, and predecessor orga-
nizations since 1981. He has
worked as a communications
engineer in the area of Fleet
network communications since
1996. He is the project manager
of projects funded by the Office of Naval Research and
the Office of the Secretary of Defense for the development
of emerging networking protocols and implementations
for tactical use especially in the area of secure, highly-
mobile networks and also to better integrate legacy tactical
data links with IP applications.
e-mail: roger.ogden@navy.mil
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center
Hull st 53560
San Diego, CA 92152-5001, USA
Trung Tran has a B.Sc. degree
in electrical engineering. He has
worked at SPAWAR Systems
Center in San Diego, USA,
since 1989 and as a network
communications engineer since
1992. His interests have been
development of protocols and
software applications for secure,
highly-mobile tactical network
communications. He was instru-
mental in the development of applications and implemen-
tations that allowed initial use of military tactical links for
IP networking in the US Fleet. He holds two patents.
e-mail: trung.tran@navy.mil
Space and Naval Warfare Systems Center
Hull st 53560
San Diego, CA 92152-5001, USA
Hartmut Seifert received his
diploma degree in communi-
cations technology from the
Universität der Bundeswehr in
Neubiberg, Germany, in 1979
and was serving afterwards up
to 1987 as a technical offi-
cer within the German Airforce.
Since 1987 he works as a scien-
tist and as a program manager
in several national and interna-
tional research projects related to military network design
and planning, including INSC, at IABG in Ottobrunn.
e-mail: seifert@iabg.de
Industrieanlagen-Betriebsgesellschaft mbH (IABG)
Einsteinstrasse 20
D-85521 Ottobrunn, Germany
Peter Martini – for biography, see this issue, p. 61.
83
Paper
Automatic tactical network node
conﬁguration with XML and SNMP
Marek Małowidzki and Przemysław Bereziński
Abstract— In the paper, we describe a “plug-and-play” con-
ﬁguration of nodes of a tactical network on the basis of XML
conﬁguration templates and a network plan, developed dur-
ing the network planning process. We present the concept
of a conﬁguration repository, an XML-based database that
stores network structure and conﬁguration data, and describe
how the Simple Network Management Protocol is used to ap-
ply the settings to network devices. We also comment on a pos-
sible use of the next-generation NETCONF protocol for such
a task.
Keywords— network management, network configuration, tacti-
cal network, SNMP, NETCONF.
1. Introduction
The typical operation of a tactical network usually consists
of two main phases. The ﬁrst, planning phase, requires
deﬁning all the important details about the network’s con-
ﬁguration: where the nodes are placed, how they are con-
nected, how the underlying networking technologies are
conﬁgured. The second phase, the operation one, assumes
the network is up and running. Between these two phases
the developed plan should be appropriately mapped onto
networking devices and their parameters. This is what the
paper is about – it describes our approach to a transparent,
“plug-and-play” type of network nodes conﬁguration.
The paper is organized as follows. First, we describe the
tactical network. Then, we give an overview of the most
important components that support our approach, namely,
the conﬁguration repository and node conﬁguration tem-
plates. Later in the paper, we discuss the network planning
and conﬁguration processes. We then comment on how we
could beneﬁt from using the network conﬁguration (NET-
CONF) protocol. Finally, we discuss future work and end
the paper with conclusions.
2. The tactical network
The general outline of the network’s architecture is pre-
sented in Fig. 1. The network core is built using asyn-
chronous transfer mode (ATM) technology, which inte-
grates IP traﬃc generated by a management system and
computer networks (local area networks – LANs), and tele-
phone traﬃc coming from integrated services digital net-
work (ISDN) subscribers. Besides, the ATM core provides
some military-speciﬁc quality of service (QoS) features and
improves fault tolerance.
Network nodes are not fully mobile, as they do not work
during motion. Only radio access points (RAPs) and radio
users (RU) are fully mobile and can communicate while in
motion.
Fig. 1. The tactical network.
In this work, we describe the automatic conﬁguration
of the network core, which requires handling the above-
mentioned technologies and their relationships to make the
network function properly. The correct conﬁguration re-
quires a number of various network devices and services
to be conﬁgured.
3. The conﬁguration repository
The conﬁguration repository [1] is a ﬂexible database that
contains information about the tactical network’s structure
and current conﬁguration. The structure is deﬁned in an ex-
tensible markup language (XML) template. The template
describes network objects (link, interface, device, vehicle,
and node types) and their relationships (containment and
connections, e.g., what kind of equipment a given vehicle
contains and how the devices are connected). The reposi-
tory also contains the current network conﬁguration. Ad-
ditionally, the repository provides a number of services for
client applications: MT-safety, state propagation, privileged
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and non-privileged interface, and others. (For more infor-
mation, refer to [1].) Note that the repository is independent
of the network type and may be adapted, through provid-
ing custom templates, for other network types, and even to
other scenarios. In fact, we have used the repository suc-
cessfully in a number of other projects – a recent example
was the implementation of the SecureSOA demonstrator
during the Coalition Warrior Interoperability Demonstra-
tion 2006 (CWID’2006) in Lillehammer, when the reposi-
tory was employed to model tactical situation [2].
The conﬁguration repository is implemented as a Microsoft
.NET 2.0 component and extensively uses XML technology.
The same component is used during network planning and
later, during the management phase.
4. Node conﬁguration templates
The tactical network employs a number of advanced tech-
nologies, and there are a large number of possible con-
ﬁguration settings for every network device. Fortunately,
the number of typical options for inter-node connections is
limited – speaking in other words, only a subset of possible
options may be applied. Thus, it was possible to follow the
approach the conﬁguration repository is based upon and
deﬁne XML node configuration templates for the network.
The templates are used during both network planning and
conﬁguration and they contain a number of XML elements
that automate both processes. They should be prepared
in advance by network management engineers with deep
knowledge of the network equipment.
5. Network planning
Network planning is supported by a dedicated network
planning application (Fig. 2). The application uses the con-
ﬁguration repository to learn the network structure, node,
vehicle and device types, possible connection options, etc.
The application is independent of details, e.g., when the
structure changes, or a new equipment is introduced, usu-
ally only the conﬁguration repository (and also, the node
conﬁguration templates) must be modiﬁed. The application
supports placing nodes on a digital map, conﬁguring their
parameters and links, conﬁguring the network (IP, ATM ad-
dressing; ISDN numbering) and also implements some ad-
vanced features that support radio communication for high
capacity line-of-sight (HCLOS) radio lines and WLANs
(frequency assignment, terrain proﬁles, etc.).
For each network node type, the conﬁguration repository
lists its node external interfaces – if there are any – that is,
the interfaces of the node’s devices that are used to connect
to other nodes. The node conﬁguration templates, on the
other hand, contain a wizard-type sequence of XML ele-
ments that guide through the process of deﬁning the inter-
node connection. These elements, generally, are a sequence
of – usually nested – choices that a network planner makes
to conﬁgure the connection, selecting appropriate values for
Fig. 2. Network planning application.
crucial parameters and going through subsequent choices to
complete the conﬁguration process. For example, conﬁg-
uring HCLOS link between two nodes requires deﬁning
radio line parameters (frequencies, link capacity, modula-
tion) and ATM settings (IMA group settings, signalization
type, signalization side, clock, etc.).
Fig. 3. Use of the XML node conﬁguration templates during
network planning and conﬁguration.
After the planning process has ﬁnished, the network con-
ﬁguration is stored in a binary ﬁle. The ﬁle is delivered
to a network management application, which manages the
whole network. Additionally, for each node, a binary node
configuration file is created. This ﬁle is used by the node
staﬀ to prepare the node to work. Later, the same ﬁle is
used by a node management application. The binary ﬁles
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are generally equivalent to the content of the conﬁguration
repository (for example, a simple .NET serialization may
be used here). The whole process is depicted in Fig. 3.
6. Network node conﬁguration
After the node’s vehicles have been prepared to work in
their destination positions, the staﬀ in every vehicle uses
a wizard-type application called node conﬁguration creator
(NCC) that reads the binary node conﬁguration ﬁle and
conﬁgures network equipment within each vehicle (this is
the initial node conﬁguration phase; however, the same pro-
cess may be applied later, to re-conﬁgure the node if neces-
sary). First, static IP addresses are set through a serial RS-
232C connections. Then, the Simple Network Management
Protocol (SNMP) [3] is used to conﬁgure the devices. In
most cases, the human operator only needs to observe the
conﬁguration process and press an “OK” button a number
of times; sometimes, however, the application asks the oper-
ator to perform some additional tasks manually (e.g., when
a device of an older type needs to be reset after changes
have been applied). Of course, as vehicles are not fully au-
tomated, additional manual actions are necessary, e.g., to
adjust antennas to appropriate azimuths.
The NCC uses the same XML conﬁguration template ﬁle
that has been used during network planning. The template
contains a dedicated entry for every parameter of a given
device type; the entry provides SNMP-related data required
by the application. Figure 4 shows a fragment of the tem-
plate ﬁle that illustrates the idea.
Fig. 4. XML conﬁguration entries related to SNMP.
The NCC is a Microsoft .NET Framework 2.0 appli-
cation that employs the SNMP++.NET [4] open-source
SNMP component. The component is itself based on the
SNMP++ [5] library. SNMPv3 (SNMP version 3, support-
ing authentication and encryption) is the default version
and is used for all devices that support SNMPv3.
The advantage of this approach is that a single, ﬂexible ap-
plication is able to conﬁgure all device types in a uniform
way. In fact, the NCC does not need to diﬀerentiate the de-
vice types, as the conﬁguration algorithm for every device
is the same. Thus, adding another device type to a network
merely requires the conﬁguration template ﬁle to be appro-
priately extended. This is, generally, the same idea that the
conﬁguration repository uses – shifting as much burden as
possible to a template and avoiding changes in software,
even after the network equipment or structure changes.
Unfortunately, there are also some drawbacks. The draw-
backs generally stem from the fact how the SNMP protocol
operates. Most operations involve SNMP tables and their
indexes; also, various parameters (mapped to SNMP vari-
ables) are often interrelated and the order in which they
are set is signiﬁcant. This causes the template to be more
complex and the person who creates the template must be
aware of all these details. Yet another problem are the lim-
ited error reporting capabilities of the SNMP protocol – if
anything goes wrong, it is generally impossible for the ap-
plication to display an informative message about the prob-
lem cause (in one of the SNMP agents we implemented
additional, non-standard error reporting functions, but they
are unavailable in most devices).
As it was mentioned above, the planning and conﬁgura-
tion phases are limited to conﬁguring connections between
nodes and, to some degree, connections between nodes’ ve-
hicles. It is assumed that internal settings within vehicles
(e.g., the way their internal devices cooperate) is ﬁxed with
no need for any changes.
7. The NETCONF
According to [6], the Network Conﬁguration Protocol [7]
provides a means to install, manipulate or delete conﬁgu-
ration of network devices. It uses XML for data encod-
ing and a simple RPC-type request-response model, which
may be implemented atop any transport layer that meets
some criteria. NETCONF is likely to become the standard,
next-generation network management protocol and replace
SNMP in some foreseeable future.
Application of NETCONF in our network would yield
a number of beneﬁts:
• XML technology. With XML and extensible style-
sheet language transformations (XSLT), it would be
possible to prepare conﬁgurations for devices in ad-
vance, during the planning phase. Note that usually,
conﬁgurations for the same device type only diﬀer in
a number of details.
• Conﬁguration management. NETCONF provides
a means to deﬁne multiple conﬁgurations for a de-
vice and then easily switch between them (e.g., re-
turn to a previous one in case of error or pre-planned
change). Additionally, a complete conﬁguration may
be loaded onto and read from a device in a single
step. On the other hand, there is no a similar notion
of “conﬁguration” in SNMP.
• Protocol operation. NETCONF allows a conﬁgu-
ration to be loaded to and read from a device in
a single step. Additionally, NETCONF has better
mechanisms that help synchronizing multiple man-
agers (operating on the same device) and its error
reporting capabilities are far better than in SNMP.
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We believe that NETCONF would further simplify the
whole process. Unfortunately, it is not supported in net-
work devices. One of the possible reasons could be the
fact that the devices often employ embedded systems, with
limited memory and processing capabilities.
8. Future work
Every new network service requires this work to be ex-
tended. User mobility, i.e., the ability to migrate between
various locations and terminal types, requires a number of
services to be properly planned and conﬁgured (LDAP di-
rectory servers, H.323 gatekeepers, ISDN-IP and IP-radio
gateways). This still remains to be done.
Additionally, we consider adding capabilities to conﬁgure
internal interfaces. This would enable to, for example, ini-
tially conﬁgure a freshly produced vehicle. Currently, this
“factory”, default conﬁguration must be applied using other
means.
Yet another issue is the ability to rollback changes in case
of error. This is not implemented. In fact, the only way is
just to conﬁgure a node (or, vehicle) again using a previous
ﬁle.
Finally, the conﬁguration process is currently one-way: it is
possible to “inject” a conﬁguration from the conﬁguration
repository into devices but there is no capability to read
it back (i.e., ﬁll the repository with the current conﬁguration
read from devices).
9. Conclusions
In our tactical network, there are a number of typical net-
work conﬁguration scenarios. Our goal was to support these
scenarios in such a way to automate the network planning
and network conﬁguration processes as far as possible. We
have succeeded to ease the planning phase – although still
some work is required here – and to signiﬁcantly simplify
the conﬁguration phase. The node conﬁguration creator en-
ables easy and quick node conﬁguration and reconﬁgura-
tion. The node staﬀ does not need to be highly skilled
in modern networking technologies and, additionally, the
possibility of introducing human errors is greatly reduced.
As it was mentioned above, additional work is undergo-
ing to extend the planning and conﬁguration process to
include critical node server applications.
The strength of our approach is that it is technology-
independent and could be used for planning and conﬁgura-
tion of other, even signiﬁcantly diﬀerent, network types of
similar complexity. This of course also means that changes
to the current network (e.g., new equipment, new vehicle
or node types, etc.) could be easily addressed.
Our approach assumes that the SNMP protocol is used
for actual conﬁguration of network devices. In fact, we
believe that the approach perfectly complies with the ideas
the NETCONF protocol is based on. Unfortunately, due
to lack of support for NETCONF in network equipment,
employing such a combination is currently impossible.
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Paper Subscriber location
in radio communication nets
Piotr Gajewski, Jan Marcin Kelner, and Cezary Ziółkowski
Abstract— Our aim is to develop the method of location
subscriber to be used in military communication nets. This
method is based on frequency offset measurement. Analytic
description of the Doppler effect creates one of such possibil-
ities. In this paper, an original location subscriber method
is presented. We showed the Maxwell equations solution in
the case of a transmitter continually changing location in re-
lation to a receiver. It makes possible to calculate exactly the
value of the received signal parameters especially frequency
offset. The methodology described in this paper shows that
the Doppler frequency offset value can be used for radio sig-
nal sources location.
Keywords— mobile radio communication, Doppler effect, loca-
tion of radio waves sources.
1. Introduction
Over that last decade, the emerging location service of
electromagnetic waves sources has found numerous appli-
cations in the commercial as well as the military radio
systems. The rapid technological advances have made it
to implement radio navigation, radio communication nets
and military radio electronic recognition. In this paper,
we concentrate on location service of a subscriber in radio
communication nets.
Several methods for subscriber location in radio commu-
nication nets have been already presented [1−3]. Many
researches were focused on development of methods that
allow the application of well-known time-spectrum signal
structure. Some methods do not require the system infor-
mation. Nevertheless, there are few eﬃcient methods for
location of a subscriber in radio communication nets:
– access station identiﬁcation − so-called cell ID or
cell of origin (CoO),
– angle of arrival (AoA),
– time of arrival (ToA),
– time diﬀerence of arrival (TDoA),
– received signal strength (RSS),
– global positioning system (GPS).
Each of foregoing methods have some advantages and some
disadvantages too. In radio communication net, when the
location signal source is an element of this system, few
methods could be applied. If located source is an element
of unknown communication nets, only AoA method could
be used. In this case, direction determination of electro-
magnetic wave source requires complex receiving antenna
system and equipment.
Disadvantages of foregoing methods make diﬃcult for prac-
tical utilization. These factors have motivated the develop-
ment of new subscriber location methods in communication
nets. Analytic description of the Doppler eﬀect creates one
of such possibilities.
In [4] we showed the Maxwell equations solution in the
case of a transmitter continually changing location in re-
lation to a receiver. The obtained solution presents the
exact description of the received signal parameters that re-
sult from the location change between a transmitter and
a receiver. The analytic description of this problem makes
it possible to calculate exactly the value of the received
signal parameters especially frequency oﬀset.
An original location method is derived using analytical ex-
pression for frequency oﬀset. In this paper, our aim is to
described method of subscriber location that can be used
in military communication nets. This method bases on fre-
quency oﬀset measurement.
2. Analytic description
of the Doppler eﬀect
The analytic description of the Doppler eﬀect results from
solution of Maxwell equations for space stationary system
included signal source and signal receiver. In classical ap-
proach to this problem the formula of the electric ﬁeld
strength for a far-ﬁeld region presents the basis for the de-
scription of the object location change. In the case of the
half wavelength dipole as an antenna, the temporary value
of the electric ﬁeld strength is given by (cf. [5]):
E(t) = iµ0 f0 I0β r
cos((pi2 )cosθ )
sinθ e
i(ω0t−β r) , (1)
where: f0 – the signal frequency, ω0 = 2pi f0, β = 2pi/λ =
ω0/c – the wave number (λ – wavelength, c – speed of
light), µ0 – the magnetic permeability of free-space, θ – the
elevation angle, I0 – the amplitude of the antenna current,
and r – denotes distance (in general) between transmitter
and receiver.
Therefore the phase angle Φ0(t) is following:
Φ0(t) = 2pi f0t−β r . (2)
When the transmitter is moving and it is covering a dis-
tance δ r then the phase is changing due to change of the
value r, namely:
Φ(t) = 2pi f0t −β (r∓ δ r) , (3)
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(when the signal source is moving from the receiver the
sign is “+”, whereas when transmitter is moving toward
the receiver the sign is “−”).
In the case of constant velocity of motion v the increase
of distance amounts δ r = vt, thus the change of signal fre-
quency is described by the following dependence (cf. [6]):
f (t) = 1
2pi
d
dt Φ(t) =
d
dt
(
f0t− β r2pi ±
v
λ t
)
= f0 ± vλ . (4)
If the signal source moves towards the position of the re-
ceiver at an angle ϕ then:
f (t) = f0 + vλ cosϕ . (5)
The frequency fD = (v/λ )cosϕ is called the Doppler fre-
quency.
In the case of free space, the Faraday and the Ampere equa-
tions as well as the property of vector ﬁeld double rotation
are the basis for the following wave equation describing the
vector of the electric ﬁeld strength:
E(x,t) =
[
Ex(x,t),Ey(x,t),Ez(x,t)
]
,
1
c2
∂ 2
∂ t2 E(x,t)−∆E(x,t) =−µ0
∂
∂ t i0(x,t) , (6)
where: x = (x,y,z) is the space coordinate, i0(x,t) =(
ix(x,t), iy(x,t), iz(x,t)
)
is the vector of current density
(distribution of current in antenna − source of the electro-
magnetic ﬁeld), ∆ = ∂
2
∂x2 +
∂ 2
∂y2 +
∂ 2
∂ z2 − Laplacian.
In [4] we have concentrated on two considerations:
– the linear antenna system, i.e., we assume that the
current density vector has the form
i0(x,t) = (0,0, iz(x,t) = i0(t) · I(z) ·δ (x) ·δ (y)) , (7)
– the motion of signal source model in x coordinate
direction with v velocity.
Thus the problem has been reduced to solve the following
second orders partial diﬀerential equation:
1
c2
∂ 2
∂ t2 E(x,t)+ ∆E(x,t)
=−µ0
∂
∂ t [i0(t) · I(z) ·δ (x− vt) ·δ (y)] .
(8)
The solution of the above equation has been carried out
in two stages. Firstly, we have found the fundamental so-
lution of the Eq. (8). To solve the distribution wave equa-
tion we used the integral transformations, i.e., the Laplace
transform (in relation to normalized time variable) and
the Fourier transform (in relation to space variables).
The original form of the analysis problem solution has
been calculated by applying the Cagniard-deHoop method.
The solution of analysis problem is the convolution of the
fundamental solution with the function describing current
space distribution.
The analytic form of the phase of electric ﬁeld generated
by moving transmitter is ([4]):
Φ(x,t) = ω1t−β1kx−β1R0(x,t)− pi2 , (9)
where: k = v/c , β1 = ω1/c = β/(1− k2) ,
ω1 = ω0/(1− k2) = 2pi f0/(1− k2) ,
R0(x,t) =
√
(x− vt)2 +(1− k2) · (y2 + z2) .
Hence, the instantaneous frequency f (x,t) is expressed as
follows:
f (x,t) = 1
2pi
d
dt Φ(x,t)
=
f0
1− k2 −
f0
c(1− k2)
d
dt R0(x,t) .
(10)
So, the Doppler frequency expresses the following depen-
dence:
fD(x,t) = f (x,t)− f0 = k1− k2
[
k + x− vt
R0(x,t)
]
f0 . (11)
Then, we notice that the value of the Doppler frequency
fD(x,t) depends not only on signal source velocity and car-
rier frequency but also on mutual space location of a signal
source and a receiver. Notice the fD(x,t) linear depen-
dence on the frequency carrier, whereas the dependence on
velocity and space coordinate has a more complex char-
acter. Location calculation are made on the basis of the
above formula and the described value of Doppler fre-
quency shifts as a function of movement and coordinates of
signal source parameters. The frequency temporary value
f (x,t) = f0 + fD(x,t) measurement over mobile station is
the basis of the new method of the subscriber location.
3. New location method of radio signals
sources
The illustration of the subscriber location methodology is
shown in Fig. 1. Measurement of the Doppler frequency
oﬀset is base of this method.
The Doppler curves for ﬁve diﬀerent locations of subscriber
(station) are presented in Fig. 2. The diverse courses of
the Doppler curves (Fig. 2) are characteristic for each sub-
scriber location. It determinates methodology of the fre-
quency oﬀset value using to three-dimensional location.
Basing on Eq. (11) formulas of the subscriber location in-
dividual x, y, z coordinates relative to initial mobile station
location can be obtained. In case of the mobile station is
moving at ﬁxed altitude (y = const), then it should mark
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Fig. 1. Space structure of the mutually mobile station and ﬁve
station locations.
Fig. 2. Diverse courses of the Doppler curves as function of
the mobile station to subscriber vt − x distance for ﬁve diﬀerent
subscriber locations.
only two x and z coordinates. After elementary transforma-
tion of the expression (11) for two moments t1 and t2 the
formulas describing x and z coordinates are following:



x = v
t1A(t1)− t2A(t2)
A(t1)−A(t2)
,
z =±
√√√√√
[
v(t1− t2)A(t1)A(t2)
A(t1)−A(t2)
]2
1− k2 − y
2 ,
(12)
where:
A(t) =
√
1−F2(t)
F(t)
,
F(t) =
fD(t)
f0
1− k2
k − k.
(13)
This methodology and also method of bearing and three-
dimensional location has been described in patent applica-
tion [7].
4. Results and discussion
Noise and limited precision of the parameters measurement
limit a precision of this method. Analysis of the measure-
ment errors inﬂuence is conducted by following assump-
tions: x = (x,y,z) = (20,0.5,10) km − located station posi-
tion relative mobile station, v = 200 km/h − mobile station
velocity, f0 = 900 MHz − transmitted signal frequency,
∆ f =1 Hz − frequency absolute error.
The Doppler curves for foregoing foundations are presented
in Fig. 3.
Fig. 3. Courses of the Doppler curves as function of the vt−x.
In order to perform precision evaluation of this location
methodology, following new quality measure was intro-
duced:
∆r =
√
(∆x)2 +(∆z)2
=
√
|x− x˜|2 + |z− z˜|2 ,
(14)
where: x˜, z˜ − station position coordinates calculated from
formulas (12), x, z, − real coordinates.
Fig. 4. The script of numeric calculations − the orthographical
projection of the movement measuring receiver set trajectory in
relation to radio signal source.
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Figure 4 shows graphic explanation of introduced quanti-
ties.
Figures 5−9 present measures x˜, z˜, ∆x, ∆z and ∆r change as
function of the vt−x mobile station to subscriber distance.
Fig. 5. Courses of changes x˜ as function of the vt −x.
Fig. 6. Courses of changes z˜ as function of the vt−x.
Fig. 7. Courses of changes ∆x as function of the vt−x.
Fig. 8. Courses of changes ∆z as function of the vt −x.
Fig. 9. Courses of changes ∆r as function of the vt−x.
5. Conclusions
The methodology introduced in this paper shows that the
Doppler frequency oﬀset value could be used for radio sig-
nal sources location. Coordinates of these sources can be
calculated basing on the frequency oﬀset of the received
signal at two diﬀerent measurement moments. The limited
area of eﬀective measurement of frequency, where source
coordinates can be determined, results in the Doppler
curves course character. These limitations impose mea-
surements exercise methodology in practice. The location
range area is determined by change of measurement pa-
rameters, e.g., velocity value and movement trajectory of
receiver.
Fundamentally, location precision is conditioned by: pre-
cision of the frequency oﬀset value and the Doppler fre-
quency range as well as the distance from transmitter to
receiver at a moment of the measurement. In practice, pre-
sented method is determined by foregoing factors.
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